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My dissertation explores the historical origins, development, and transformations of 
Colonial Policy Studies, an academic discipline in Japan in the era of imperialism, through the 
writings of its three leading scholars, Nitobe Inazō, Yanaihara Tadao, and Tōbata Seiichi. 
Founded at Sapporo Agricultural College in Hokkaido, this new, academic discipline took a more 
systematized form when Nitobe established it at Tokyo Imperial University in 1909. Until 1945, 
when the Japanese empire collapsed, the discipline provided Japanese society with a basic 
framework through which they defined colony, colonization, and colonial policy, and legitimized 
Japanese colonization as a universal phenomenon of the time.  
Previous studies have dealt with the three economists within a binary framework of 
ethical judgment, namely, whether they were internationalists believing in benefits of empire or 
imperialists advocating exploitation. By placing the colonial policy scholars in the discursive 
context of their times, my dissertation demonstrates how these opposing terms were, in fact, 
mutually implicated in their attempts to explain, legitimate, and sometimes criticize Japan’s 
expanding colonial enterprise. Moreover, my study elucidates the continuities that link the 
conceptual assumptions and theoretical foundations of the three scholars and lend the discipline 
an internal coherence. 
Each of the three scholars represents a distinctive phase in modern Japanese history: 
Nitobe representing the “nationalist” 1910’s, Yanaihara, the “internationalist” 1920’s and 1930’s, 
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and Tōbata, the “militarist” late 1930’s and the early 1940’s. This discursive analysis of their 
lecture notes, monographs, scholarly pieces, and policy papers for the Japanese government 
demonstrates that they all advocated colonization in some form as an engine of development 
leading to a greater good, and all believed that empire could be disentangled from imperialism as 
exploitation, whether in the present or in an imagined future. All three saw colonization as an 
encounter between different societies with different stages of economic development and as the 
collective efforts of these societies to utilize all available resources to the maximum to increase 
human wealth, freedom, and equality for the benefit of all. Ultimately, I show that they served to 
legitimate and veil Japan’s actual exploitative colonial policies by claiming colonization to be 


















Colonial Policy Studies (Shokuminseisakugaku or Shokumin’gaku) is a modern Japanese 
academic discipline, which was established at the beginning of the Japanese empire in the late 
19th century1 and abolished with the collapse of the empire in 1945. In the beginning, the 
discipline started as a class in the Faculty of Agriculture at Sapporo Agricultural College 
(Sapporo nōgakō) in Hokkaido. The class was called Agricultural Policy and Colonial Policy 
(nōseigaku oyobi shokuminsaku) in 1887 and Colonial History (shokuminshi) in 1890. Later, in 
1907, it grew to the status of an independent expanded curriculum, titled Colonial Studies 
(shokumin-gaku). The main subject of the discipline in this period was “internal” colonization 
focusing on the agricultural development of Hokkaido, the northern periphery of Japan.  
The discipline made a big stride forward in 1909, when its center moved from Hokkaido 
to Tokyo. Nitobe Inazō (1862-1933), a graduate of Sapporo Agricultural College, founded 
Colonial Policy Studies in the Faculty of Law at Tokyo Imperial University, with the help of 
Gōtō Shinpei, the then head of civilian affairs in the colonial government of Taiwan, and other 
political and business leaders of Japan. By that time, Nitobe already had established himself as a 
well-known pacifist and internationalist scholar and had once served as a government bureaucrat 
in the Meiji period. It was at this juncture that Colonial Policy Studies emerged as a powerful 
discourse set and institution in imperial Japan. Under the leadership of Yanaihara in the 1920s, 
                                           
1 See the Appendix for a chronology of Japanese colonialism. 
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the new academic discipline was systemized; its textbooks were published, the curriculum was 
solidified, and the programs were funded by the Japanese government. In this period, the 
discipline became even more closely related to economics, particularly, studies on the 
international economy. 
In the late 1930s and early 1940s, the discipline made another transformation; it 
developed into a part of area studies departments focusing on Asian countries. As Japan occupied 
a portion of China, including Manchuria, and later some South East Asian countries through war 
with Western imperial powers, Colonial Policy Studies became integrated with several 
disciplines in the human and social sciences, such as history, linguistics, ethnography, 
anthropology, and medicine, under the name of Colonial Studies (shokumin-gaku). Colonial 
Studies, once an academic field primarily addressing the agricultural economy of colonies, was 
expanded into interdisciplinary area studies on Asia at that time. 
After 1945, Colonial Policy Studies was abolished along with the demise of the Japanese 
empire, but the academic tradition managed to continue, as some of its classes were taught under 
the name of International Economy (kokusai keizaigaku). Eventually, in 1952, the old discipline 
was reconstructed as International Relations studies at Tokyo University by combining 
International Economy and International Politics (kokusai seijigaku), which became the 
theoretical foundation for Japan’s foreign development assistance programs.  
Colonial Policy Studies has wielded a significant discursive power in Japanese society 
throughout the modern era until the present day. In pre-1945, it provided Japanese people with 
terms and a framework to theorize and define colonial relations between Japan and its colonial 
and occupied territories as well as to enact and to legitimize the Japanese imperial project. After 
1945, this system of colonial knowledge continued to provide the intellectual and ideological 
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ground on which Japanese people characterized the relationship between Japan and its 
neighboring developing countries; this system also became the basis for establishing 
international organizations to manage relationships in the region.  
As historian Alexis Dudden shows in her book, Japan’s Colonization of Korea: 
Discourse and Power,2 the history of Japanese imperialism was not only about colonial politics 
and ruling institutions, but also about the discursive legitimization of empire. Japanese 
aggrandizers in the transformative Meiji era (1868-1912), the period of Japan’s modern nation-
building, realized the necessity of defining their colonial policies in mutually referential terms of 
law, that is, international law, if they were to gain full legitimacy for Japan as a colonizing nation 
in the international politics of imperialism: “Colonizing politics were above all a reflexive 
process,” as Dudden states. Therefore, the Japanese leaders expended a great deal of effort to 
make their territorial expansion through colonization, as in the annexation of Korea, legal in the 
eyes of the international community. This discursive project of the Meiji leaders, demonstrating 
Japanese colonization as a recognized practice of the day, was an important factor in the making 
of modern imperial Japan.  
This dissertation explores the history of Colonial Policy Studies, which, as an academic 
project of Japanese political and intellectual leaders, had as much discursive power as the 
language of international law. The leaders attempted to legitimate Japan’s imperialist claims 
within Japan and abroad with this new discipline – a discipline that “confirmed by its logic that 
the Japanese knowledgeably controlled their colonies.” In other words, Colonial Policy Studies 
explained to both the Japanese and the world, “how Japan’s empire engaged with and also was 
                                           




upheld by the prevailing international political science of the day.”3 
The founder of Colonial Policy Studies, Nitobe Inazō, was well aware of this 
legitimating effect of the new discipline. As will be seen in Chapter 1 in this dissertation, he 
expected the system of knowledge to “create a foundation for disseminating colonial knowledge 
to the Japanese people”4 for the benefit of the Japanese nation. In 1910, when Nitobe witnessed 
the official annexation of Korea by Japan,5 a “historic” event signaling the rise of Japan as one 
of the legitimate imperial world powers, he pronounced his view that the most urgent priority 
was to standardize Japanese colonial knowledge with a “scientific and practical approach, 
reflecting the contemporary trends of colonization.” Lamenting the fact that even the term, 
colony, had not been interpreted in Japan according to the “international standard” of the field, 
Nitobe, as the first chair of the new department at the most prestigious university in Japan, 
presented a universal definition of colony and explained Japanese colonization as one instance of 
internationally accepted practices at that time. In his colonial theory, Japanese control of Korea 
was legitimated as a commonly shared set of colonial practices, comparable to the British 
colonization of India and colonial activities of other imperialist powers. 
From the beginning, Colonial Policy Studies placed great emphasis on acquainting the 
Japanese people with the “international trends” of colonialism and demonstrating the universality 
and contemporaneity of their colonial project by employing international terms. The discipline 
aimed to offer the Japanese people a standardized vocabulary of colonization with which they 
could communicate with each other and with the people of other countries, including those living 
                                           
3 Ibid., 132. 
4 Kaneko Fumio, “Nihon no Shokumin Seisakugaku no Seiritsu to Tenkai,” Kikan Sanzenri, no. 41 (February, 
1985): 73. 
5 The Japanese colonization of Korea was possible through an over-a-decade-long process of legitimization, from 
1895, by which the Japanese political leaders strove to gain approval for their colonization in the international 
society of Western imperial counterparts. Dudden, The Japanese Colonization of Korea.  
5 
 
in the lands that they colonized. The new academic discipline helped to make these terms a part 
of public discourse in Japanese society, and it also presented Japanese colonization to 
international society as part of a broader world political field in which all the Western Powers 
operated at that time. 
The colonial policy scholars addressed in this dissertation, Nitobe Inazō, Yanaihara 
Tadao (1893-1961), and Tōbata Seiichi (1899-1983),6 each of whom filled the chair of Colonial 
Policy Studies at Tokyo Imperial University in succession (Nitobe, from 1909-1918, Yanaihara, 
from 1921-1937, and Tōbata, from 1939-1945), all intended to describe the Japanese empire as 
part of the larger current of world empires. First, they endeavored to define colonization in 
general as a universal project with a mission to benefit all of humanity, and then argued that the 
Japanese project could make a contribution to this larger mission of colonization. More 
specifically, they characterized the ultimate purpose of colonization as “development” (hatten, or 
betterment) for all humanity and, to fulfill this purpose, they identified inter- and transnational 
cooperative economic development (kaihatsu, or the utilization of all resources) under the 
principle of mutual aid as most critical. They promoted the idea of forging cooperative economic 
relationships among colonizing countries or between colonizing and colonized countries. 
Although their specific discussions about the extent and range of such development and the 
mechanism by which such development would happen varied depending on the historical 
contexts and theoretical frameworks in which each scholar operated, they all converged along 
                                           
6 In academia, his last name, 東畑, has been read in two ways, Tōbata and Tōhata. The National Diet Library in 
Japan uses Tōbata, while the Library of Congress in U.S. uses both Tōhata and Tōbata. Because he lived in Japan 
and all his published books are from Japan, I use Tōbata, following the National Diet Library authorities. Refer to 
Web NDL Authorities, 
http://id.ndl.go.jp/auth/ndla/?qw=%E6%9D%B1%E7%95%91%E7%B2%BE%E4%B8%80&g=all and Library of 
Congress’ filing, which goes, 100 1_ |a Tōhata, Seiichi, |d 1899-1983; 400 1_ |a Tōbata, Seiichi, |d 1899-1983; 400 
1_ |a 東畑精一, |d 1899-1983. 
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parallel lines to inscribe Japanese colonization as a universal practice of humanity historically 
verified and commonly understood – that is to say, a cooperative human activity for the 
betterment of all.  
Such an idealist and internationalist idea in the sense of emphasizing cooperation of 
international communities resulted in a very interesting consequence for the theory and practice 
of these colonial studies scholars: the producers of the language of colonization legitimizing 
Japanese empire often became critics of its specific policies in certain contexts. Any colonial 
project prioritizing the benefit of the metropole to the detriment of the colony was met with 
criticism by these scholars as an “imperialist” or “exploitative” policy which, according to them, 
would damage international cooperation. This seemingly contradictory position taken by the 
Colonial Policy Studies scholars ultimately produced two opposing images of them: as 
imperialists (teikokushugisha) who actually served as propagandists for the Japanese empire, or 
as internationalists (kokusaishugisha) who genuinely disapproved of unfair colonial policies. 
This is the main reason why the previous scholarship on the discipline has confined 
these protagonists within a restrictive binary division, in which it has attempted to define them 
exclusively as either imperialist or internationalist.7 Therefore, the fact that these two 
contradictory ideas are theoretically linked and logically coexist in their texts has been 
                                           
7 Asada Kyōji, Nihon Shokuminchi Kenkyū Shiron (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1990); Tanaka Shin’ichi, “Shokumin Seisaku 
to Nitobe,” in Sapporoshi Kyōiku Iinkai Bunka Shiryōshitsu, eds., Nitobe Inazō (Hokkaido Shinbunsha, 1985); 
Sharlie C. Ushioda, “Man of Two Worlds: An Inquiry into the Value System of Inazō Nitobe (1862-1933),” in 
Hilary Conroy and T. Scott Miyakawa, eds., East Across the Pacific (Santa Barbara: ABC Clio Press, 1972); 
Thomas Burkman, “Nitobe Inazō: From World Order to Regional Order,” in J. Thomas Rimer, ed., Culture and 
Identity: Japanese Intellectuals during the Interwar Years (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990); Miwa 
Kimitada, “Crossroads of Patriotism in Imperial Japan: Shiga Shigetaka (1863-1927), Uchimura Kanzō (1861-1930), 
and Nitobe Inazō (1962-1933),” Ph. D. diss., Princeton University (1967); George Masaaki Oshiro, “Internationalist 
in Prewar Japan: Nitobe Inazō, 1862-1933,” Ph. D. diss. University of British Columbia (Canada, 1985); Ōta Yūzō, 
“Taiheiyō no Hashi” toshite no Nitobe Inazō (Misuzu Shobo, 1986); Kang Sang-Jung, “Shakai Kagakusha no 
Shokumin Ninshiki: Shokumin Seisaku to Orientalism,” in Sakai Naoki, Yamanouchi Yasushi et al., eds., Nihon 
Shakai Kagaku no Shisō (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1993); Yi Gyu Soo, “Kŭndae Ilbon ŭi Sikmin Chŭngch’aek e nat’anan 
Chosŭn Insik,” Asia Munhwa Yŏngu, vol. 26 (2012). 
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overlooked, or simply forgotten by previous scholars. The existing literature often resolved the 
alleged ambiguity in Nitobe Inazō’s and Yanaihara Tadao’s discourses by deeming their 
internationalist dimension as a product not of their theoretical logic but of their practical strategy. 
In the previous scholarship on Colonial Studies, the critical positions that these two took toward 
some colonial policies were just seen as an anomaly, an exception, or an intentional/unintentional 
rupture with their own theory. More specifically, in the face of the coexistence of imperialism 
and internationalism within the discourse of Colonial Policy scholars, previous studies have 
concluded that it was a “theoretical retreat forced by the militarist social atmosphere” (Nitobe)8 
and a “theoretical error” (Yanaihara).9 In the case of Tōbata Seiichi, who played a crucial role in 
articulating the economic aspects of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere policy during 
wartime Japan in the late 1930s and early 1940s, only his postwar internationalist thought and 
activities have been highlighted, while his earlier experience as a colonial scholar has been 
largely forgotten. 
In fact, a few recent studies take a less binary approach to the discourse of Colonial 
Policy Studies.10 By historicizing its internationalist rhetoric – “colonization as an international 
economic community for development of all” – in the context of the Japanese empire, they 
actually identify the Janus-faced co-existence of internationalism and imperialism at its 
foundations, and show the ambiguity of the academic discipline that supported “liberalist 
transnationalism” in the 1920s while endorsing colonization. But in this new trend of critical 
                                           
8 Asada, Nihon Shokuminchi Kenkyū Shiron, 181. 
9 Ibid., 371. 
10 Sakai Tetsuya, Kindai Nihon no Kokusai Chitsujoron (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2007); “The Political Discourse 
of International Order in Modern Japan: 1868-1945,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 9:2 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008); Michael Schneider, “The Future of the Japanese Colonial Empire, 1914-1931,” Ph.D. diss., 
University of Chicago (1996); Nakano Ryōko, Beyond the Western Liberal Order: Yanaihra Tadao and Empire as 
Society (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Morita Ryōji, “Nihon Shakai Kagaku to Shokuminchi Ajia,” Ph. D diss., Osaka 
University (Osaka, 2000); “Tōbata Seiichi no Philippine: ‘Shokumin Seisakugaku’ kara ‘Chiiki Kenkyū’e no 
Tenkai,” Shakai Shisōshi Kenkyū, no. 21 (1997). 
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studies, mainly originating from the field of International Relations studies, Colonial Policy 
Studies has been examined only as part of the genealogy for their own field of International 
Relations. As a result, rather than studying the entire period of Japanese empire, these studies 
concentrate on a specific time frame, particularly, on Yanaihara in the 1920s, to show the 
“unfortunate” transition from “liberalist transnationalism” to “hegemonic regionalism.” More 
importantly, they tend to idealize Yanaihara’s conceptualization of the liberalist development of 
Japanese empire, which, as they suggest, could have been realized without political disruptions 
like the Manchurian Incident. They even directly link Yanaihara’s liberalist transnationalism in 
the 1920s to today’s democratic globalism.  In doing so, they turn a blind eye to the 
instrumental role of his theory, which served as a bridge between the theories of Nitobe and 
Tōbata justifying Japanese imperialism. Consequently, their studies actually end up largely 
staying within the binary framework of the previous studies.  
My dissertation argues that if we explore theoretical linkages among the three 
protagonists of Colonial Policy Studies, whose academic careers spanned more than three 
decades, and look into the discursive structure that they “collectively” built, we can overcome 
the binary “either/or” approach that has divided commentators on whether each of these colonial 
policy scholars was internationalist or imperialist, an approach that has hindered a 
comprehensive and systematic understanding of their theory. Rather, a close analysis of core 
assumptions, main categories, theoretical breakdowns, and key concepts extensively employed in 
their texts (such as lecture notes, monographs, scholarly pieces in academic journals, and policy 
papers for Japanese government), as well as a clear revelation of their organizational 
configurations and discursive strategies will show that, in the work of these colonial scholars, the 
two ideas, imperialist and internationalist, were never placed in opposition to one another; 
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instead they were actually integrated in their discursive world.  
Moreover, this more discursive analysis helps to capture the theoretical consistency and 
coherence among the three scholars in a clear way. While what these three had to say here and 
there about specific colonial policies varied, mostly due to the fact that they were situated in 
different political contexts – that is, Nitobe in the era of “nationalism” in the 1910’s, Yanaihara in 
the era of “liberalist internationalism” in the 1920s and early 1930s, and Tōbata in the era of 
“wartime hegemonic regionalism” in the late 1930s and early 1940s – they shared a common 
discursive structure in which they used the language of Smithian modern economics, theorized 
colonization through universal terminology as a vehicle to the progress of humanity, and 
compared and contrasted the Japanese imperial project with contemporary Western practices.  
Both Nitobe and Yanaihara were critics of Japanese assimilation policy, which 
prioritized the benefit of the metropole and would possibly sacrifice that of the colonies, because 
it politically undermined the Smithian ideal of international economic cooperation. While their 
criticism would seem at first sight to claim Japanese empire to be illegitimate, in reality, the 
opposite was true; at the core of their discursive world, Japanese colonialism was fundamentally 
described as a universal project in which all humankind should participate – and as an 
internationally validated practice of the times that was carried out by other imperial powers as 
well. The specific colonial problems that Japan faced were often depicted as comparable to those 
that other imperialists also encountered. Regardless of the fact that Nitobe and Yanaihara 
criticized Japanese assimilation policy, or Tōbata advocated it in a different political atmosphere, 
namely, the wartime period of total mobilization, their theories were all consistent and 
comparable in their entanglement of internationalist and imperialist perspectives. 
My approach, revealing the theoretical foundations of Colonial Policy Studies through a 
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discursive analysis, aims to overcome another binary that pervades the discourse of and about 
Japanese imperialism – a binary that can be regarded as even more significant in light of its 
lingering effect on today’s international relations between Japan and the countries that were 
liberated from its colonial rule in 1945, most notably, Korea: whether Japanese colonization was 
developmental or exploitative. Put differently, the existing studies on Japanese imperialism have 
asked whether the countries colonized by Japan benefitted from, more specifically, were 
modernized by, Japanese rule or were so exploited that their path to modernity was derailed.11 
This question has arisen frequently in both political and public spheres, creating heated 
controversies in academic circles as well as causing unceasing political and diplomatic conflict 
between the two sides. 
Such a question, sometimes expressed in a broader form of discussion about the nature 
of Japanese colonialism, became a major academic topic in the 1960s and 1970s, in the midst of 
the Cold War, when modernization theory was imported from the U.S to the Asian countries in 
                                           
11 According to a Korean historian, Lee Sŭng Ryul, there are three types in the studies on the nature of Japanese 
colonialism: (1) Perspective of Exploitation (Sut’alron 収奪論) focusing on exploitation of Japan’s rule, some of 
which are, Cho Kijun, Han’guk Chabonjuŭi Sŏngnipsaron (Seoul: Taewangsa, 1973); Han’guk Kiupgasa 
(Pak’yŏngsa: 1973); “Ilche Singminji T’ongch’ihaŭi Minjokjabon,” Hanguk Kŭndaesaron 1 (Chisiksanŭpsa: 1977); 
Kang Man’gil, Chosŏn Hugi Sangŏp Chabon ŭi Paltal (Seoul: Koryŏ Taehakkyo Ch’ulp’anbu, 1974); Kim Yongsŏp, 
Chosŏn Hugi Nongŏpsa Yŏn’gu, 2 vols. (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1974); Hŏ Su-yŏl, Kaebal ŭpnŭn Kaebal (Seoul:Ŭnhaeng 
Namu, 2005). (2) Perspective of Colonial Modernization (Singminji Kŭndaehwaron 植民地近代化論) focusing on 
the colony’s development under Japan’s rule, some of which are, Nakamura Satoru, An Pyŭng-Jik, et. al. eds., 
Chosen Kindai no Rekishi Zō (Nihon Hyōronsha, 1988); An Pyŭng-Jik, Lee Dae-Gŭn, Nakamura Satoru, et. al. eds., 
Kŭndae Josŭn ŭi Kyŭngje Kujo (Seoul: Pibong Ch’ulpansa, 1989); An Pyŭng-Jik and Nakamura Satoru, eds., 
Kŭndae Josŭn Kongŭphwa ŭi Yŭngu: 1930-1945 Nyŭn (Seoul: Iljo’gak, 1993); Lee Yŏng-Hun, Matsumoto 
Takenori, et. al. eds., Kŭndae Chosŭn ŭi Suri Chohap ŭi Suri Chohap Yŭngu (Seoul: Iljo’gak, 1992); Lee Yŏng-Hun, 
“Oe Tasi Haebang Chŏnhusa in’ga,” Haebang Chŏnhusa ŭi Chaeinsik 1 (Seoul: Ch’aek Sesang, 2006); James Palais, 
“Nationalism: Good or Bad?” Hyung Il Pai and Timothy R. Tangherlini eds., Nationalism and the Construction of 
Korean Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Carter J. Eckert, Offspring of Empire: The 
Koch'ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876-1945 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1991). (3) Perspective of Colonial Modernity (Shingminji Kŭndaehwaron 植民地近代性論) focusing on the 
coexistance of development and exploitation, some of which are, Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., 
Colonial Modernity in Korea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999); Yun Hae-Dong, Singminji ŭi 
Hoesaek Chidae: Han’guk ŭi Kŭndaesŏng kwa Singminjuŭi Pip’an (Seoul: Yŏksa Pip’yŏngsa, 2003); Yun Hae-
Dong, et. al. eds., Kŭndae rŭl Tasi Ingnŭnda: Hanʼguk Kŭndae Insik ŭi Saeroun p’aerŏdaim ŭl wihayŏ (Seoul: 
Yŏksa Pip’yŏngsa, 2006). For the details, see Lee Sŭng Ryul, “‘Singminji Kŭnda’ron kwa Minjokchuŭi,” Yŏksa 
Pip’yŏng, no. 80 (Yŏksa Munje Yŏnguso, 2007).  
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the “free” world. In modernization theory, which played a propagandistic role in articulating the 
superiority of the capitalist “free” world to the communist bloc, capitalist economic development 
and Western-styled industrialization were described as the norm and even as the final destination 
of human development. Thus, under the rubric of the intellectual scheme that elevates the status 
of capitalist development as universal progress, its historical origins in the then developing 
countries came under scholarly scrutiny. Some claimed that the countries that had been Japan’s 
colonies owed their contemporary capitalist development to the period of Japanese colonial rule. 
Opposing this claim, scholars in the countries that had been Japan’s colonies, particularly in 
Korea, many of whom were motivated by nationalist sentiment, argued that Japan’s rule had 
actually prevented Korean capitalism from developing an autonomous path. During the colonial 
period, they maintained, the Korean economy was subordinated to the Japanese economy for 
Japan’s benefit, and the indigenously driven development of Korean capitalism was distorted due 
to this exploitative economic structure.  
I do not intend to deeply engage with this debate, nor position myself on either side. 
Rather than determining which side in the debate is closer to historical reality, instead, I would 
like to focus on the form the debate has taken – the binary discursive framework of 
“development or exploitation” itself, within which the nature of Japanese colonialism has been 
discussed. In Chapter 2 and 3 in this dissertation, I will show that the framework was created 
during the Japanese colonial period by colonial policy scholars. Nitobe, Yanaihara, and Tōbata 
all emphasized the developmental dimension of colonization first by providing a general 
definition of colonization as the cooperative efforts of humanity for the development of all. 
However, they also noted that this general nature of colonization could be expressed differently, 
namely, taking a more exploitative form, in certain specific historical contexts or cases. Of 
12 
 
course, they all attempted to deemphasize its exploitative dimension by imagining the possibility 
of colonization as development without exploitation. Such imaginary colonization, based on the 
affirmation that “colonization is development for all,” became the very ground on which the 
binary framework of “development or exploitation” was built.  
 The framework was firstly created by Nitobe. Trained at Sapporo Agricultural College 
in Hokkaido and inspired by its frontier mentality, he basically defined colonization as a matter 
between humans and nature, not between two groups of human beings. For him, colonization 
was a natural phenomenon in which all humanity cooperated in developing nature and, in due 
course, would reach the ultimate state of human development. In addition to this internationalist 
view of colonization, however, the founder of Colonial Policy Studies had a “nationalist” view of 
colonization as well, defining colonization as the territorial expansion of a nation. Living in the 
early era of nation and empire building of Japan, Nitobe theorized the political exploitation of the 
colonized and the subsequent conflicts between the colonizer and the colonized in the actual 
process of colonization as “disturbances,” which inevitably happened on the road to the final 
stage of human development but would eventually disappear following the law of nature. In this 
way, he linked colonization as a national phenomenon with colonization as a natural 
phenomenon that would, he believed, create international development in an organic and 
harmonious relationship.   
It was Yanaihara who inherited Nitobe’s dualistic view of colonization, but made a 
critical revision of it by establishing an opposing relationship between colonization as an 
international phenomenon and colonization as a national phenomenon, arguing that the former 
was for development and the latter for exploitation. In the 1920s, the so-called era of Taisho 
democracy, Yanaihara, who genuinely aspired to the political emancipation of the colonized and 
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disapproved of the contemporary trends of colonization caused by imperialism, vividly imagined 
colonization as development without exploitation. Believing that global modernization resulting 
from colonization had an emancipatory effect of promoting the freedom of ordinary people and 
nations, he sought to achieve this ideal status by dividing colonization into two opposing kinds. 
The first type, colonization as development, occurred as a result of the socio-economic 
transnational movements of people, without generating any political dominant-subordinate 
relationship between the metropole and the colony. The second, colonization as exploitation, was 
conducted for nationalist and imperialist motives to expand the territory of the metropole. He 
then attempted a theoretical strategy to separate the former from the latter. He conceived of a 
binary framework of development or exploitation as a way to criticize the contemporary trends 
of colonization, which, he believed, were the fusion of development and exploitation. Observing 
the contemporary trends of colonization in which colonization as development and colonization 
as exploitation were intricately entangled, Yanaihara dreamt of vitalizing the former and 
eliminating the latter.  
However, once such a binary framework contrasting colonization as development with 
colonization as exploitation was created, Yanaihara’s original critical intent toward the actually 
existing imperialism was buried under the weight of history. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, in 
wartime Japan, Tōbata began to assign geographical attributes to this binary framework as a way 
of justifying Japan’s wartime total mobilization in the colonies. He claimed that the Japanese 
Empire was the model of colonization as development while the British Empire, representing 
Japan’s wartime enemy, adhered to the model of colonization as exploitation. This was the 
moment when Yanaihara’s criticism of “colonization as development and exploitation” was 
transformed into a politically-loaded discourse set and wartime propaganda, “colonization as 
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development or exploitation,” where the Japanese project was legitimized as a developmental 
one but the case of British colonization was condemned as exploitative. From this moment, the 
binary framework was employed to disguise the fact that Japan needed to develop and exploit its 
colonies to fully mobilize their resources in order to expand its sphere of influence during the 
war.  
In this sense, if we discuss the nature of Japanese colonialism within the binary 
“development or exploitation” framework, which was the historical creature of the wartime 
mobilization period, we remain locked in the very logic manufactured to disguise the nature of 
colonialism in the era of imperialism. My dissertation seeks to contribute to the scholarship of 
Japanese imperialism, which is still confined in the binary framework, by revealing a genealogy 
of how the framework was created, established, and transformed in the texts of Colonial Policy 
Studies in the era of Japanese empire. 
The colonial discourse of “development” has survived in the post-colonial period in the 
name of “science.” This is mainly because the belief is still widespread that the discourse is 
based on “scientific,” “objective,” and “practical” research and facts, such as statistics of the 
growth of schools, literacy rates, population, hospitals, and factories. But this “scientific” 
methodology has a colonial origin. It was originally created in the colonial and imperial structure 
in which the rhetoric, “colonization is development for all,” was widely produced and 
reproduced to become a foundational assumption sustaining the structure. The objectivity of the 
scientific method itself needs to be reexamined. In fact, when colonial policy scholars actually 
legitimated the exploitative system of imperialism with the internationalist claim of colonization 
as development, they did so based on a belief in the validity of “scientific,” “objective,” and 
“practical” research, which was another universal practice of the day. Nitobe, as mentioned 
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above, in his project to standardize Japanese colonial knowledge, emphasized that Japanese 
colonial policy studies must follow the international standards of the field by taking a scientific 
and practical approach. He then listed modern benefits as the signs of development that 
colonization brought to humanity, such as medicine and public hygiene, claiming that 
“colonization is the spread of civilization.” Even Yanaihara, who was a persistent humanist critic 
of Japanese colonial policy, under the rubric of scientific “objectivity,” praised the spread of 
modern civilization in the colony – such as public health, education, railways and other 
transportation, water control and reforestation, political reforms to extinguish evil customs, and 
nationalism – as having an emancipatory function for ordinary people and nations.  
Regarding this question of the objectivity of the scientific methods that originated in the 
colonial period, very suggestive is Tomiyama Ichirō’s critical review of Japanese intellectuals’ 
“scientific” works published in the 1930s and 1940s on other cultures. In his article, 
“Colonialism and the Sciences of the Tropical Zone: The Academic Analysis of Difference in 
‘the Island Peoples’,” Tomiyama questions the “objectivity and neutrality” claimed by the human 
and social sciences of the colonial period in his analysis of the so-called tropical sciences on the 
Southern Islands during wartime Japan.12 According to him, “human [and social] sciences such 
as anthropology, ethnography, geography, and medicine” were produced throughout the entire 
period of Japanese colonization to examine the subordinated peoples in the colonies, one after 
the other. These sciences created a relativistic epistemology of unique “traditions” of the 
colonized by classifying and treating them as the “Other” with uniquely different cultures from 
“Us,” the Japanese. In his view, 2hat makes this discursive framework of relativism significant – 
even though it was constructed by “scientific research” and sounded neutral with no political 
                                           
12 Tomiyama Ichirō, “Colonialism and the Sciences of the Tropical Zone: The Academic Analysis of Difference in 
‘The Island Peoples’,” Positions 3:2 (1995). 
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orientation – is that it became an essential discursive basis for Japanese political and regional 
domination in the form of the “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere,” which envisioned an 
international organic community for economic development under the hegemony of the leading 
country, Japan. He emphasizes the fact that the wartime propaganda claiming “cooperative 
development” within the Japanese empire was based on the “affirmation of a [scientific] practice, 
born in the midst of classifying and reforming the Other, not a naked racism or nationalism.”13       
Tomiyama’s observation of the human sciences is highly suggestive for Colonial Policy 
Studies as well. Searching for scientific foundations, Nitobe, Yanaihara, and Tōbata, who were 
all economists, paid close attention to the difference between the colonies as pre-capitalist 
societies and the metropole as a capitalist society. They then classified the attributes of pre-
capitalism and those of capitalism in economics terms and discussed how to reform the pre-
capitalist societies to become as modernized as the metropole, the capitalist society, and how the 
latter could be even more developed. This academic practice was based on their Smithian belief 
that both the colonies and the metropole developed by forming an international economic system 
that operated through an international division of labor. They defined colonization as the meeting 
of different societies with different stages of economic development and as the collective efforts 
of these societies to utilize all available resources, such as lands and raw materials, to the 
maximum. Such cooperative efforts were described as a mechanism for increasing human wealth, 
freedom, and equality. In this way, the scientific methodology of Colonial Policy Studies was 
conducted under a grand discursive schema: A colonial empire is an international economic 
community in which the international division of labor enables all its members, including the 
colonies, to develop. This theoretical setting blurred the fact that colonization was the forceful 
                                           
13 Ibid., 387. 
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subjugation and exploitation of another country by a capitalist imperialist country that sought 
new sources of raw materials and markets to solve its domestic problems of overproduction and 
overcapitalization, but highlighted the alleged benefits that colonization could bring to all, even 
the forcefully colonized country. The objective and scientific methodology that Colonial Policy 
Studies claimed for itself was, in fact, created and formulated within this broader discursive field. 
By positing Colonial Policy Studies in Japan as an academic discipline and public 
discourse legitimating Japanese empire in internationalist terms in the period of Japanese 
imperialism, this dissertation examines the origin, development, and transformation of the new 
and modern academic discipline. My main interest resides in an exploration of the discursive 
process by which colonization was inscribed as a universal given of the times. I focus on the 
process by which the internationalist notion of colonization – “colonization is development for 
all, including the colonized” – was collectively formulated by these three colonial policy scholars. 
Using various intellectual sources to claim scientific and practical validation for their discipline, , 
these scholars legitimated this internationalist definition of colonization. While such a definition 
actually allowed them to criticize specific Japanese colonial policies that, they believed, would 
damage international cooperation in pursuit of development through colonization, this critical 
stance did not mean that they opposed colonization itself. By examining the genealogy of the 
conceptualization of colonization without exploitation in these three scholars, my dissertation 
will elucidate the fact that internationalism and imperialism were always mutually implicated in 
Japanese colonial theory. 
Although Nitobe, Yanaihara, and Tōbata collectively created the internationalist 
definition of colonization, their motives, goals, and ideas were not completely identical. As the 
historical contexts in which they acted as colonial policy scholars varied, so too did the concrete 
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content of their thought. I will show how their different ideas converged in the coherent and 
systematic discourse set of colonization and development in the shared theoretical space in 
which they rejected, revised, appropriated, and embraced others’ ideas. My genealogy starts from 
the creation of Colonial Policy Studies. In Chapter 1, I examine Nitobe’s colonial thought and 
activity as the origin of the academic discipline. First, I describe the relocation of the center of 
colonial studies from Hokkaido to Tokyo with Nitobe’s establishment of the new academic 
discipline at Tokyo Imperial University and address the historical significance of this move in 
terms of Japanese political and intellectual leaders’ discursive project to legitimate Japanese 
empire as a universal colonial practice. I then explore the significance of Nitobe’s double 
definition of colonization as both a natural phenomenon and a national phenomenon. Chapter 2 
deals with Yanaihara’s revision of Nitobe’s colonial thought. In the liberalist mood after WWI, 
he endeavored to introduce radical reform into mainstream academic thought in the field of 
colonial studies. As a passionate sympathizer with the colonized, he conceived a colonial theory 
for all, including the colonized and the colonizer; this theoretical vision provided a logical 
foundation for his successor, Tōbata, who was able to make an economic policy theory to 
support a more militarist Japanese colonial policy. In Chapter 3, I analyze Tōbata’s colonial 
thought by putting special emphasis on its legacy in post-colonial Japanese international relations. 
I reveal colonial origins in the post-1945 activity of Tōbata as an advisor of the Japanese foreign 
assistance program (ODA, the Official Development Assistance).  
Colonial Policy Studies claimed to be a science. By using internationally circulated 
terms of human and social sciences of the day, the new academic discipline defined and 
legitimated colonization as an international, cooperative human effort to bring development to all, 
including the colonized. This discursive framework of colonization and development was widely 
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disseminated and circulated as the universal understanding of the day in Japan and in the empire 










Nitobe Inazō (1862-1933) was the original “pioneer of Japanese Colonial Policy 
Studies” (Shokumingaku or Shokumin seisakugaku)14 and one of the most influential public 
figures in Japan in his time. His theory of colonization provided the basic framework , 
throughout the entire period of Japanese imperialism, for later Japanese colonial policy scholars 
who relied on him to craft their own theories. Many of his ideas persisted in the work of 
Yanaihara Tadao (1893-1961) and Tōbata Seiichi (1899-1983), who will be the subjects of later 
chapters in my dissertation. As Nitobe was the thinker who provided the coherence of Japanese 
colonial theory throughout the entire imperial era, it would be most relevant to begin my 
discussion with a close analysis of his theory. In particular, I will attempt to show that the two 
strands of his theory, his definitions of the colony as a natural phenomenon and as a national one, 
are not separate as usually understood by previous scholars, but are in fact deeply and 
inextricably intertwined. 
To best understand Nitobe’s thinking, I will draw on details of his life as well as his 
                                           
14 Ōuchi Hyōe, “Kaisetsu,” in Nitobe Inazō Zenshū Henshū Iinkai, eds., Nitobe Inazō Zenshū [NIZ afterwards], vol. 
4 (1969), 645. This famous Marxist economist calls Nitobe the “pioneer of the colonial policy studies” arguing that 
“colony” (shokumin) had not been considered as an academic theme until Nitobe. He was one of Nitobe’s students at 
the Tokyo Imperial University, and took his colonial policy classes in 1912 and 1913. 
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works. Therefore, this chapter will start with the facts of Nitobe’s biography that significantly 
affected and directed his thinking about the subject of colonization. I will then focus on the two 
main threads of his theory noted above and explore how these two seemingly contradictory 
concepts actually align with each other. The result will be an understanding of Nitobe’s thought 
that emphasizes the continuity of colonial theory throughout the Japanese colonial period. 
 Nitobe was a famous public writer, educator, diplomat, administrator and scholar. His 
fame began with his book, Bushido: The Soul of Japan, which he wrote in English and published 
in the U.S. in 1900.15 Soon it was published in Japan too, in its original form without being 
translated into Japanese, and over the next three years it ran through nine printings.16 
Particularly after 1905, when Japan defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, the international 
interest in Japanese culture surged, and the book was newly published in a revised and expanded 
edition and widely distributed to the world by a major American publisher. In the preface of this 
new edition, Nitobe referred to Theodore Roosevelt's appreciation of his book, which further 
enhanced sales.17 On April 12, 1905, he and his wife were even invited to the Imperial palace 
for an audience with Emperor Meiji.18 By the age of forty three, he had become internationally 
well-known as one of the most prestigious Japanese scholars and educators, versed in both 
Japanese and Western cultures.19  
                                           
15 Nitobe Inazō, Bushido: the Soul of Japan: An Exposition of Japanese Thought (Philadelphia: Leeds & Biddle, 
1900). In this book, Nitobe analyzes the moral codes of the Japanese medieval warrior class, samurai, associating 
them with the modern bourgeois values of western Europe and the U.S. See Michael Schneider, “The Future of the 
Japanese Colonial Empire, 1914-1931,” 52. 
16 Nitobe Inazō, Bushido: the Soul of Japan: An Exposition of Japanese Thought (Tokyo: Shōkwabō, 1900). George 
Masaaki Oshiro, “Internationalist in Prewar Japan: Nitobe Inazō, 1862-1933,” 100. 
17 Nitobe Inazō, Bushido, The Soul of Japan: An Exposition of Japanese Thought. 10th rev. and enl. ed. (New York 
and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1905). Most libraries have this tenth and revised edition. See Alexis Dudden, The 
Japanese Colonization of Korea, 180.  
18 Oshiro, Internationalist in Prewar Japan, 107-109.  
19 Unlike this popular acclaim, the established Japanese scholars in these areas were critical of the academic quality 
of Bushido. For example, Inoue Tetsujiro dismissed it as an “amateur’s work trespassing the turf.” This philosopher 
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Nitobe was a recognized “internationalist,” frequently called by his self-made epithet, 
“bridge across the Pacific.” That lifelong motto describes not just his literary and academic 
works emphasizing international cooperation, but also his actual life. A faithful Christian, in 
1891, he married an American woman from a distinguished Quaker missionary family from 
Philadelphia. And in 1911, he was selected as the first exchange professor from Japan to work in 
America under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace. For nine months, he gave 166 
lectures at a variety of universities and academic institutions including Brown University, 
Columbia University, the University of Chicago, Johns Hopkins University, the University of 
Minnesota, and others. When the League of Nations was established in 1920, he was appointed 
as an Under Secretary-General and worked there until 1927, after which he worked for the 
Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) as the Japanese chairman.20  
But as Oshiro Masaaki pointed out, though he was a famed and revered public figure in 
his time, many Japanese people nowadays, in contrast to his contemporaries such as Fukuzawa 
Yukichi and Natsume Sōseki, have not remembered him as such.21 It has been the case since 
1945 and the end of Japanese empire. This sudden forgetting of Nitobe among the Japanese 
public, in my view, is most likely related to his “ambiguous” position in the prewar era, 
somewhere between internationalist and imperialist. In 1932, less than a year after the 
Manchurian Incident, Nitobe set off on a lecture tour to the U.S. and Canada to defend the 
Japanese invasion of Manchuria. Through nationwide radio broadcasts across the U.S. and public 
lectures at major universities, he defended the legitimacy of his nation’s military and political 
actions in Manchuria, which had cold the responses there. He died of an illness the following 
                                                                                                                                        
of Japan and others chastised him for carelessly identifying Japanese medieval values with Western modern values 
particularly related to Quakerism. Ibid., 100-101. 
20 Ibid., 51-56, 135-147, 181-219. 
21 Ibid., 1. 
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year in Canada.22 In the Japanese public view, Nitobe has been regarded as a man of contrasts. 
On the one hand, he is seen as a Taisho-liberal who promoted democracy and social justice to the 
extent that he highly praised the Japanese socialist movement in 1902, for he viewed socialism as 
a means of social reform for struggling common people.23 On the other hand, he has been 
looked upon as a “successful” colonial bureaucrat who worked for the colonial government in 
Taiwan, as well as a prominent colonial policy scholar who espoused colonial domination and 
oppression of other nations.24 The difficulty with reconciling these two aspects has made 
postwar Japanese society reluctant to revere Nitobe.                    
In fact, when the issue of whether to print Nitobe’s portrait on the 5,000 yen Japanese 
banknote arose in 1981, a controversy ensued, unlike the uncontested processes of printing 
Fukuzawa Yukichi on the 10,000 yen note and Natsume Sōseki on the 1,000 yen note. Inuma 
Jirō and Satō Masahiro had heated debates in the Mainichi and the Asahi newspapers. Inuma 
opposed the idea, arguing that Nitobe was a “pure imperialist” throughout his life, even before 
the Manchurian Incident in 1931, which was conventionally identified as the turning point when 
Nitobe suddenly changed his position from anti-imperialism to pro-imperialism. Satō held, by 
contrast, that Nitobe was a genuine Christian, liberal, humanist and pacifist, who dreamt of the 
cooperation of the entire human race, as exemplified in his idea of “the internationalization of 
lands.”25  
Nitobe has left a legacy of dual images: One is as a humanist and internationalist, the 
                                           
22 Dudden, The Japanese Colonization of Korea, 140-141; Oshiro, Internationalist in Prewar Japan, 235-261. 
23 Oshiro, Internationalist in Prewar Japan, 171. 
24 Ibid., 91-97, 148-156. Oshiro shows his own difficulties with handling the aspect of Nitobe as a colonial policy 
scholar as well as bureaucrat. Compared to the internationalist and liberalist aspect of Nitobe, this facet is covered 
much less significantly.    
25 Sakai Tetsuya, “Teikoku Chitsujo to Kokusai Chitsujo,” Kindai Nihon no Kokusai Chitsujoron (Tokyo: Iwanami 
Koza, 2007): 196-197. For Inuma’s argument, see The Mainichi, 26 August 1981 and The Asahi, 27 November 1984 
and 1 February 1985. For Sato’s argument, see The Mainichi, 4 September 1981 and The Asahi, 25 December 1984 
and 1 March 1985.  
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more familiar image to the external world, as captured in the epithet, “bridge across the 
Pacific”26; the other is as an ardent imperialist, as seen in his speech during his trip to America in 
1932 defending the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.27 Most of the existing studies on Nitobe’s 
thoughts have explored him within the framework of this dichotomy, choosing sides on the 
question of whether Nitobe was a liberal humanist and a pacifist internationalist or a racist 
imperialist.28 And, as in the case of its pioneer, Colonial Policy Studies in Japan has also 
received these dual responses from the public who have judged the academic discipline within 
the framework of whether it was “internationalist” or “imperialist” system of knowledge and 
educational program.  
Given the context of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, however, this categorical 
dichotomy between “internationalist” and “imperialist” may fail to effectively capture the 
position of Nitobe and other colonial policy scholars. At that time, the two concepts were closely 
interrelated to the extent that they sustained each other. On a broad level, some scholars have 
already addressed this point.29 Sakai Tetsuya, an international relations sociologist, attempts to 
                                           
26 Most biographies of Nitobe have focused on this aspect of him as “internationalist.” Kitazawa Sukeo, The Life of 
Dr. Nitobe (Tokyo: Hokuseidō, 1953); Isonokami Gen’ichiro, Taiheiyo no Hashi (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1971); Satō 
Masahiro, Nitobe Inazō: Shōgai to Shisō (Tokyo: Kirisutokyō Tosho Shuppansha, 1980); Uchikawa Eiichirō, Nitobe 
Inazō: The Twilight Years [Bannen no Inazō], Trans, Michael Newton (Tokyo: Kyobunkan, 1985); Sasaki 
Takamura, Amerika no Nitobe Inazō (Morioka: Iwate Broadcasting Company, 1985); Oshiro, Internationalist in 
Prewar Japan; Ōta Yūzō, “Taiheiyō no Hashi” toshite no Nitobe Inazō; John F. Howes ed, Nitobe Inazō: Japan’s 
Bridge across the Pacific (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). Oshiro provides an annotated bibliography of the Nitobe 
biographies that had been written by 1985. See Oshiro, Ibid., 348. 
27 Nitobe, “The Manchurian Question and Sino-Japanese Relations” (Lecture delivered on 21 September 1932), 
inTakagi Yasaka et. al. ed., The Works of Inazo Nitobe, vol. 4 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1972): 221-233. 
28 Tanaka Shinichi, “Nitobe Inazō to Chosen,” Kikan Sanzenri, vol. 34 (1983); “Shokumin Seisaku to Nitobe”; 
Hirase Tetsuya, “Nitobe Inazō no Shokumin Shisō,” Tōkyō Joshi Daigaku Fusoku Hikaku Bunka Kenkyū Kiyō 47 
(1986); Kitaoka Shin’ichi, “Nitobe Inazō ni okeru Teikokushugi to Kokusaishugi,” in Ōe Shinobu, et. al. eds., 
Kindai Nihon to Shokuminchi, vol. 4 (Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 1993); Kang Sang-Jung, “Shakai Kagakusha no 
Shokuminchi Ninshiki.”  
29 Mrinalini Sinha, Specters of Mother India: the Global Restructuring of an Empire (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2006); John Fabian Witt, Patriots and Cosmopolitans: Hidden Histories of American Law (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007); David Long and Peter Wilson eds., Thinkers of the Twenty Year’s Crisis: 
Interwar Idealism Reassessed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); David Long and Brian Schmidt eds., Imperialism 
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explain the interrelation through his analysis of “civilization.” In his view, the modern concept of 
“civilization” was so double-edged that it contained the elements of both internationalism and 
imperialism within itself without any contradiction. It was a concept infused with social 
Darwinism, which identified the difference among societies as based on the level of civilization, 
and functioned as a justification for imperialist rule over the lower by the higher in the name of 
“survival of the fittest.” Under the rubric of the “standard of civilization,” internationalism, 
which espoused international cooperation among “legally equal” sovereign states, coexisted with 
imperialism advocating the aggressive expansion into non-Western regions, which were not 
recognized as fully civilized nations and thus were unqualified to be members of the 
international society yet.30  
My analysis of Nitobe’s idea of colonialism will show that he was simultaneously both 
an internationalist and an imperialist. The two categories were so intermixed in his scholarship 
throughout his life that any attempt to sharply divide the two cannot give a holistic picture of his 
colonial thought in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Noting this point, previous scholars have 
attempted to reconcile the two seemingly contradictory images of Nitobe, but their efforts have 
not been fully successful. For example, Asada Kyōji, a preeminent post-war scholar of Japanese 
colonialism and colonial policy, attempts to do so by limiting the definition of “imperialist” 
(teikokushugisha). He defines the “imperialist” as an “advocate of political reaction and 
dictatorship domestically and, at the same time, an advocate of colonization internationally.” 
With this narrow definition, he tries to exempt Nitobe from the category of imperialist by 
highlighting Nitobe’s sympathy for “exploited” social classes in Japan. Asada calls him instead a 
                                                                                                                                        
and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2005). 
30 Sakai Tetsuya, “The Political Discourse of International Order in Modern Japan: 1868-1945,” 234; “Teikoku 
Chitsujo to Kokusai Chitsujo,”199. 
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“humanist colonial policy scholar who approved of colonialism in a formal sense” (shokumin 
teisai yōnin suru jindōshugiteki shokuminseisakugakusha).31 By deliberately using the term 
“colonialism in a formal sense” (shokumin teisai) to soften “colonial” (shokumin), Asada implies 
that Nitobe, who espoused colonial expansion in a humanist and internationalist guise, should 
not be labeled an imperialist. Nevertheless, Asada’s division of humanism/internationalism and 
imperialism into two separate domains renders him unable to reconcile Nitobe’s defense of the 
“Manchurian Incident” in 1931 with his entire theoretical itinerary from the 1890s through the 
1930s.32 Instead, Asada ends up claiming that Nitobe’s imperialist justification of the Japanese 
advance into China was a strategic “retreat” which the internationalist humanist was forced to 
make in the midst of the militaristic social atmosphere of the time.33  
In his study of ideas of the future of the Japanese empire among Japanese colonial policy 
scholars in the years from 1914 to 1931, Michael Schneider, a historian of Japanese international 
relations, attempts to show the coexistence of internationalism and imperialism within Nitobe by 
exploring “cultural internationalism” in his colonial theory.34 Schneider argues that Japanese 
imperialism was not conceptualized in the 1920s based on “exceptionalism,” emphasizing 
Japanese particular nationalist interests,35 but on universalism. Schneider places great 
                                           
31 Asada Kyōji, Nihon Shokuminchi Kenkyū Shiron, 181-182. 
32 Other scholars have shared this problem. For example, Tanaka Shin’ichi, “Shokumin Seisaku to Nitobe”; Sharlie 
C. Ushioda, “Man of Two Worlds: An Inquiry into the Value System of Inazo Nitobe (1862-1933)”; Thomas 
Burkman, “Nitobe Inazō: From World Order to Regional Order”; Miwa Kimitada, “Crossroads of Patriotism in 
Imperial Japan: Shiga Shigetaka (1863-1927), Uchimura Kanzō (1861-1930), and Nitobe Inazō (1962-1933)”; 
Oshiro, Internationalist in Prewar Japan; Ōta Yūzō, “Taiheiyō no hashi” toshite no Nitobe Inazō. 
33 However, Mary P. Elkinton, Nitobe’s wife, clarified that Nitobe had not been compelled by any authority to go to 
America and defend the Japanese military attack of Manchuria. She said that he had done so of his own will. 
Dudden, Japan’s Colonization of Korea, 141; Along with the Showa militarism, for the factors of the “retreat,” 
Asada blames Nitobe’s neglect of the ethnic problem in the colonial problem. He states, “Nitobe’s humanism, which 
did not include the fact that the colonial problem was essentially an ethnic problem, gave its way to the social 
pressure in the authoritarian state.” Asada, Nihon Shokuminchi Kenkyū Shiron, 181. 
34 Michael Schneider, The Future of the Japanese Colonial Empire, 46-50.  
35 Schneider means by this term the “exceptional” view of Japanese imperialism, which emphasizes the “special 
rule of the Emperor system, the special needs of national defense and regional stability in East Asia, the special 
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importance on Nitobe’s reconceptualization of the Japanese empire as an international movement 
for the cultural and economic development of the entire human race, not as a national one for the 
political and military growth solely of the colonizing nation. In order to highlight the link 
between Nitobe’s internationalist and imperialist ideas, however, Schneider completely leaves 
out Nitobe’s nationalist view of colonization, which was another key strand of his colonial 
thought. Overlooking the fact that Nitobe led the trend in the 1910s toward defining colonialism 
as a national and political matter, Schneider assumes that Nitobe only emphasized the 
internationalist and cultural/economic aspect of colonization.36 Summarizing his view of Nitobe, 
Schneider asserts, “cultural universalism thus took Nitobe away from37 the particularistic aspects 
of colonialism (race, ethnicity/minzoku, nationality/kokuminsei) to the universal (economic 
development, moral valuation, culture, civilization (bunmei)).”38 
Similarly, in his study on the Japanese social and cultural transition from internationalism 
in the 1920s to imperialism in the 1930s, Sakai Tetsuya attempts to understand Nitobe’s thought 
by concentrating on his internationalism, without seriously considering its interconnectedness 
with his nationalism which was already apparent in the 1910s. According to Sakai, the 
internationalist colonial thought of Nitobe developed after WWI following the contemporary 
cultural phenomenon known as the “Discovery of Society” (shakai no hakken):39 After the 
destructive world war broke out among states, the supremacy of state sovereignty became subject 
to question, and thus the concept of “society (shakai)” as autonomous from “state” (kokka) arose 
                                                                                                                                        
cultural unity of Asians, and the special geographical proximity of Japan’s empire.” Ibid., 5; Michael Schneider, 
“The Intellectual Origins of Colonial Trusteeship in East Asia: Nitobe Inazō, Paul Reinsch and the End of Empire,” 
American Asian Review 17. 1 (Spring 1999): 14. 
36 Schneider, The Future of the Japanese Colonial Empire, 50-54. 
37 This is my emphasis. 
38 Ibid., 54. 
39 Carol Gluck and Douglas Howland have located the “Discovery of Society” earlier around the turn-of-the-20th 
century. Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myth (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985); Douglas Howland, 
Translating the West (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawai’i Press). 
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as an alternative concept for building a peaceful world.40 In colonial studies as well, Sakai 
argues, scholars including Nitobe began to view the Japanese empire as a reciprocal and 
cooperative socio-economic community of autonomous social groups, that is, Japan and its 
colonies.41  
In fact, these analyses by Sakai and Schneider are more appropriate to the ideas of 
Yanaihara Tadao, which will be discussed in the next chapter, rather than to those of Nitobe. I 
argue that it was Yanaihara who used the idea of society to redefine colonization and empire in 
order to overcome the limitations of a national and political conceptualization that had caused 
conflicts among nations. By contrast, Nitobe constructed his internationalist view of colonization 
on the basis of his nationalist understanding of it; the interconnectedness of these two in his 
theory ultimately left a lasting legacy for later generations. In this chapter, I will tackle the 
question about how Nitobe’s seemingly contradictory ideas of colonization—on the one hand, an 
internationalist view considering it as a universal value for all humanity and, on the other, a 
nationalist one as a particular value only for the colonizing country—could coexist and sustain 
each other in his theoretical logic. The answer will be given when I explore his concept of 
colonization as a natural phenomenon.   
The main body of this chapter will consist of four parts. In the first section, I will deal 
with aspects of Nitobe’s biography that had a significant influence on his colonial theory. In 
addition, I will examine his leading role in establishing colonial policy studies at Tokyo Imperial 
University. By doing so, I will shed light on the early institutionalization of Colonial Policy 
Studies in Japan, as well as on why and in what context the studies became established in Japan 
as an academic discipline.  
                                           
40 Sakai Tetsuya, “Teikoku Chitsujo to Kokusai Chitsujo,” 199-200. 
41 Ibid., 206-214.  
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In the following three sections, I will give a detailed analysis of Nitobe’s colonial theory 
through his main works. First, I will introduce Nitobe’s view of colonization as a natural 
phenomenon. He saw colonization as something natural and morally good because it is subject to 
God’s or natural law. To him, colonization was originally a matter between humans and nature, 
not between humans. He defined colonization as an international cooperative activity in which 
all humans make relations with nature and God. Nitobe’s deliberate selection of a proper 
Japanese translation for colony will be discussed as evidence to prove this point.  
Then, I will examine Nitobe’s conceptualization of colony, colonization, and colonial 
policy as national phenomena. Rejecting an existing view of colonization as the social relations 
among private social groups, he attempted to theorize colonization as a function of national 
policy to emphasize the public and political relations between colonizer and colonized. I will 
explore the reason why he adhered to this nationalist concept of colonization in relation to the 
historical context of Japan at that time. In addition, I will reinterpret his idea of “colonial policy 
prioritizing the benefits of the colonized” (shokuminchi hon’i shugi seisaku)—which has been 
invoked to show his genuine internationalist aspirations42—in the light of his nationalist 
orientation.  
Lastly, I will reveal the theoretical logic by which the two strands of Nitobe’s colonial 
theory that are seemingly opposite to each other, colonization as a natural and a national 
phenomenon, are integrated into one. Focusing on his argument regarding the ultimate goal of 
colonization, influenced by 1) August Comte’s philosophy, 2) theories of social evolution drawn 
from Charles Darwin, Henri Bergson, and Herbert Spencer, and 3) Adam Smith’s view of the 
colony, I will show how Nitobe subsumed colonization as a national project with a particularistic 
                                           
42 Kawata Tadashi, “Kokusai Keizai,” Tokyo Daigaku Keizaigakubu, eds., Tokyo Daigaku Keizaigakubu 50nen Shi 
(1976): 459.  
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value under colonization with an internationalist value. Nitobe found a way to dismiss the 
national conflicts caused by colonization as a temporal “disturbance” that would inevitably occur 
as a historical necessity but would be resolved eventually by human efforts at pacification. 
Nitobe theorized the national aspect of colonization as a constituent of the natural dimension of 
colonization; as a result, the particularistic form of colonization was idealized as the one with a 
universal value—to lead all nations to the final stage of human development, the perfect 
harmony among humans, nature, and God.  
In the conclusion, I will discuss the limitations and significance of Nitobe’s colonial 
theory, which affected Japanese intellectual circle and society throughout the entire period of 
Japanese colonialism. In doing so, I provide an idea based on which the development of Japanese 
colonial thinking can be comprehensively understood as a continuouis and consistent process, 
even with the existence of notable historical ruptures during the period.  
 
Nitobe and Colonial Policy Studies 
 
In 1909, Nitobe became the first chair of the Colonial Policy Studies Department, newly 
established at Tokyo Imperial University. By that time, he was an established colonial policy 
expert, not only as a scholar but also as a colonial bureaucrat. He had been trained in Japan, 
America, and Germany, and had worked in Taiwan for the Japanese colonial government. Born 
in Morioka in 1862 to a high-ranking samurai family of the Nanbu domain,43 Nitobe graduated 
from the elite Tokyo English School (Tokyo Eigo Gakkō) in 1876 and entered Sapporo 
Agricultural College in 1877 as part of the second class, where he majored in agricultural policy 
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(nōseigaku). Sapporo Agricultural College (Sapporo Nōgakō) had been newly established in 
1876 by the Hokkaido Colonization Office (kaitakushi) of the Meiji government to support its 
colonizing project on the northern frontier, which had just started in 1875.44 At the college, 
which was staffed with American teachers who were Christian, Nitobe received his baptism and 
became Christian in 1878 with some of his classmates, including Uchimura Kanzō.45  
After his graduation in 1881, he worked for about two years at the Hokkaido 
Colonization Office and then at the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, to which the Office’s 
functions were transferred. In 1884, he went to the U.S. to study at Johns Hopkins University. He 
spent three years there studying economics and politics under the guidance of his advisor, 
Richard T. Ely, an ethical economist and reformist who interpreted American politics from 
perspectives borrowed from the German social policy school.46 Along with Ely, Nitobe was 
influenced by Herbert Baxter Adams, among the best-known historians in early twentieth-century 
America, from whom he learned history, literature, and international politics.47 Under Adams’ 
guidance, Nitobe changed his field of interest from agricultural economics to US-Japan relations 
and published a book on the topic.48 In 1887, he went to Germany with the sponsorship of the 
Sapporo Agricultural College, which had just appointed him as an assistant professor of 
Agricultural Economics. He studied economics and agricultural economics at the University of 
Bonn, the University of Berlin, and University of Halle, where he received his first doctoral 
                                           
44 Tanaka Shin’ichi, “Shokumingaku no Seiritsu,” in Hokkaido daigaku eds., Hokudai Hyakunenshi Tsuusetsu, 
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45 Oshiro, Ibid., 21-23.  
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47 Dudden, Japan’s Colonization of Korea, 133; Tōbata, “Nitobe Inazō,” Keizaigaku Daijiten, vol. 3 (Tōyō Keizai 
Dhinpōsha, 1959): 311. 
48 Nitobe Inazō, The Intercourse between the U.S. and Japan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1891). This is a 
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degree. After finishing his studies in Germany, he came back with his new wife, Mary P. 
Elkinton, to Japan in 1891 and taught colonial history (shokuminshi) at Sapporo Agricultural 
College until 1897,49 when he had to stop teaching to receive medical treatment in the U.S. 
During his stay in the U.S., he published Bushido in 1900.   
After recovering, Nitobe was appointed to be the head of the Sugar Industry Bureau of 
the Japanese colonial government in Taiwan (Taiwan Sōtokufu) in 1901. From that time until 
1903, he worked in Taiwan under the patronage of Gotō Shinpei (1857-1929), the head of 
civilian affairs in the colonial government of Taiwan. Upon Gotō’s request, he drew up plans for 
the reform of the Taiwanese sugar industry in 1901 based on his three-month inspection tour, and 
made a great success in the industry.50 
From 1903 to 1905, Nitobe taught colonial theory at Kyoto Imperial University in Japan 
while still being associated with the Japanese colonial government in Taiwan.51 During that time, 
he saw the victory of his home country in the Russo-Japanese War and its subsequent feat of 
making Korea a protectorate. His own success followed too, as Bushido became a bestseller in 
Japan and abroad. Then, in 1906, he was able to move to Tokyo because he had been offered the 
position of headmaster at the elite First Higher School. The well-known public figure accepted 
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this offer on the condition that he would also be appointed as a professor in the Department of 
Agriculture at Tokyo Imperial University. He taught colonial policy studies there.  
In 1909, Nitobe moved again to the Faculty of Law at the same university, where he took 
the initiative to establish Colonial Policy Studies as a sub-division of the Law Faculty.  His 
initiative was supported financially by Gotō as well as several businessmen and colonial 
bureaucrats who had made a success in Taiwan and Korea. He stressed to them the importance of 
establishing colonial studies as an independent academic discipline. “In light of the colonial 
governance of Taiwan,” he said, “it has become an urgent priority to create a foundation for 
disseminating colonial knowledge to the Japanese people.”52 As a public educator, he no doubt 
believed that his nation should be more prepared before the imminent expansion of territory that 
would come with the annexation of Korea. He began the task to standardize and systematize 
Japanese colonial knowledge in emulation of the examples set by Western counterparts. 
In 1910, the year of the official colonization of Korea, Nitobe established the Association 
of Colonial Studies (shokumingakkai) with Takekoshi Yosaburō (1865-1950), a historian and 
politician. Since Colonial Studies was just emerging in Japan and scholars specializing in the 
new field were few, the members of the association, numbering approximately 150 in total, were 
mostly politicians, businessmen, and men of letters who had been engaged primarily in Taiwan. 
In fact, they regarded themselves as an “academic association of colonization” (shokumin no 
gakkai) rather than as an “association of colonial studies” (shokumingaku no kai). At the 
inaugural meeting of the association in Tokyo, Terauchi Masatake (1852-1919), Governor 
General of Korea, and Uchida Kakichi (1866-1933), Chief of Home Affairs of Taiwan, who later 
became Governor General of Taiwan in 1923, were present and listened to the public lectures on 
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various contemporary colonial issues such as British colonial policy in India, the nature of 
Japanese imperialism, the national motives for colonization, and economic policy in the colony.53   
Japanese businessmen and bureaucrats were eager to understand the meaning of what 
they were doing and the best policy options that they should adopt in the light of world trends. 
They believed that colonization was an important project, not only at the national level, but also 
at a more individual level, as an opportunity for personal profit.54 Especially because they had 
already observed the rapid growth of the sugar industry in Taiwan, they were eager to know what 
they could expect from Korea. Thus, the establishment of colonial policy studies as a scholarly 
discipline was the creation of a kind of consortium of bureaucrats, businessmen, and scholars, 
who aimed to educate the public as well as themselves in the most up-to-date trends of 
colonialism for national and personal benefit.  
Nitobe taught colonial policy studies during the critical period between the Russo-
Japanese War and the end of WWI, when Japan rose as an imperialist power. As Ōuchi Hyōe 
summarizes, from his Kyoto period (1903-1905) to his Tokyo period (1906-1919), Nitobe made 
Japanese society acknowledge the theme of colony (shokumin) as academic. “Nitobe was indeed 
the pioneer of Colonial Policy Studies,” Ōuchi comments, “who started his career as an 
agricultural economist in Hokkaido, but later became a colonial policy scholar in Tokyo.”55  
Nitobe’s main works on colonization and colonial policy were written mostly in the 
Tokyo years, 1906-1919,56 when he taught the subject at Tokyo Imperial University. At this time, 
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his colonial thought was broadened and systematized. I will analyze in this chapter Nitobe’s 
public lectures, published articles, and essays in academic journals during the Tokyo era which 
ended by 1920, when Nitobe resigned his post of head of the Colonial Policy Studies and began 
to serve as undersecretary to the League of Nations.57 His works have two main themes on the 
subject of colonization—colonization as a natural phenomenon and a national phenomenon. In 
the following three sections, I will examine the two concepts one by one and then consider the 
internal logic by which the two seemingly contradictory concepts become closely interconnected.   
 
Colonization as a Natural Phenomenon 
 
This past August was full of things that will be difficult for me to forget…. for example, the 
terrible floods throughout the country causing damage exceeding 30 million yen…. Another 
unforgettable event was the annexation of Korea. Such an occurrence takes place only once in 
a lifetime. Our country became bigger than Germany, France, and Spain overnight. Many 
people will comment and give speeches, [but no matter how you look at it] all of a sudden we 
grew by ten million people.58 
 
At the opening assembly of the 1910 fall term of the First Higher School in Tokyo, 
Nitobe, the principle, gave a speech commemorating Japan’s annexation of Korea, which had 
occurred just a month earlier. In his speech, he juxtaposed the recent, tremendously damaging 
floods with the immense territorial expansion resulting from the colonization of Korea. Nitobe 
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argued that the two events shared one thing in common: Both are natural phenomena which 
come like destiny; rare, unexpected, and irresistible. And, as will become clear below, for the 
Christian Nitobe, nature is suffused with divine power.  
This analogy with nature was later made concrete and detailed in a lecture Nitobe gave 
to Japanese businessmen in England on the rise of nationalism and colonialism in the 19th 
century. Here Nitobe clearly explains colonization as a natural phenomenon using a juxtaposition 
of the Darwinist rhetoric of natural selection and the Christian biblical rhetoric of God’s 
judgment.     
 
The 19th century was an era of national consciousness and national expansion. As all the 
nations have a strong sense of themselves, less powerful nations have grown concerned 
about it. Nations who successfully adapted their nationalism to the law of organic growth 
have become conquerors or colonizers. Just like the foolish virgins in the Bible,59 however, 
nations who did not immediately act upon the call of the era lost their independence. The 
law of survival of the fittest, declared beginning in the 19th century, proves the legitimacy 
of the expansion of strong nations.60  
 
Here, Nitobe argues that there are two kinds of nations, colonizer and colonized. 
Colonized nations were weeded out, according to him, not only by natural selection but also by 
God’s selection, because they had been too lazy to make themselves grow strong and healthy. By 
contrast, colonizing nations were selected by nature and God because they had “immediately 
                                           
59 This phrase, “the foolish virgins,” is from the Christian biblical story of the “Analogy of Ten Virgins.” The 
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acted upon” the call. When the rare, unexpected, irresistible law of nature and God arrived, they 
successfully responded to it because they had prepared themselves well to do so, enabling 
“organic growth.” Likewise, for Nitobe, the primary relationship of colonization is between 
humans and nature or God, not between colonizer and colonized. Thus colonization is not a 
matter of history guided by human initiative but a matter of providence decided by natural law 
and God’s law. In this way, colonization, and the colonizer, can be justified as morally good.  
This understanding of Nitobe’s basic tenet of colonization is specified in his Japanese 
translation of the European word, colony. In 1911, less than a year after Japan colonized Korea, 
he wrote an article dedicated to the question of what the most appropriate Japanese translation 
for colony was. He thought that it was a critical moment when Japan needed to claim 
colonization as a “legitimate” imperial power, just as its European counterparts had, and the first 
step was to standardize the translation of colony in accordance with its internationally circulated 
meaning.61 Nitobe begins by pointing out that there have been two translations for “colony” in 
Japanese—“as the increasing people” (shokumin 殖民) and “as the planting people” (shokumin 
植民)— that Japanese people have commonly used without any serious consideration of their 
fundamental difference.62 He strongly argues that the latter should be standardized as the official 
translation because it evokes the original meaning of colony, expressed in the Dutch “zie 
Volkplanting.”63 What makes him think “to plant people” is the right choice but “to increase 
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people” is not?  
Quoting Brückner, Nitobe reasons as follows: “Colonization is controlled by an 
irresistible natural force…...People have left their birth places and moved to unknown, 
undeveloped, and different places. This is because they have been compelled by an irresistible 
force they must follow.”64 “The entire earth is a field,” he continues, “and what plants human 
seeds in the field is the likes of a force beyond mankind. The bible says ‘God is a farmer.’”65 In 
Nitobe’s view “to plant people” best conveys the meaning of people’s migration from one place 
to another, new, and unfamiliar place.  Furthermore, using an agronomical metaphor, he 
elevates colonization to a Christian god’s plan for the human race. In this way, colonial policy 
becomes the most precious human task, which puts the divine plan into practice. He concludes, 
“it is the greatest policy for all humanity to plant human seeds from a land with rich people but 
poor soil to a land with rich soil but poor people.”66 In sum, in Nitobe’s view, colonization 
becomes all humanity’s task for the fulfillment of God’s plan. It is a part of God’s plan for the 
benefit of humankind; thus all nations have to respond to it with “faithfulness.” These universal 
benefits of colonization, which Nitobe asserts to be advantageous to both colonizer and 
colonized, will be more closely examined in the section below entitled Colonization as the 
Utmost Development of Humanity.  
 
                                                                                                                                        
Taiwan and Karafuto should be called colonies (shokuminchi 植民地), not “new additions” (shinpu no chi 新附の
地) or “new territories” (shin ryōdo 新領土, or shin hanto 新版図) as had been widely used before. 
64 Nitobe, “Shokumin no Shūkyoku Mokuteki” (1913), NIZ, vol. 4, 354. 
65 Ibid., 358.  
66 Ibid., 357-358. So much of this argument derives from Nitobe’s experience in Hokkaido, where the development 
of Japanese and North American forms of agriculture was seen as “civilizing” an uncivilized northern island and 
making it habitable for “wajin” as well as Japanese people. See, Michele Mason, Dominant Narratives of Colonial 




Colonization as a National Phenomenon 
 
Nitobe defined colonization as something subject to natural law or God’s law that would 
bring general benefits to all nations. As for the specific way that such colonization as a natural 
phenomenon was put into practice, however, he paid attention to the role of each nation-state 
with its own particular national interests. In other words, he defined colonization as a national 
phenomenon as well: a nation-state’s political activity of planting its people in a new land to 
expand its own national territory.  
Nitobe’s emphasis on the political dimension of colonization is clearly revealed in his 
definition of “colony,” which he thought was the most basic term for any colonial theory. Listing 
the three constituent components of the colony—people, land, and political relations with the 
motherland—he explains, “the colony is a new land (shokuminchi towa shinryōdō) to which 
people migrate from their motherland and settle in.”67 Here, “people” means the citizens of the 
colonizing state who migrate from their motherland (bokoku 母国) to the colony and come to 
interact with the colonized who live there. “Land” means “new land,” he argues, in the sense that 
it is “different” from the motherland in terms of language, customs, socio-cultural system, and 
ways of thought. He adds that it is “newly acquired” land in a political sense, rather than a 
scientifically created or geographically discovered land.68 Lastly, he explains that “political 
relations with the motherland” means that the colony must be politically subject to its motherland. 
Colonization is a nation-state’s activity of establishing a colony, and colonial policy is the policy 
                                           
67 NIZ, vol. 4, 61. 
68 NIZ, vol. 4, 56-57.  
40 
 
that the nation-state plans and executes to establish a colony.  
Nitobe was concerned that his contemporaries were not receptive to political 
characterization of the colony. Just as he criticized his contemporaries’ ignorance of the most 
appropriate translation of colony in Japanese, Nitobe criticized a broadly shared concept of 
colony as “settlement” or kyojyūchi (居住地). Defining settlement as the “land among new lands 
where people from the motherland live and settle,” Nitobe argues that the understanding of 
colony as settlement cannot capture “recent currents” in the realities of colonization.69 In his 
view, the term “settlement” is not the same as “colony” because it carries no implication of the 
“political relations between the colony and its motherland.” Invoking the “Anglo-Saxon 
colonies” such as North America, Australia, and New Zealand as examples of settlement, he 
observes that “although they have been regarded as prototypical colonies, they are not colonies 
in a modern sense because they have been established at the level of individual people as private 
and personal initiatives.”70 Instead, he presents the political nature of a colony as the most 
essential element of a modern colony. 
[Modern] colonization is generally an activity of a nation-state and starts from the concept 
of state (kokka kannen) or national consciousness (kokumin no jikaku) … And colonization 
is the expansion of national strength beyond its national borders… Colonization and the 
concept of state (kokka to iu kannen) or the concept of nation (minzoku to iu kannen) cannot 
be separated.71  
 
Compared to settlements, or settler colonies, which result from the initiative of private 
social groups, Nitobe highlights that the modern colony is the political achievement of a nation-
state that aims to expand its national territory as a matter of national pride. From the side of the 
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colonized, he suggests, it entails the loss of their own national sovereignty and political 
subjugation to the colonizing state. Placing the utmost value of colonization on its political 
purpose, Nitobe regards commercial, agricultural, and industrial motives for colonization as 
being subordinate to the political objective of expanding national prestige and strength. The 
merchants and businessmen who are actively engaged in colonization to improve their own 
economic status are merely an arm of the state or its subordinate partner at best.  
Likewise, Nitobe argues that the “modern” colony is not characterized by its social and 
economic nature but by its military and political nature.  With this argument, Nitobe hopes to 
bring about a shift in public understanding of the colony in alignment with a new trend in 
colonization in the early 1900s. Before the 1900s, Japanese colonial policy studies had focused 
on the settler colony as the primary form of colony. The so-called Hokkaido group, who were 
from the Sapporo Agricultural College in Hokkaido, led the old understanding. Their main 
interest was in colonizing Hokkaido, a “virgin land” (shojochi) that needed modern technologies 
from the mainland for its economic development, particularly in agriculture. As the Japanese 
government intensively implemented an agricultural settlement program in Hokkaido from 1875 
to 1904,72 in fact, public interest in colonization of Hokkaido grew significantly. Hokkaido was 
described by Japanese society as an “uninhabited land” (mujinchi, mujin no sakai), “primeval 
forest” (genshirin, gnseirin), or “virgin land” (shojochi), and colonization meant the economic 
exploitation of nature and the subsequent increase of people. Indeed, the most popular translation 
for colony at this time was “increasing people” (殖民), shortened from takuchishokumin 
(拓地殖民)—“to open up lands and increase people on them.”73 Nitobe, who was a Sapporo 
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Agricultural College graduate as well, regarded colonization as a matter between humans and 
nature, with economic and social implications. As Michele Mason argues, he “emptied Hokkaido 
entirely of Ainu [the native inhabitants who had already lived in Hokkaido before the Japanese 
colonization] existence and history and described the island in terms of its ‘natural resources yet 
untouched by human hand.’”74 To him, the colony, as represented by Hokkaido, was close in 
meaning to a settler colony such as Australia and New Zealand of Britain. For Japan, it meant 
new lands of their own where their people migrated and settled. In other words, in the Hokkaido 
settlement era, Nitobe and his contemporaries formulated the idea of colonization solely in terms 
of a natural phenomenon with economic benefits. 
As Japan went through a new phase of colonization in the 1900s, however, the idea of 
colonization originally based on the Hokkaido experience was rejected and reformulated by 
Nitobe. The cautious but persistent efforts to colonize Korea brought about this change. To 
colonize Korea, Japan fought against two world powers, both allies of Korea, China in 1895 and 
Russia in 1904-1905. And it was not an easy task to colonize Korea, which had its own long 
dynastic history and a strong collective identity; Japan had to suppress the fierce resistance of 
Koreans that erupted first when Japan claimed Korea as a protectorate in 1905 and then in the 
wake of formal annexation in 1910.75 Of course, Korea was not the only colony Japan had 
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established by that time; Japan obtained Taiwan from China in 1895 and Karafuto (or the 
southern half of Sahalin) from Russia in 1905. These early colonies were, however, war booty 
they could take without the many difficulties that the colonization of Korea posed.  Under the 
weight of defeat, the belligerents were willing to give up these territories, and those who lived 
there did not mount the same kind of strong opposition as Korea. But Korea was an independent 
nation-state in itself with a significant population.  
As Dudden points out, Japan now came to need a new framework of colonial theory to 
legitimize the colonization of Korea. They needed a new definition of the colony.76 Colonization 
could no longer mean “peaceful” cultivation of virgin lands.77 Now the colony had to be 
redefined in terms of the military and political activity of a nation-state.  Nitobe argued that 
Japan had to expand its national territory to increase its national strength by occupying another 
country, regardless of international and national conflicts. For this reason, the definition of 
colony focusing on internal colony (naichi shokumin), formulated by the Hokkaido group, began 
to be sharply excluded from mainstream colonial theory. Nitobe, who, by that time, had become 
the head of colonial policy studies at Tokyo Imperial University, put himself at the center of this 
conceptual shift by standardizing the concept of “modern colony” in light of the Japanese 
colonization of Korea. 
 As a result of the colonization of Korea, Nitobe articulated his colonial theory within a 
context of international confrontation. In his opening lecture on colonial policy studies at Tokyo 
Imperial University, he employed the “Wave Theory” (hadōsetsu) to explain the historical 
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development of the world in terms of the contact between two waves, eastern and western 
civilizations. With this visual description, he described how the two civilizational waves rose and 
declined in such a way that when one was at its highest, the other was at its lowest.78 In the 
1920s, this inverse relationship found expression as the confrontation between the yellow and 
white races.79 The heightened rhetoric of conflict occurred particularly after the passage of the 
American immigration law restricting Japanese immigration, as a result of the perceived “Yellow 
Peril” that swept the Western coast of the U.S.80 Nitobe strongly criticized this law, 
consolidating the confrontational rhetoric.81  
In tandem with the rhetoric of international confrontation, the theme of colonization for 
national survival was widely circulated as well in Japan throughout the early 1900s. After the 
colonization of Korea, colonization became conceptualized as a necessity for maintaining 
national security in the arena of international struggle. Around the turn of the nineteenth century, 
Korea was regarded as the line of national defense for Japan against China and Russia. After 
Korea was colonized and became a Japanese territory, the line was drawn north of Korea, that is, 
at the southern border of Manchuria. After a part of Manchuria was colonized, the line was 
redrawn at China.82 The rhetoric of colonization for national survival, likewise, contributed to 
justifying the ceaseless expansion of the Japanese empire.  
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This nationalist conceptualization of colonization shaped Nitobe’s ideas on colonial 
policy. To make an effective colonial policy, he underlined the “abnormal” characteristics of the 
colony, influenced by Theodore Roosevelt, who had said “the colony is an abnormal state” 
(植民地は変態国家).83 Nitobe gave three reasons for characterizing the colony as an “abnormal 
state.” First, the colony is located far away from the home country, as exemplified by Europe’s 
overseas colonies, so it is hard for its “motherland” to control it. Secondly, it has its own socio-
cultural system different from that of the home country because its people are different from 
those in the home country in terms of ethnicity or race. Thus, it has its own history, language, 
religion, customs, and practices, which are different from those of the home country. Finally, it is 
difficult for the colony and the home country to communicate without conflict, because there is a 
tendency of the colonized to see their colonizer with suspicion, while the colonizer despises the 
colonized, treating them as subordinate.84 In sum, the colony is a place where national conflicts 
between the colonized and the colonizer occur presumably as a result of the abnormality 
(hentaisei) of the colony. 
If political tensions in colonial settings are inevitable, it is logical to ask what kinds of 
colonial policies would be best to deal with these conflicts. To meet this challenge, Nitobe 
proposed the so-called “colonial policy prioritizing the benefit of the colonized” (shokuminchi 
hon’i shugi seisaku). He argued that, in the colony, such policies implemented different systems 
from those of the motherland in accordance with the colony’s own history and culture, not the 
same political, social, economic, and cultural systems as the motherland’s. Rather than “forcing” 
the colonizer’s systems on the colony, the colonizer must “respect” the colony’s own systems. In 
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this vein, he criticized the colonial government’s attempts to abolish “harmful” [emphasis in 
original] practices of the colonized, such as the Taiwanese queue or Korean white work clothes, 
which the colonial government viewed as less productive and hygienic. In addition, after the 
March First Independence Movement in Korea in 1919, which gave voice to the Wilsonian 
principle of self-determination after WWI in the colonies, Nitobe, in a public lecture, made the 
argument that colonial policy had to pursue the principle of mutual benefit for both the colony 
and the motherland to prevent national conflicts between them. 
 
It is natural that a colony does not like to be governed by a foreign power. The colonial government did 
not gain approval from the colonized to govern them. Also whether the colonizer is white or brown, there is 
little reason that the colonized believe that it would be willing to sacrifice itself for them and carry heavy 
burdens in order to improve the destiny of those who it takes care of. The history of colonization is that of 
the nation-state’s self-assertion (kokka no jiko shuchō). And this self-assertion can be achieved through the 
simple principle of human relationships, “give and take.” The principle of mutual benefit should be the 
principle [of the colonial relationship].85  
 
Based on Nitobe’s advocacy of a colonial policy “prioritizing the benefits of the 
colonized” (shokuminchi hon’i shugi seisaku) based on a principle of mutual benefit, some 
scholars have argued that Nitobe was a humanist who supported equal rights in the colony.86 
Other scholars have interpreted Nitobe’s views as an expression of the post-WWI trend toward 
the reconstruction of empire as an economic entity among autonomous nations, similar to the 
British Commonwealth, which Nitobe directly witnessed as undersecretary of the League of 
Nations in 1919.87 I will reinterpret it, however, based on his view of the colony as abnormal, 
fundamentally different from the motherland, and impossible to change autonomously without 
the help of colonizers.    
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In “Thoughts on a Dying Country” and “Withering Korea,” his journal entries from 
October and November 1906 during his inspection tour of Cheolla province, the southwest rural 
area of Korea, Nitobe, the humanist, expresses his belief in the racial difference between 
Koreans and the Japanese and the impossibility for Koreans to overcome their dismal fate.88 
Viewing Korean peasants and laborers as emblematic of the Korean national character, he states, 
“they have absolutely no will to work. The men squat in their white clothes smoking on their 
long pipes and dream of the past, never thinking of the present nor hoping for the future.”89 
Korean people are characterized as “so arcadian” that “they do not look like those of the 
twentieth century, nor of the tenth nor even the first. They are a people who predate history.”90 
Such images as “squatting” and “smoking with long pipes” show Nitobe judging Koreans as 
being uninterested in politics as well as being so “slothful” that they have no zeal for national 
survival. He concludes that “Korean traditions are dead traditions. . . Korea is soon to be 
governed by death.”91 He can find no potential for Koreans to progress on their own.92  
Nitobe is convinced that the colony’s social ills prove the inability of Koreans to exercise 
the same political rights as Japanese people. Opposing giving the colony the same political rights 
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as Japan, he asserts that Koreans’ level of culture (mindo) is not yet “mature.”93 In fact, he is 
utterly pessimistic about the prospects for the Korean people to ever attain maturity; “It will take 
800 years for the colony to become fully assimilated to the motherland [to the point where they 
could be treated just as the motherland under the same institutional systems].”94 Because he 
thinks that it is impossible for Japanese colonies to reach the same level of civilization as Japan, 
he instead prevails upon the Japanese to accept the “abnormality” of the colony and to exercise 
patience in educating the indigenous inhabitants.95 He did not believe that the colonized could 
make independent progress, instead maintaining the notorious rhetoric of the “white man’s 
burden,” that is, the “colonizer’s mission to enlighten the colonized.”96  
Nitobe’s colonial policy “prioritizing the benefits of the colonized” should be understood 
in this vein of “abnormality.” The policy was neither a manifestation of humanism nor 
egalitarianism as these terms might be defined today.97 Rather, it was a representation of his 
theorization of a prejudice regarding the aptitude of a colonized people. Oguma Eiiji reveals such 
colonialist prejudice during Nitobe’s time through the case of Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931), the 
pioneer of crowd psychology who had a strong influence on Japanese intellectuals including 
Nitobe.98 In his examination of Le Bon’s criticism of French assimilation policy (dōka shugi 
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seisaku), Oguma sheds light on Japanese intellectuals’ understanding of equality in their own 
colonial context. According to Oguma, Le Bon argued that French assimilation policy was a 
failed policy, criticizing the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of its bureaucratic and institutional 
colonial apparatus including the military, police, and educational systems. Le Bon particularly 
rejected the concept of equality that French assimilationists based on three assumptions: 1) the 
colonized people have the same human reason as the French people; 2) the principles of the 
French Revolution such as liberty, equality and fraternity are pursued as eagerly by the colonized 
as by the French; 3) the colonized can enjoy those principles by being reformed through 
education, which would lead them to the universal civilization. Le Bon held none of these 
assertions to be true. 
In opposition to the French assimilationists, Le Bon—a staunch believer in scientific race 
theory based on modern biology—claimed that “human beings are not equal or homogeneous but 
are determined by race (jinshu) and genetic transmission.” Sorting humanity into four levels—
primitive race, inferior race [rettō], middle race [chūtō], and superior race [yūtō]—he claimed 
that the racial boundaries could never be crossed. The social system, custom, law, and culture of 
each race, he believed, were an inevitable consequence of the race’s genetic attributes that could 
not be changed or acquired through education. Although the superior race’s knowledge or 
language could be inculcated in the inferior race, the effect, he believed, was too superficial to 
make a significant change in the fundamental psychology of the race.99 Rather, he maintained 
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that bestowing a high level of education on the colonized would arouse dissatisfaction by 
spurring their desire for success and by creating discontent with their current situation; moreover, 
it would incite disturbances and rebellion.100 
The Haitian rebellion was the evidence Le Bon and his followers often invoked to show 
the failure of French assimilation policy and its assumptions about human nature. In fact, they 
argued that the assimilationists’ belief that universal reason could be realized equally in the 
colony could only lead to increased hardship for the colonized. Nitobe makes this same point 
very clearly. “What does it mean to protect the indigenous people (genjyūmin)? They cannot 
have the same rights as the people in the motherland. In other words, they must be ruled by laws 
made especially for them. We have reached this conclusion from bitter experience: because 
France applied the French Revolution’s slogan—liberty, equality, and fraternity— to its colony 
without any modifications, treating the indigenous peoples in the same way as the metropolitans, 
the Haitian rebellion broke out and atrocities committed by the French against the Haitians 
ensued.”101  
In sum, Nitobe’s idea of sound colonial policy based on the principle of “prioritizing the 
benefits of the colonized” (shokuminchi hon’i shugi)—a policy that seemingly emphasized the 
equal treatment of the colony—was, in fact, a discriminatory ideal, influenced by Le Bon’s 
crowd psychology based on scientific race theory. The “abnormality” of the colony was another 
word for the racial or ethnic inferiority of the colony. This is why Nitobe claimed that the 
colonizer must not treat the colony equally under a commonly shared set of institutions. Only a 
discriminatory policy that denied the colony the same political rights as its motherland, on the 
basis of the inferiority of its national or racial character, could protect the lives and dignity of the 
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colonized.102 For Nitobe, it seems, the term “equality” meant the discriminatory treatment of 
people corresponding to their racial character or their level of civilization. Borrowing from 
Oguma’s argument, we can say that many Japanese believed that “discrimination” assured 
“equality” in the colonial context.103  
 
Colonization as the Utmost Development of Humanity 
  
While the two preceding sections have shown that colonization was both a natural 
phenomenon and a national project for Nitobe, the question remains: How are the two axes of 
Nitobe’s colonial ideas related to each other? While his internationalist view claims the colony’s 
universal value for all humanity, his nationalist view emphasizes its particular value solely for 
the colonizing country. How can these seemingly contradictory concepts be interconnected in 
Nitobe’s colonial theory? What theoretical logic can we find to understand the 
interconnectedness? The key to answering these questions lies in Nitobe’s concept of 
colonization as a natural phenomenon. 
In his article, “The Ultimate Purpose of Colonization,” published in 1913, Nitobe 
elaborates his basic tenet that colonization is a natural phenomenon, based on his reinterpretation 
of Auguste Comte’s (1798-1857) concept, “biocracy” (biocratie).104 This concept originally 
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meant the form of government in which all organic substances associated with one another 
subjugate (seifuku) the inorganic substances and make them suitable for the human world.105 But 
Nitobe inflects it with colonialism at its center and argues, “colonization is the process in which 
the “biocratic league” (yusei dōmei), the organic entity, which consists of God the general, 
people the captain, and plants and animals, the sergeant, dominates nature, the inorganic entity, 
to expand their habitable lands (Oikumene in Greek).”106 In sum, Nitobe defines colonization as 
the subjugation of nature by humans who act upon God’s command. This idea is also expressed 
in another phrase he coined, the humanization of nature or the “humanization of the earth” 
(chikyū no jin’ka 地球の人化).”107 With this term, he presents colonization as a mission to 
transform primitive nature into a suitable place for human habitation. By doing so, he defines 
colonization as a battle between humans and nature, instead of one between humans. In this logic, 
all nations are regarded as one unified group—regardless of whether they are colonizer or 
colonized—which cooperatively participates in the process of expanding habitable lands. Nitobe 
asserts that colonization is a natural phenomenon beneficial to all humanity that proceeds with 
God’s blessing. 
Nitobe’s favorite epigram, “colonization is the expansion of civilization” (bunmei no 
kakuchō),108 or “colonization is the spread of civilization (bunmei no denpa),” which he 
borrowed from Paul S. Reinsch, an American colonial policy theorist and diplomat,109 represents 
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this essential idea of colonization. Nitobe invoked this epigram in his public lecture on the role 
of public hygiene in colonization, “The Medical Advance and Colonial Development” (Igaku 
shinpo to shokumin hatten), which he delivered in memory of Robert Koch (1843-1910), the 
German physician and bacteriologist who was famous in Japan especially for his anti-malaria 
methods that Japanese people found useful in Taiwan.110 In this lecture, he describes civilization 
(or culture) as the tangible modern benefits, such as medicine and public hygiene, that can help 
the biocratic league subjugate nature and make it habitable.111 He states, “like the law of 
osmosis, colonization is the natural flow of culture, from a country with a high density of culture 
to a country with a low density of culture.”112 In this statement, he is arguing that colonization is 
the spread of modern science and technology to conquer nature within the biocratic league. This 
technological transfer is claimed to be as natural as the law of osmosis since it follows the law of 
God, the commander of the league. Nitobe thus characterizes colonization as the bestowal of 
blessings (ontaku) from the motherland to the colony as a way of helping the colony conquer 
their untamed nature. After all, to him, colonization was the subjugation of nature by humans, 
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not that of the colony by the motherland. 
The question still remains why it was so important in Nitobe’s view that humans 
subjugate nature. It may be that Nitobe needed the mandate that humans subjugate nature in 
order to justify his claim that colonies should be thankful for being colonized and for receiving 
the benefits of modern technology and knowledge with which they could transform nature. To 
him it is so because he believes that humans will be able to reach the highest status of 
development through their encounter with an immense nature. By “development” here, he means 
not just economic development, but a fundamental level of human development encompassing 
the natural, human, and spiritual worlds.  
In fact, when he defines colonization as a matter between nature and humans, he assumes 
that humans can be changed by nature just as much as they can change nature. Citing Henri 
Bergson’s argument, “Human affairs (hito no nasu koto) are not simply ruled by natural selection 
but delicately operate within the circle of all living beings (raifu naru mono), Nitobe argues that, 
in response (kannō) to their surroundings, humans change in accordance with the changes in 
their surroundings.”113 Here, he emphasizes that people are influenced (kanka) by their external 
surroundings in a significant way as they progress. In other words, he is anticipating that humans 
can change by way of adapting to their surroundings, not just dying out or becoming extinct. But 
the change goes beyond mere survival for Nitobe. Intentionally using the Taoist, Confucian, and 
Buddhist concept kanka (meaning “to be cultivated or spiritually influenced”) rather than henka 
(to change), he implies that the change by nature will lead people to a high spiritual stage in 
which they can realize the Way, the Truth, or the essence of the Universe. In the same manner, he 
uses kannō, highlighting “to feel sympathy” toward the object, not hannō which means “to react” 
                                           
113 Nitobe, “Shokumin no Shūkyoku Mokuteki,” NIZ, vol. 4, 360.  
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without such connotation of sympathy. By doing so, he is asserting that humans can be united 
with nature and, going further, with God, through colonization. 
In his reading of Darwin’s theory of natural selection, Nitobe highlights the grave 
influence of environment on human evolution rather than emphasizing the survival of the fittest 
in natural selection.114 Agreeing with Franz Uri Boas (1858-1942), a German-American physical 
anthropologist and advocate of scientific race theory, for example, he claims that European 
colonizers in America, after two generation of migration, developed a long-head shape in 
contrast to their original broad-head shape.115 In addition, he maintains that environment affects 
the transition of human social character, claiming that once the British colonizers migrated to 
America, their national character was transformed into a more plebeian disposition (heimin no 
kishitsu), but when they migrated to Australia, they became more socialistic in character.  
Moreover, Nitobe claims that some people, less competitive in their home country, could 
have a chance to develop themselves through colonization by finding the “right” conditions. 
Thus, he states, “The colony is a place where natural selection operates at its best… It is not a 
refuge for losers or the settlement of an inferior race. People who have experienced a failure in 
their regular society merely because they are ‘weaker’ will rise again in the colony because the 
encounter with a new land fills them with a new vigor. While they may have ranked in the 
middle in their home country, they will survive and be competitive in the colony.”116 In other 
words, he is arguing that “the broader an environment is given, the more a person can progress.” 
This idea of the relationship among nature, humans, and God seems to be shared by 
some of Nitobe’s contemporaries. For example, as Julia Thomas points out, Spencer had already 
                                           
114 This is the same as Uchimura Kanzō’s understanding in his Chijinron. Sakai, “Teikoku Chitsujo to Kokusai 
Chitsujo,” 203-204.  
115 “Shokumin no Shūkyoku Mokuteki,” vol. 4, 359-360. 
116 Ibid., 388-389. 
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discussed this point in his early work, First Principles, published in 1863.117 Thomas argues that 
Spencer comprehended the whole world—material, political, and spiritual—as one moral system. 
Using an oxymoronic concept of “evolutionary equilibration” based on Catholic understanding, 
Spencer argues, according to Thomas, that although all things are now continually in process, 
one day all processes will cease in a perfection, the absolutely stable balance among all entities, 
organic and non-organic, and their environment. On the way to reaching this perfect stasis, he 
continues, each entity reacts to “disturbances” in its surroundings by better adapting itself to 
them. He states, “The adaptation of man’s nature to the conditions of his existence cannot cease 
until the internal forces which we know as feelings are in equilibrium with the external forces 
they encounter. And the establishment of this equilibrium is the arrival at a state of human nature 
and social organization, such that the individual has no desires but those which may be satisfied 
without exceeding his proper sphere of action, while society maintains no restraints but those 
which the individual voluntarily respects.” As Thomas aptly summarizes, Spencer imagines that 
all things—human and non-human—are engaged in “fine-tuning their increasing harmony until 
the moment when perfection or equilibration is achieved.”118  
The status of evolutionary equilibration is what Nitobe conceives as the highest status of 
human development that people can reach through colonization. The ultimate purpose of 
colonization is to realize “Infinite Perfection” (mugen no kanzen),119the “status in which people 
                                           
117 Julia Thomas, Reconfiguring Modernity: Concepts of Nature in Japanese Political Ideology (Univ. of California 
Press, 2001): 59, 117. The evolutionary theory that had started from Charles Darwin’s (1809-1882) biology was so 
popular in Japan at that time that at least thirty-two translations of Herbert Spencer’s (1820-1903) work were 
published between 1877 and 1890; Nitobe cited Spencer in his inaugural lecture of the colonial policy studies at the 
Imperial University of Tokyo. NIZ, vol. 4, 17. 
118 This summary of Spencer’s argument is excerpted from Julia Thomas, Reconfiguring Modernity, 118. 
119 Ibid., 362. Nitobe borrowed this term from European philosophers in the late 18th century, Nicolas de Condorcet 
(1743-1794) and Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829). His own translation of the term is “Endless perfectibility.” 
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can become perfect and have power to communicate with God” through encountering nature.120 
Just as Spencer views the whole world, material, political, and spiritual, in one moral system, 
Nitobe interprets colonization within the triple relationship among nature, humans, and God as 
seen from his concept of colonization based on biocracy. He argues that “heaven (ten, sora 天), 
earth (chi, tsuchi 地) and people (jin, hito 人) will be integrated into one” through the 
humanization of the earth, the process where the biocratic league between humans and God 
subjugates nature. He also expresses this ideal status using Ernest Seillière’s concept of “ethical 
imperialism,” with an analogy to the Confucian idea of “the mean” (chūyō 中庸, Doctrine of the 
Mean): “the wise cultivates heaven and earth through ethics, knowledge and wisdom with all 
their humanity.”121 In other words, Nitobe is arguing that through colonization people can 
achieve “the mean,” or equilibration.  
Likewise, empire and colonization are elevated to the lofty human efforts to reach the 
perfect ethical harmony among nature, humanity and heaven in Nitobe’s colonial theory. 
Referring to both classical as well as modern scientific teachings from both Eastern and Western 
civilizations, such as Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity, and theories of social 
evolution,122 he attempts to show that colonization is a universally ethical enterprise that will 
realize the ultimate development of humanity. He attempts to claim colonization not as the 
economic exploitation of a colony by its colonizers, but as an economic, social, cultural, political, 
and even spiritual achievement for the benefit of all humanity.  
                                           
120 Ibid., 362. As Tanaka Kotarō(1890-1974), a Catholic expert of natural law, has commented, in a sense, Nitobe 
seems rather “materialistic.” See, Sakai, “Teikoku chitsujo to kokusai chitsujo,” 204-205.   
121 Ibid., 358. 
122 This ecumenical approach can be understood in that Nitobe dreamt of the harmony of civilization between the 
East and the West. For the theory of civilizational harmony between the East and the West which was widely 
circulated at his time in Japan, see Sakai, Ibid., 203-204. Or, to follow Dudden’s argument, it can be read as 
evidence of his efforts to prove that Japanese colonization has as much universal value as Western colonization. 
Dudden, The Japanese Colonization of Korea, 5. 
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His Japanese translation of colony as “to plant people” (shokumin 植民) can be fully 
understood in this context. As seen in the section above, Colonization as a Natural Phenomenon, 
he chose this translation in preference to “to increase people” (shokumin 殖民). I would like to 
argue that this is because he thought “to increase people” (shokumin 殖民), originally from 
takuchishokumin (拓地殖民), which means “to open up lands and increase people on them,”123 
could not stand for his ideal of colonization. The main focus of this term is the economic value of 
colonization, the increase of new and arable lands. By contrast, “to plant people” (shokumin 
植民) suggests a broader meaning. Nitobe took issue with the economic approach toward 
colonization of some Western colonial policy scholars as well as his Japanese contemporaries, 
like the Hokkaido group, who argued that the main purpose of colonization is “to open up lands 
or to enhance agriculture. ”124 Choosing instead to highlight “planting people in new lands” as 
the essence of colonization, he highlights people’s migration to new lands and the subsequent 
results: the development (or civilization) of the land in a broad sense and the achievement of 
infinite perfection through the interaction between people and the land. By doing so, he elevates 
colonization to a historical mission for all humanity in order to reach the highest stage of human 
civilization, not a mere economic task to increase human wealth.125 
This high purpose notwithstanding, we still face the task of understanding his other 
definition of colony as a national phenomenon in this framework where its universal value seems 
exclusively highlighted. After all, an integrated view of his theory must account for the grave 
colonial problems such as national conflicts that Nitobe was so concerned about when he 
                                           
123 Nitobe, “Shokumin naru Meishi ni tsuite,” NIZ, vol. 4, 346. 
124 Nitobe, NIZ, vol. 4, 59. 
125 This could be related to the shift of his academic interest from agricultural economy to history and international 
relations under the influence of Herbert Adams at Johns Hopkins.  
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proposed a “colonial policy prioritizing the benefits of the colonized.” It may be difficult to see 
how these colonial tensions can be addressed in the basic framework of his colonial theory based 
on biocracy.  
To answer these questions, we need to go back to Spencer’s concept of evolutionary 
equilibration. Addressing the perfect harmony among the material, political, and spiritual worlds, 
Spencer mentions that, on the road to this state of perfection, there will inevitably be 
disturbances in nature that humans will have to address. Until the disturbance is settled and 
perfection is achieved, humans must engage in a constant fine-tuning process where they try 
earnestly to adapt themselves to the disturbed nature. In Nitobe’s terms, political problems in the 
colony can be an example of disturbance. And colonial policymaking can stand for the fine-
tuning process.  
Therefore, it can be said that, although Nitobe basically comprehends colonization as a 
natural phenomenon in which humans encounter nature according to God’s law, he thinks that 
the specific form it takes in practice is a nationalist political movement. And because of its 
nationalist character, he acknowledges that colonization inevitably causes colonial problems; he 
nevertheless, anticipates that these disturbances will ultimately be quelled because the colonizers 
address them with colonial policies. This continuous process of recognizing problems and 
solving them with effective policymaking is a part of the process of fine-tuning.  Nitobe 
believes, without any solid evidence, that this constant process of adaptation will cease at some 
point when the perfect harmony between a colony and its motherland is realized.  
But just as his students complained that he was too “genuinely scholarly,” Nitobe’s view 
of the ultimate resolution of all colonial problems does not offer any executable solutions. There 
are visions and ideals but no specific policies that can create the harmony. Ōuchi Hyōe recalled 
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that Nitobe’s lectures on colonial policies were disappointing. As he said, “what we learned from 
him was a variety of anecdotes about peoples, natural wonders, and various policies in the 
colonies, not so-called national policy…. In another sense, I learned about society and his ideal 
of society.”126  
 As a colonial policy to accomplish the ultimate goal of colonization, in fact, Nitobe 
advanced too idealistic an idea of “Internationalization of Land” [sekai tochi kyōyū ron]. With 
this international socialist phrase by Henry George, he asserts that any person or any nation 
should have a legitimate chance to develop any land anywhere in the world. In other words, he 
claims that the colonized should allow people with different nationalities to use their lands.127 
For this reason, he argues, “while one is good at handwork, another is at music. While one is 
talented at drawing, another is at cultivating the fields. In accordance with their own different 
national abilities endowed from God (tenpu no minzokuteki nōroku), all nations can plan the 
utilization of resources as they respect and interact with each other.”128 In this statement, 
influenced by the Smithian idea of the division of labor, Nitobe makes two arguments. First, all 
nations can develop their own talents if they find their own rightful place to do so. Colonization, 
the expansion of human development, helps each nation find that rightful place. Secondly, just as 
no country can develop unless its people, who all have different talents, cooperate with each 
other, the colonized and the colonizer should cooperate for their own respective development. In 
sum, he declares to the colonized that colonization is beneficial to them as well, because it will 
help them develop their own national abilities. He concludes that “each land should be given to 
                                           
126 See Ōuchi Hyōe, “Yanaihara Kyōju no Shokumin oyobi Shokumin Seisaku,” Keizaigaku Roshū 5 (1927), 536-
537.      
127 Nitobe, “Shokumin no Shūkyoku Mokuteki,” NIZ, vol. 4, 371. 
128 Ibid., 370. Katō Hiroyuki (1836-1916), Uchimura Kanzō (1861-1930), and Tōgō Minoru (1881-1959) also 
attempted to extract from evolutionary theory the possibility of realizing organic harmony among the nations, not 
just the struggle for survival among nations. Sakai, “Teikoku Chitsujo to Kokusai Chitsujo,” 226, n. 31. 
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the fittest who can utilize it best and contribute the most to humanity. . . Land is a gift from the 
Heavens and it should go to the people who can use it best. . . Leaving a vast land unutilized is 
akin to a sin against the Heavens as well as against the entire human race.”129 However, it is 
hard to imagine that this policy would sound persuasive to the colonized, those deprived of their 
national independence and politically suppressed by their colonizers. Nitobe’s nationalistic 
internationalism does not seem to have been so effective at toning down the political aspirations 




Nitobe Inazō has traditionally been studied within a binary framework in which most 
scholars choose sides on the question of whether he was an internationalist or an imperialist. 
Although some scholars have made efforts to overcome such a dichotomy, they have not been 
fully successful in revealing the internal logic of his colonial theory in which the two 
categories—internationalism and imperialism—became intertwined and intermixed.  
In this chapter, I have attempted to show the interconnectedness between the two 
categories. First I have isolated his two entangled definitions of colony, as a natural phenomenon 
and a national phenomenon, and then examined the way in which these two seemingly 
contradictory concepts were able to coexist and sustain each other. Nitobe defined colonization 
as an irresistible moral force which was subject to the law of nature and God. Particularly 
                                           
129 Nitobe, Ibid., 371. This kind of view is also seen among Puritan colonial settlers in North America. In 1653, the 
Puritan colonial historian Edward Johnson wrote that colonial changes in New England were “one of God’s 
providences,” that a “‘remote, rocky, barren, bushy, wild-woody wilderness’ had been transformed in a ‘generation 
into a second England for fertileness.’” For Johnson, colonization was “divinely ordained and wholly positive.” See, 
William Cronon, Changes in the Land (NY: Hill and Wang, 2003), 3.  
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influenced by biological thinking, evolutionary theory and Christianity, he comprehended 
colonization within the threefold relationship among nature, humans and God, and concluded 
that it would lead all humanity to the state of utmost development by integrating the three parties 
into one entity. For Nitobe, this was the destiny of humankind ultimately mandated by the law of 
nature or God. For this reason, he emphasized the importance of international cooperation and 
concessions in the course of colonization for the achievement of this ultimate goal of humanity. 
As for the specific ways in which colonization was practiced, he claimed that all nations 
should necessarily go through a nationalist political stage of colonization, the result of the world 
historical trends in the late 19th and 20th centuries. As I have shown, this was also what he had 
learned from his first-hand experience of the Japanese colonization of Korea from 1895 to 1910. 
He regarded the international as well as national conflicts caused by colonization as disturbances, 
which inevitable occurred on the path toward perfect union among nature, humans and God. He 
believed that these colonial problems could be solved through the fine-tuning process in colonial 
policy.  
So, can we actually ask a question about if Nitobe was an imperialist or an 
internationalist? In my view, this type of question is closer to being meaningless because his 
internationalism necessitated imperialism. His internationalist vision of colonization must be 
fulfilled through the nationalist practice of colonization. Nitobe’s logic does not differentiate 
imperialism from nationalism, because what Nitobe meant by nationalism was the self-
consciousness of nations that they could construct through their empire building. In his thought, 
nationalism could not stand without empire, and imperialism could not stand without nationalism.  
Here I have to point out a couple of problems in Nitobe’s colonial theory. First of all, 
though he claimed the internationalist ideal of colonization could be achieved through the 
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nationalistic practice of colonization, he did not pay keen attention to serious problems and 
conflicts that the practice had been producing in the real world. What he suggested was that since 
colonization is a natural phenomenon, namely, a matter between humans and nature, the ideal of 
colonization should ultimately be attained at some point according to the law of nature or God. 
His colonial ideal was an ill-founded and teleological argument. 
Secondly, though he argued that colonial problems can be settled though specific 
policies, Nitobe never presented realistic methods that could be effective. His proposed policy of 
“prioritizing the benefits of the colonized first,” as already revealed in this chapter, turned out to 
be ineffective in reducing the national conflicts within empire since it did not allow what the 
colonized people most wanted, that is, political autonomy. The policy, in fact, prioritized the 
benefits of the “motherland,” in the sense that it was primarily for the security of the empire by 
not provoking colonial revolts. Nitobe’s policy was a defensive one, aimed at preventing the rise 
of political aspirations among the colonized in advance, who, he thought, were a fundamentally 
inferior race incapable of political maturity.  
Regardless of these shortcomings, Nitobe’s colonial theory is highly significant mainly 
because it provided the basic framework throughout the entire era of Japanese imperialism—a 
framework upon which later Japanese colonial policy scholars constructed their own theories. 
His belief that colonization brings development to all humanity was widely shared by them, as 
will be seen in the later chapters on Yanaihara Tadao (1893-1961) and Tōbata Seiichi (1899-
1983), the second and third chairs of Colonial Policy Studies at Tokyo Imperial University. The 
specific ways in which they defined the scope of development varied, but the basic tenet, that 
colonization is development for all, remained intact in their texts to the end of the empire. In 
particular, Nitobe’s ideas about the two kinds of advantages of colonization, international and 
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national became the fundamental ground to his successors. How to conceptualize the relationship 
between the two was the main theoretical task for Yanaihara in the 1920s and Tōbata in the 
1930s and 1940s, when they drew a master plan for the future of the Japanese empire.  
I will demonstrate in the later chapters that the idea of “the East Asian Community” (Tōa 
kyōdōtai ron 東亜協同体論) and “the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” (Daitōa kyōeiken 
大東亜共栄圏) in the late 1930s and 1940s owed their intellectual roots to Nitobe’s colonial 
thinking elaborated in the 1910s, in which internationalism/imperialism and 
internationalism/nationalism were locked in a tight embrace. Nitobe’s colonial ideas paved an 
ideological path that led from the liberalism of the 1920s to the imperialism of the 1930s. He laid 
foundation of the Japanese colonial discursive field which was partially modified and reformed 
but eventually shared by intellectuals from the 1920s to the 1940s. Japanese colonial history, 
which has been narrated in many cases as if it were a history of three disparate stories under the 
rubric of 1910’s nationalism, 1920’s internationalism and 1930’s imperialism, will be understood 















This chapter discusses the characteristics of Japanese Colonial Policy Studies in the 
1920s through the 1930s by examining Yanaihara Tadao’s colonial theory. Yanaihara Tadao 
(1893-1961) was the second chair of Colonial Policy Studies at Tokyo Imperial University, from 
1923 to 1937, succeeding Nitobe Inazō. In the post-WWI era when colonies’ demands for the 
rights of self-determination intensified and their challenges against the existing order of empire 
with its dominant-subordinate relationship arose, Yanaihara was among the most important 
critics of Japan’s imperialist colonial policies. In this chapter, I attempt to explore this humanist 
reformist’s concepts of colonization, colony and empire, particularly by placing them within the 
entire stream of Japanese Colonial Policy Studies. A close exploration of them will reveal the 
continuity and discontinuity among the theories of the three scholars—Nitobe Inazō in the 1910s, 
Yanaihara Tadao in the 1920s, and Tōbata Seiichi from the late 1930s to 1945. In particular, my 
analysis will show that, indeed, while Yanaihara, inspired by Nitobe, attempted to break with 
exploitation as an inherent element of colonialism, he actually provided a set of ideas which was 
later manipulated by Tōbata to endorse the imperialist wartime propaganda. 
A brief biography of Yanaihara will help us understand the basic tenets of his colonial 
theory. After graduating from the Tokyo Imperial University Faculty of Law in 1917, and 
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working for two years at a mining company, Yanaihara became an assistant professor in 1920 in 
the Faculty of Economics at Tokyo Imperial University, which was newly established that year as 
separate from the Faculty of Law.130 To study the contemporary Western colonial affairs, he 
spent two years in England, France and the U.S. In 1923, he returned to Japan and became a full 
professor in the field of colonial policy theory. From that time, he began to publish critical essays 
against the contemporary imperialist colonial policies, which he deemed exploitative and 
oppressive. In particular, he opposed the tendency of Japanese academe to dismiss (or use) Adam 
Smith’s theory to support exploitative imperialist colonial policies. Yanaihara actively 
disseminated his reinterpretation of the Scottish economist in whose work he found the 
possibility of an alternative colonial policy.131 As a crystallization of these efforts, in 1926 he 
published a 600-page long monograph, Shokumin oyobi Shokumin Seisaku (Colonization and 
Colonial Policies), which he wrote as a textbook for college students.132 And the following year, 
he edited his articles written from 1923 to 1926 and published them as a collection, titled 
                                           
130 Schneider, “The Future of the Japanese Colonial Empire, 1914-1931,” 122.  
131 From 1925 to 1926, Yanaihara had heated debates with Yamamoto Miono, an established colonial policy studies 
professor at Kyoto Imperial University, and his followers, on Adam Smith’s colonial theory and economics. For 
some details on the debates, see Yanaihara Tadao’s review of his own article, “Adamu Sumisu no shokuminchi ron” 
(1924) in Shokumin Seisaku no Shin Kichō (Kyoto: Kōbundō Shobō, 1927), which is compiled in Nambara Shigeru 
et al. eds., Yanaihara Tadao Zenshu [YTZ afterwards] I (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1963): 535-538.     
132 Ōuchi Hyōe, a famous Marxist economist and Yanaihara’s close friend at Tokyo Imperial University, highly 
praised this book as “a phenomenal and exceptional work (kinrai no taicho, kinrai shusshoku no chosho).” Ōuchi 
Hyōe, “Yanaihara kyōjyu no ‘shokumin oyobi shokumin seisaku’,” Keizai Ronshū, vol. 5 issue (1926) in Nambara 
Shigeru eds., Yanaihara Tadao: Shinkō, gakumon, shōgai (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1968). Both Ōuchi and 
Yanaihara had taken Nitobe’s colonial policy studies class when they were students at Tokyo Imperial University. 
When they were in Europe to study after graduation, they once traveled to Germany together. They became 
colleagues in the department of Economics at Tokyo Imperial University, having their offices near each other on the 
same floor. In 1948, after WWII, as they returned to the university from their respective expulsions, Yanaihara 
organized a seminar group of professors and graduate students to study Adam Smith, which was called the “Adam 
Smith Reading Group (Adamu Sumisu no kai)” and Ōuchi joined the group. In addition, in the same year when the 
Peace Issues Discussion Group (Heiwa Mondai Danwakai) was organized by Japanese intellectuals who were 
concerned over the strained international relations at the dawn of the Cold War, Yanaihara and Ōuchi joined the 
group together, representing the “Labor Farmer School (Rōnōha)” of economists at Tokyo University. For more 
details, see Ōuchi Hyōei, “Nihon shokumingaku no keifu,” and Ōkōchi Kazuo, “Yanaihara sensei to ‘Adamu sumisu 
no kai’,” in Nambara Shigeru eds., Yanaihara Tadao: Shinkō, gakumon, shōgai; Igarashi Takeshi, “Peace-Making 
and Party Politics: the Formation of the Domestic Foreign-Policy System in Postwar Japan,” The Journal of 
Japanese Studies, vol. 11:2 (Summer, 1985): 343. 
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Shokumin seisaku no shin kichō (The New Foundation of Colonial Policy). Including his review 
of Adam Smith’s colonial theory, an essay on the Zionist movement as colonization, and some 
critical essays on the colonial and immigrant policies of Japan, the U.S. and England, this 
supplement to his monumental textbook aimed at clarifying his criticism of various serious 
problems that imperialist colonial policy had caused.133 
Yanaihara’s works produced an immense sensation among his contemporaries in the 
academia. This was particularly because of his unique definition of colonization as “a social 
phenomenon in which a social group migrates to a new region and conducts social and economic 
activities with the natives there” (shokumin towa shakaigun ga aratanaru chiiki ni ijūshite shakai 
teki keizai teki ni katsudōsuru genshō). By the 1920s when Yanaihara’s academic career just 
began, colonization had come to be regarded as a political and cultural project of a superior state 
under the rubric of “the white man’s burden”; but Yanaihara opposed the existing view, arguing 
that political and cultural factors should be excluded from the definition of colonization. Instead, 
he included such forms of migration that had previously been left out from the category of 
colonization, as the Jewish settlement in Palestine through the Zionist movement, the movement 
of Koreans to Manchuria and Siberia, internal colonization (naichi shokumin), the Japanese 
movement to Hokkaido, the northern part of Japan, and even their emigrationto Hawaii in the 
category of colonization. Of course, colonization with a political dominant-subordinate 
relationship between the metropole and the colony, the prevailing type of colonization at that 
time, was also colonization in this view, in the sense that it involved with human migration.   
                                           
133 Yanaihara Tadao, Shokumin oyobi Shokumin Seisaku (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1926); Shokumin Seisaku no Shin Kichō. 
These books are compiled in Yanaihara Tadao Zenshu [YTZ] I. After its first publication in 1926, Shokumin oyobi 
shokumin seisaku went through five editions, the second in 1929, the third in 1930, the fourth in 1933, and the fifth 
in 1934. For a list of his other major works on colonial policy studies, see Nakano, Beyond the Western Liberal 
Order, 157-158. On his personal history, see Asada, Nihon Shokuminchi Kenkyū Shiron, 316-317; Kamoshita 
Shigehiko, Kibata Yoichi, and Ikeda Nobuo, Yanaihara Tadao (Tokyo: Tokyodaigakushuppankai, 2011): 2-88.  
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Not only liberals but also conservatives in Japan criticized Yanaihara’s definition of 
colonization. They called him an advocate of colonization, an imperialist, a fool or an idealist 
ignorant of the realities of colonization. They particularly problematized his unique methodology 
of dividing colonization into two types: actual colonization (jisshitsuteki shokumin) and formal 
colonization (keishikiteki shokumin). The former, which Yanaihara advocated, stood for 
colonization in which two different social groups, settlers and natives, formed a community of 
international division of labor, and as a result, both groups (and by extension, all humanity) 
could enjoy economic prosperities. By contrast, the latter, which he criticized, represented 
colonization in which a settler group and native people were placed in a politically dominant-
subordinate relationship, not a socio-economically cooperative one among equally independent 
groups, which frequently spawned national conflicts and ultimately diminished chances for 
prosperity. This argument, advocating and criticizing colonization at the same time, was 
interpreted by some of his critics as the advocacy of imperialism; it assumed the existence of 
colonization with no political implication or conflict even in the era of imperialism. They saw 
this as impossible on the ground that actual colonization and formal one could not be separated 
in reality.134  
However, such criticism by his contemporaries failed to account for the actual life that 
Yanaihara led during the era of Japanese imperialism. He was a humanist activist against 
Japanese imperialist colonial policies. To draw on his engagement in the colonial problems of 
                                           
134 A Marxist critic, Hosokawa Kaoru, called Yanaihara a “bourgeois spokesman,” who could be identified with 
other “aggressive expansionists, war mongers, and paternalistic oppressors of the lesser races.” A conservative critic, 
Nagao Sakuro, opposed Yanaihara for including immigration and stateless ethnic group migration to a new land in 
colonization, and pejoratively dismissed him by saying, “That rabble is just the refuse of the world.” Kanaji Ichirō, 
an economist and a colonial theorist, condemning Yanaihara’s rejection of the state’s role as the essential force of 
colonization, characterized his ideas as “utterly vague and formless hopes through religious idealism.” Ōuchi also 
questioned Yanaihara’s exclusion of the political dimension from colonization. See Asada, Nihon Shokuminchi 
Kenkyū Shiron, 317-319 and Schneider, “The Future of the Japanese Colonial Empire, 1914-1931,” 146-148.   
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Korea, he criticized Japan’s cruel suppression of the Korean independence movement on March 
1st 1919 and opposed Japanese assimilation policy that subjugated the Korean industries and 
resources to the needs of the Japanese economy. He argued for offering the Koreans suffrage and 
allowing them to make autonomous assemblies or a cabinet government where they could decide 
their own foreign and military affairs.135 In fact, he personally interacted with Korean people 
and supported them, often expressing his sympathy with their aspirations for national 
independence.136 His anti-imperialist attitude was epitomized by his opposition to the Second 
Sino-Japanese War. Soon after the outbreak of the war in 1937, he wrote an essay condemning 
Japan’s invasion of China in which he stated, “Bury Japan for a while so that her ideals may 
live.” As a result, he was forced by his university to resign, just three months after the 
publication of the essay.137 In light of his consistent critical posture against Japanese colonial 
policies, the judgment of his contemporary critics—that he was an imperialist who took no 
account of the real problems of colonization and ignored the political nature of colonization—
can hardly stand.  
Then, how should his colonial theory, which appears so “non-political as to advocate for 
imperialism” and therefore seems to contradict his actual commitment to anti-imperialist 
activism, be reinterpreted? In other words, in what ways should the coexistence of advocacy for 
colonization and criticism against colonization in his theory be explained? Regarding this 
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question, the existing studies have simply viewed the coexistence as a “theoretical error,” instead 
of examining his theoretical logic on which such coexistence might be possible. For example, 
Asada Kyōji, a prominent historian of Japanese colonial policy, concluded that “Yanaihara made 
a contradictory error in that he strongly advocates the autonomy of colonies (jishushugi seisaku) 
while praising the enormous contribution of colonization to all humanity.”138 Kang Sang-jung 
found the reason for such error in Japanese orientalism, by which Yanaihara viewed the 
colonized as uncivilized “them” outside, compared to Japan, namely, the civilized “us” inside.139 
Ubukata Naokichi and Lee Gyu-soo argued that Yanaihara’s error was a product of “modern 
rationalism,” that is, the colonizers’ calculative thinking through self-reflection that the Japanese 
empire must make rational changes to its colonial policy in order to maintain the Japanese 
empire.140 All of these scholars concluded that Yanaihara’s colonial theory was not so anti-
imperialist as to advocate for national independence of the colonized people.  
In this chapter, I would like to challenge these existing views of Yanaihara’s colonial 
theory by illuminating the theoretical coherence between his advocacy and his criticism of 
colonization. I will take a couple of strategies to do that. First of all, I reconsider his argument 
concerning colonization that “modernization through colonization brings welfare and economic 
prosperity to all humanity.” While this statement has been regarded as proof of his pro-
imperialist position, I will argue that it should be interpreted as evidence of his advocacy of 
modernization. For Yanaihara, colonization was a diachronic concept meaning actual 
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Noboru and Masao Fukushima, Niida Noboru Hakushi tsuitō ronbunshū: Vol. 3, Nihonhō to Ajia (Japan and Asia) 
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colonization without political dominance, a human activity that had existed throughout history. 
To him, it did not indicate just the form of political dominance (“formal colonization” in his own 
terms) that became prevalent in the specific moment of history, namely, the era of imperialism. 
As he defined colonization or, more precisely, actual colonization, Yanaihara imagined the 
establishment of an economic community among politically independent and equal nations based 
on the principle of mutual aids in their international division of labor. Through such international 
economic unity, he believed that all people in the world, regardless of their class and social status, 
could equally enjoy modern benefits and bring about the end of the era of imperialism.  
Secondly, I will illuminate the theoretical process by which the coexistence between pro-
modernization and anti-imperialism could take place in Yanaihara’s theory. I will explore two 
theoretical sources that he relied on—Adam Smith’s international economics and Marxist studies 
of imperialism. In the course of these analyses, I will demonstrate that Yanaihara, inspired by 
Smith’s colonial theory, conceived of the two types of colonization—colonization based on 
political and military domination (formal colonization) and colonization as a socio-economic 
phenomenon without political implications (actual colonization)—as a methodological principle 
to criticize Japanese imperialist colonial policies that denied the colonies’ political autonomy. 
Employing Smith’s logic, Yanaihara disapproved of “formal colonization” for its economic 
inefficiency in terms of national interest, while he praised “actual colonization” for its potentials 
to achieve human equality and prosperity. The latter, he believed, would transform an immense 
uncivilized nature into inhabitable spaces and expand the international division of labor to make 
the world better. As a result, it would enable even ordinary people and nations in the world to get 
access to resources and goods, which had been limited previously to a small number of people in 
the high-status and wealthy nations.  
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Yanaihara’s own critical arguments against formal colonization was strengthened when 
he added the Marxist critique of imperialism to this Smithian colonial theory. Influenced by Rosa 
Luxemburg, Rudolf Hilferding and Vladimir Lenin, the Smithian colonial theorist emphasized 
how the exploitative structure of imperialism in the era of high capitalism reinforced the political 
and dominant-subordinate relationship between the metropole and the colony through the 
movement of capital, and he displayed how severely it damaged world peace, causing conflicts 
and inequalities among nations. Based on these two theoretical sources, Yanaihara demanded that 
colonial policy offer colonies political autonomy (jishushugi seisaku), by which colonies could 
have political, economic, social and cultural independence for their own benefit. In this ven, he 
strongly rejected assimilation policy (dōkashugi seisaku), which subordinated all aspects of life 
in the colonies to Japanese interests.  
No matter how seriously the humanist reformist contrasted actual colonization with 
formal one and pursued an end to imperialism, however, he failed to recognize fully some 
theoretical “potentials” of his “internationalist” or “anti-imperialist” perspective for abuse and 
misuse. His advocacy for modernization in the 1920s came to be co-opted and appropriated 
during the Japanese wartime period from the late 1930s to 1945. In this period, Tōbata Seiichi, 
Yanaihara’s successor as the third chair of Colonial Policy Studies at Tokyo Imperial University, 
adapted Yanaihara’s colonial theory, particularly, its clear-cut divisions between actual 
colonization and formal colonization, development and exploitation, and internationalism and 
imperialism, and utilized it as a theoretical basis for imperialist wartime propaganda claiming 
that the Japanese empire promoted international cooperation and mutual development for all its 
member nations, that is to say, a Greater East Asian Co-prosperity sphere.  
Such “unexpected” transformation of Yanaihara’s theory by Tōbata points to the 
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limitations of Yanaihara’s views. I will argue that his ideas of modernization as development for 
all humanity served as the crucial link that made such a transformation possible. These pro-
modernization ideas, which he shared with Nitobe as well as Smith, led Yanaihara to imagine the 
possibility of actual colonization—colonization as development without exploitation—even in 
the era of imperialism when such possibility could not be fulfilled. This imagined possibility, 
which was originally intended to bring an end to imperialism, was ultimately appropriated by 
Tōbata to prove that colonization as development and colonization as exploitation could exist 
separately. In fact, during the Pacific War, Tōbata claimed that the Japanese empire was an 
international economic community for development without exploitation, while the British 
Empire was an exploitative model of empire. In this way, Yanaihara’s colonial theory had grave, 
if unintended, consequences, providing his contemporaries and later generations with a 
theoretical tool to evade responsibility for colonization in the era of imperialism. Contrary to the 
creator’s intention, the theory established a theoretical framework through which they evaluated 
Japanese imperialism in a clear-cut binary division between development and exploitation 
without a serious historical examination of the specific conlonial realities, imperial exploitative 
systems and distorted capitalist economic development.  
 Taking all the issues mentioned above into consideration, the main body of this chapter 
comprises four parts. The first section introduces the general structure of Yanaihara’s colonial 
theory by illuminating the relationship between his goal of study and his new approach to 
colonization. Yanaihara framed his theory as an anti-imperialist pursuit and consequently defined 
colonization as a social phenomenon as a way to oppose the political definition of colonization 
on which the imperialist colonial policies were based. In next two sections, I explore the two 
bodies of theory that Yanaihara relied on to construct such reformist ideas—Adam Smith’s 
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colonial theory and Marxist studies of imperialism. By integrating these two sources, Yanaihara 
attempted to criticize imperialist colonial practice characterized by economic exploitation of 
colonies, while promoting an ideal form of colonization without political dominance aiming at 
economic development for all humanity. In the fourth section, I describe the ideal colonial policy 
that Yanaihara dreamt of. Lastly, in conclusion, I reflect on the historical significance and 
limitations of Yanaihara’s colonial theory in terms of the continuities and discontinuities that it 
had with his predecessor, Nitobe and his successor, Tōbata. My criticism centers on his dual 
approach to colonization, colonization as development and colonization as exploitation.  
While Yanaihara’s works are various and voluminous, as seen in the twenty-nine volume  
collection of his writings, in this chapter, I mainly deal with his books, Colonization and 
Colonial Policy and The New Foundation of Colonial Policy, as well as his articles and critical 
essays on contemporary colonial policies. In addition to these, some sources, such as 
recollections of Yanaihara written by his son and students, are used to show how his life 
experience gave reality to his colonial theory.141 With these sources, I reconstruct Yanaihara’s 
colonial theory in the context of his life. In doing so, I elucidate the complexities and 
contradictions inherent in his arguments, which will be helpful to understand the characteristics 




                                           
141 In particular, I was able to obtain unpublished postcards that he exchanged with Cho Yong-hak, an elder at a 
Korean Presbyterian church in Pusan, Korea, who died a martyr in 1941 for his resistance against the Japanese 
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Colonization as a Social Phenomenon 
 
In the very beginning of Colonization and Colonial Policy, Yanaihara introduces the 
academic significance and purpose of his book. In contrast to the existing Japanese colonial 
studies, he explains, his is a “practical study (jisshitsuteki kenkyū) of colonization and colonial 
policy,” or at least the efforts toward such a study; it was written to illuminate “the significance 
of colonization and colonial policy as a social fact (shakaiteki jijitsu)” and “the effects of 
colonization on humanity (jinrui),” particularly on those with a vested interest (rigai kankeisha) 
such as the colonizing country (shokuminkoku) and the colony (shokuminchi), or the colonizer 
(shokuminsha) and the natives (genjūsha), and “the characteristics of the various colonial social 
relationships (shokuminteki shakai sho kankei).” And therefore, he expects, his “objective study 
based on facts (kyakkan teki bunseki ni motozuku jijitsu kankei no haaku) could appeal to all 
ranges of groups without prejudice,” for example, “to the colonizing people as well as the 
colonized people, to the capitalist class as well as the working class, and to the imperialist as 
well as the non-imperialist.” By doing so, he hopes his study will become the grounds on which 
“practically effective (jissai teki) colonial policies” can be made and implemented.142 
 In other words, he is arguing that his colonial theory is an alternative to the existing 
Japanese colonial policy studies by being a “social, practical, factual, objective, effective, and 
reconciling” theory that will be acceptable to all nations and classes. To understand this 
statement, it is helpful to look at his specific assessment of the problems of traditional colonial 
policy studies, an assessment that can be summarized in two points.  
First of all, according to Yanaihara, the existing colonial policy studies do not stand on 
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practical facts (jissai teki chi’i). That is, they do not constitute a social science. To borrow an 
expression from his reviewer, Ōuchi Hyōe, they are theories “standing on prospects” (tenbō teki 
chi’i), or “ideologies based on the self-consciousness of a world-class great empire (sekai teki 
daiteikoku).” Without considering a social history of actual life in a colony, the existing studies 
are simply based on the ideologies of Japan’s superiority (sokoku yūetsu), civilizational guidance 
(bunmei shidō), and racism (jinshu sabetsu). They are a “pseudo-theory (ese gakumon)” that 
disguises the colonizing countries’ administrative techniques for pillage and exploitation as a 
magnificent spectacle in front of the colonized people.143 
 Secondly, Yanaihara regards them as “ruling policies (tōchi saku)” sustaining imperialist 
colonial policy (teikoku teki shokumin seisaku), which cannot solve the contemporary colonial 
problems prevailing all over the world. In Colonization and Colonial Policy, he enumerates such 
colonial problems experienced by the early half of 1920s, centering on three issues: 1) conflicts 
and wars among colonizing powers; 2) national conflicts between the colonizing country and the 
colony; and 3) resistance from ordinary people or the working class in colonizing countries. As 
illustrative examples of these conflicts, he invokes WWI, the Opium War, the independence 
movements in Ireland, Egypt, India, China (kokken kaifuku undō), and Korea, Russian 
Communism (sekka undō), Woodrow Wilson’s doctrine of the right of self-determination, and 
the mandate system after WWI. In Yanaihara’s view, current colonial policy studies could not 
provide any solution to these grave problems because they had a tendency to serve imperialist 
colonial policies, contributing only to the benefit of a small number of colonizing powers and 
capitalists.144  
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Yanaihara constructed his own colonial policy theory with the clear intention of 
reforming “impractical” and “imperialist” colonial theories. He attempted to construct an anti-
imperialist, humanist, and reconciling colonial theory, and to do so, he concentrated on 
redefining the essential terms of the field—colonization, colony, and colonial policy. Following 
the structure of his book, Colonization and Colonial policy, I analyze Yanaihara’s understanding 
of colonization—the definition, motives, and ends of colonization; its specific historical phases; 
and the value and ideal of colonization.  
Colonization and Colonial Policy begins with Yanaihara’s urge that colonial policy 
studies should start from the examination of the nature of “colonization,” not from that of 
“colony” as was a customary practice:  
Colonization [shokumin], Colony [shokuminchi], and Colonial Policy [shokumin seisaku]. 
Among these three interrelated concepts, the most fundamental one is colonization. The land 
where colonization is conducted is the colony; the policy related to colonization is colonial 
policy. In the study of the various colonial relationships of humankind, therefore, the first 
thing that should be determined is the substance of colonization. We should no longer simply 
assume the concept of colony as the starting point of our study, as has been repeatedly 
attempted so far.145 
 
As seen in the previous chapter on Nitobe Inazō, the most foundational concept in mainstream 
colonial policy studies was indeed the “colony,” standing for a “new territory” (shin ryōdō, or 
“new land” in Nitobe’s translation), or a “newly acquired land,” which was different from “new 
soil” (shin chi) suggesting “nearly or wholly uninhabited by man.” In conventional 
understanding, a modern colony was predicated on the existence of a political relationship 
between the metropole and the colony. The U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were 
considered settlements, not colonies, in these studies, since they were established by individual 
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initiatives, not by a state at the prompting of nationalism.146 In addition, the existing concept of 
colony emphasized the legal element as well. Yamamoto Miono, an established colonial theorist 
at Kyoto Imperial University, captures this definition of a colony precisely as a “new territory 
that is not considered a part of the homeland (honkoku) according to the national constitution and 
therefore is ruled by a separate system of laws.”147  
Based on this political and legal understanding of colony, mainstream colonial theory 
defined colonization as a “political phenomenon in which a part of a nation migrates from 
its motherland (bokoku) to a new territory, and thereby a political relationship is generated 
between the motherland and the new land, or the colony.” In other words, colonization had 
been understood as human migration along with the extension of political sovereignty from 
motherland to colony.  
Opposing this common view of colonization, Yanaihara claimed that colonization 
must be interpreted as the socioeconomic activities of social groups.  
Shokumin is a social phenomenon. In order to study the substance of shokumin, the character 
of this social phenomenon needs to be clarified. The study of the substance of a social 
phenomenon should not be restricted by formal conditions (keishiki teki jōken). The right 
approach is to explore the actual characteristics (jishitsu teki tokushusei) associated with that 
phenomenon. Human society is composed of the interactions and the existence of shakaigun 
or social groups that are distinguished as tribe (shūzoku), ethnos (minzoku), and nation 
(kokumin). Each group occupies and dominates its own region; and yet, it also moves from 
one place to another when necessity arises. The new residence may not have a previous 
owner, or may be occupied by other social groups. In either case, the collective way of life of 
the migrating social group (ijū suru shakaigun no shūdan) may have a set of particular 
attributes. [To include this breadth of meaning,] I call shokumin a phenomenon produced by a 
social group that migrates to a region (chi’iki), perceived as new by the migrants, in which it 
acts socially and economically.  
 
Here, Yanaihara claims that political interpretation had limited the scope of the studies of 
colonization. Urging that the “concept of colonization should be emancipated from national 
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constraints,”148 Yanaihara suggests a new idea of colonization, that is, “colonization as a social 
phenomenon in which a social group migrates to a new region and conducts social and economic 
activities with the natives there.” Therefore, a colony is “the region where a migrating settler 
social group conducts their social and economic activities with the native social group” without 
having a national, political, territorial, dominant-subordinate relationship itself as its 
substance.149    
According to Yanaihara, this conceptual shift is necessary for two reasons. First, through 
his new definition, he was able to claim that some key forms of colonization that had been 
neglected in the more politicized definition could be revived. For example, stateless ethnic 
migration, such as Jews to Palestine and Koreans to Manchuria and Siberia, domestic migration 
or internal colonization (kokunai tenjyū, naichi shokumin), such as Japanese migration to 
Hokkaido, and the migration of an entire social group (zenbuteki ijyū), could be regarded as 
colonization.150 Agreeing with George Cornewall Lewis (1806-1863) and Edward Gibbon 
Wakefield (1796-1862), whose non-political concept of colonization had been rejected by most 
Japanese colonial theorists for the reason that it was not adaptable to the “modern” colony, the 
reformist colonial theorist argued that the major feature of colony was migration of people, not 
political dependence on the motherland. In this sense, he claimed that even immigration (imin), 
such as Japanese people’s migration to Hawaii, and the white settlements, such as North America, 
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, were a kind of colonization. In his view, the U.S., even 
after political independence, could still be called a colony since it continued to receive English 
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Secondly, Yanaihara claimed that his new concept of colonization could explain actual 
characteristics of colonization that could not be explored in the political interpretation of 
colonization: the effects of colonization on humanity, including colonizer and colonized, for 
example, or the characteristics of various social relationships in the colony. Colonial Policy 
Studies, which had belonged squarely in the discipline of political science, he maintained, should 
be a part of a comprehensive academic system encompassing economics, sociology, and political 
science.152   
In addition to these two reasons that the author clearly lays out, one more reason can be 
inferred for his emphasis on the social definition of colonization. It seems that Yanaihara thought 
that such conceptual reorientation would allow scholars to imagine a peaceful end to 
colonization in the era of imperialism. Criticizing Otto Köbner (1869 - 1934), a German colonial 
law scholar, who argued for the continuation of the political and legal relationship between the 
motherland (bokoku) and the colony and at the same time the extinction of the motherland, 
Yanaihara dismissed his argument as a “theoretically careless one”153 which neglected the basic 
fact that the extinction of the “motherland” should also mean the extinction of the political 
relationship with the colony. Since it presupposed the perpetual existence of “motherland” in its 
definition, “A colony is a new land to which people from the motherland migrate, and thereby 
comes to be placed under a dominant-subordinate relationship to the motherland,” the political 
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and national definition of colonization could not assume the natural end (shokuminchi shūshi) of 
the colonial relationship between the motherland and the colony.   
In this context, Yanaihara apparently believed that the redefinition of colonization as a 
social phenomenon, in which the agent of colonization became a “social group” (shakaigun) 
rather than a nation (kokumin) or a representative of a motherland, a natural end to the colonial 
relationship could be imagined. Declaring that “[n]o permanent colony can exist,” the reformist 
colonial theorist argued that a “colony can be a colony only when it looks new to the migrant 
group’s eyes; but as time passes by, the moment comes when the colonial society no longer looks 
strange or foreign (fremd in German) to them.” In other words, he anticipated a time when the 
migrants would see the colonial society as their own society, as they accumulate various kinds of 
relationships with the local society. “At this very moment,” he concluded, “the phenomenon of 
colonization ends.”154 In sum, he endeavored to reconceptualize colonization in order to address 
the possibility of a “peaceful” separation of the colony, which could never be imagined in 
existing colonial studies under “national constraints.” 
 It is clear that Yanaihara’s redefinition of colonization with a focus on its social aspects 
had its roots in the anti-imperialist consciousness of his time. But for the theoretical inspiration 
for his redefinition, we must look to Adam Smith. In the next section, I will explore this major 




Before Yanaihara, Adam Smith had been assumed in Japanese academia to be an 
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economist, whose theory of free trade supported an imperialist economic system.155 Strongly 
opposing such a perspective, however, Yanaihara rather praised Smith as a great colonial policy 
scholar whom every Japanese colonial policy scholar in his time must know. In his view, Smith 
was a powerful critic at the end of mercantilism who attacked the harmful effects of the 
exclusively monopolistic colonial policy on British society as well as on the world in general. In 
particular, Yanaihara extoled his practical and scientific research as an effective tool for criticism, 
because it analyzed the way in which the monopolistic colonial policy, prioritizing the interest of 
a small number of “merchants and master manufacturers” (shōnin oyobi daiseizōka, Yanaihara’s 
own translation), affected the interest of ordinary people and the development of human 
productivity.156  
For Yanaihara, Smith was an “advocate of a new colonial policy who prioritized the 
benefits of ordinary people and human peace and development in a difficult historical 
situation”;157 moreover, Smith’s theory of free trade and noninterference policy (jiyūhōnin setsu) 
was a kind of “emancipation movement for ordinary people” (ippan minshū wo kaihō sentosuru 
no kaihōundō).158 Thus, Yanaihara emulated Smith in his aim to become a humanist reformist in 
the field of Japanese colonial policy studies. In this section, I will elucidate Smith’s influence on 
Yanaihara’s colonial theory. First I will introduce Smith’s views of colonization and unique 
methodology of dividing the advantages of colonization into two kinds. And then, I will examine 
the way in which Yanaihara directly adapted Smith’s ideas to his own colonial theory, 
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particularly focusing on his argument of the value of the colony.  
In his phenomenal book, The Wealth of Nations, Smith included a chapter titled “Of 
Colonies.”159 According to an American historian of economic thought, Robert L. Heilbroner, 
Smith regarded “wealth” as the “goods and services that all the people of society consume”160 
and colonization as contributing to the increase of nations’ wealth. He argued that the 
international trade system formed through colonization increased the general consumption of 
goods among common people in the metropole as well as in the colony. And the increased 
consumption brought a general increase in production too, he thought, because “consumption” 
was “the sole end of purpose of all production.”  
Adam Smith’s “democratic” idea of colonization, which “was neither anti-labor nor anti-
capital, but pro-consumer,”161 seems to have attracted Yanaihara, who wanted to construct a 
colonial policy theory without any partiality. In his article, “Adam Smith’s Colonial Theory,”162 
the humanist colonial policy scholar introduces Smith’s idea of the positive effects of 
colonization—the increase of human consumption and productivity. Yanaihara explains how 
Smith addressed the “general advantages of colonization” (ippanteki rieki) by drawing on the 
example of the British colonization of America and the East Indies. As he summarizes Smith’s 
argument, British colonization provided not only Britain, but also Europe with a broader market 
for their overproduction in general, which resulted in an increase in their production of goods. 
Moreover, the exchange between European goods and American goods brought advantages to all 
the common people on both sides of the Atlantic, giving them more opportunities to enjoy novel 
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goods that had previously been monopolized by nobles or great merchants. In other words, Smith 
believed that as long as the free market mechanism without any government intervention or 
monopoly of great merchants was working, the kinds and quantities of commodities would 
expand and, as a result, the wealth of all nations would rapidly increase, including colonizing, 
colonized, and even neighboring nations.163  
Likewise, Smith’s concept of “general advantages of colonization” was strictly based on 
the social interpretation of colonization, excluding any political aspects. For him, colonization 
stood for the expansion of international free trade without political oppression. However, most of 
Smith’s contemporaries regarded the colony as a national matter directly related to their national 
pride, supporting colonization with monopoly policies based on mercantilism. Lamenting this 
stance, Smith harshly criticized the prevailing view of colonization for its “economic 
ineffectiveness.” In fact, he blamed it for harming the economic interests of England itself.  
Yanaihara goes on to show how Smith criticized the negative effects of the nationalist 
colonization on the societies of both metropole and colony under the name of “the particular 
profits of colonization” (tokushu rieki). He argued that if colonial trade was governed not by the 
free market mechanism, but by government intervention, as in British mercantilist policy 
prioritizing the “particular” profits of a small number of great British merchants, bureaucrats, 
and politicians, they could not increase the wealth of nations; the level of human consumption 
and production would drop.164 Smith’s reasoning goes as follows: mercantilist policy increases 
the price of goods, which then decreases consumption in Britain and subsequently, production as 
well. The decrease of production limits the demand for goods, causing less production and less 
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consumption, as a result of which a market with cheap and abundant goods will disappear. In 
other words, a trade monopoly produces relative profits for a small group, not absolute profits for 
all people in the metropole. In Smith’s view, British mercantilist policy was designed to maintain 
the superiority of Britain by preventing other nations from producing goods. Therefore, it could 
not increase the profits for Britain beyond what could have been attained naturally through the 
free market mechanism.165 Smith also argued that mercantilist trade policies made it more 
difficult for ordinary people living in Britain and the colonies to buy cheap products from other 
nations. And, finally, he argued that even the great merchants were prevented from running their 
business on a stable basis, because the pace of the capital turnover was too slow in the colonial 
trade, where commodities were shunted over a long distance between the metropole and the 
colonies.166   
In addition to these anti-consumer effects, according to Yanaihara, Smith drew on a dark 
side of the particular advantages of colonization—the increase of the costs for wars and national 
defense, which was harmful to the metropolitan economy itself. Smith argued that the British 
attempts at the political domination of colonies to secure a trade monopoly caused international 
conflicts with their colonies as well as with neighboring countries. As a result, Britain could get 
no financial and military support from the American colonies, which resisted the policy that 
imposed taxes without allowing political autonomy. Britain had to pay enormous military and 
administrative expenses even in times of peace, thus reducing the British national treasury rather 
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than increasing its revenue.167  
Smith’s advocacy of the “general advantages” of colonization and his criticism against 
the “particular advantages” of colonization were the very grounds on which Yanaihara 
constructed his colonial theory. Relying heavily on Smith’s methodological division between 
socio-economic colonization and political-military colonization, Yanaihara, as previously 
mentioned, divided colonization into two kinds—actual colonization (jisshitsuteki shokumin) and 
formal colonization (keishikiteki shokumin).168 Actual colonization stands for his definition of 
colonization itself, “a social phenomenon in which a social group migrates to a new region and 
conducts social and economic activities with the natives there.” Or, in Smith’s terms, it can also 
stand for “the expansion of international free trade without political intervention.” By contrast, 
formal colonization stands for “the political and military occupation of the colony (shokuminchi 
ryōyū) generating a dominant-subordinate relationship between the motherland and the colony.”  
Yanaihara argues, just as Smith does, that actual colonization produces general 
advantages (ippan teki rieki) beneficial to all human societies, while formal colonization 
generates the particular advantages (tokushu teki rieki) beneficial only to the colonizing country, 
failing to serve the interests of ordinary people in the metropole, the colony, and even in other 
states.169 This view is clearly demonstrated in Yanaihara’s argument on the value of colonization. 
Yanaihara examines the value of colonization in four directions: the general advantages 
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of actual colonization for humanity, the advantages of actual colonization for the settler group, 
and the values of formal colonization, that is, the political domination of the colony, for the 
settler group, and for the native group. The first two categories address the general advantages 
(rieki) of actual colonization while the last two concern the value (kachi) of formal colonization. 
As the first part of the general advantage of actual colonization, Yanaihara starts with the 
expansion of human habitable lands [Oikume, in Greek] through colonization and the subsequent 
development of humankind in both quantity and quality.170 He argues that colonization causes an 
increase in human population and their economic development. Actual colonization produces an 
international economy, which then brings economic prosperity to all humanity. For this reason, 
he emphasizes the Smithian idea of the international division of labor. That is, he maintains that 
colonization encourages the movement of goods, people, and capital between the metropole and 
the colony, particularly the movement of raw materials and labor from the colony to the 
metropole and the movement of capital from the metropole to the colony. This so-called 
“expansion of international division of labor,” he continues, increases the total sum and kinds of 
production; as a result, human wealth increases, enabling ordinary people and ordinary nations in 
the world to consume goods that were previously limited to an elite minority in wealthy nations. 
In this respect, he concludes, the effects of colonization are so positive as “to make the economic 
development of the entire humanity possible in terms of both quantity and quality.”171  
 As for the social and economic advantages that the settler group can receive from actual 
colonization, Yanaihara argues that they can acquire some emergency methods for addressing the 
problems of overpopulation, unemployment, and rural areas at home. In addition, they can 
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increase their wealth by increasing trade with their colonies and by investing their capital in 
them.172  
Yet, in reality, it was commonly regarded that such advantages of actual colonization 
could be protected more effectively by the political occupation of the colony and the subsequent 
exploitation of the colony’s economy. Therefore, formal colonization became the main trend of 
colonization. Yanaihara acknowledges that these common views are right in a sense. He draws 
on some examples of the values of formal colonization for the settler group: besides advantages 
through migration, investment, and trade, through the monopolistic domination of an 
international economic region (ichidai keizai chiiki tokusen teki shihai), they can acquire some 
financial and military support from the colonies. But Yanaihara points out that compared to these 
supports from the colonies, the financial burdens that the settler group must carry to maintain the 
exclusive domination of colonies are much greater. That is, they have to pay enormous financial 
and military expenses to resolve conflicts with the colonies as well as with other colonizing 
countries. By suggesting a kind of comparative profit and loss statement of Japan’s formal 
colonization, the Smithian Japanese colonial policy scholar underlines the ineffectiveness of the 
political occupation of colonies. Going further, he argues that people support formal colonization 
regardless of such economic ineffectiveness for reasons that are emotional rather than economic, 
such as the private interests of the ruling classes, a sense of cultural superiority, a desire for 
national prestige, and a sense of national rivalry.173   
Lastly, Yanaihara discusses the value of colonization for the natives (genjūsha). This part 
of his argument is very interesting in that Yanaihara shifts the way in which he uses the term 
colonization. Here, without clarifying which of the two meanings of colonization he is invoking, 
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he states, “Colonization is inevitably a misfortune to the natives (genjūsha no fukō wa shokumin 
ni hitsuzen teki nariya).” In other words, whether it is actual or formal, he aptly points out, 
colonization is a misfortune for the natives, because they have no choice but to encounter new 
migrants who intrude into their lands and occupy them without their permission. He states, 
although colonization is valuable to the settler group because it brings them various advantages, 
it is not to the native group because of the forceful and exploitative methods (kyōatsu sakushu) of 
its implementation. Employing the example of the Western colonization of the East and West 
Indies (tōzai indo), he states that historically colonization was conducted through “accidents” 
(guzen) such as the “farmers’ ignorance” (nōmin teki muchi); that is, the settlers oppressed and 
eradicated (zetsumetsu) the natives.174 He emphasizes that it should be remembered that the 
advantages of colonization for humanity were in fact established on the basis of the sacrifice of 
the natives.175  
In other words, as Ōuchi aptly comments, Yanaihara suggests that actual colonization and 
formal colonization are continuously entangled with each other (kōsaku) during the course of 
colonization, which generates positive and negative value (kachi / fukachi), depending on the 
perspective. For example, Yanaihara argued that the contemporary colonization after the 
Industrial Revolution had a value for the settler group because it brought them capitalist 
development; at the same time it had no value for the native group because it prevented the 
natural development of their economy by making them proletariats (musansha) as well as 
destroying their indigenous culture, customs, and social order.176  
Nevertheless, Yanaihara claims that if the general advantages of actual colonization 
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beneficial both to the settlers and the natives are considered, colonization is still a valuable 
pursuit.  Therefore, he demands that each of the settlers and the natives reconsider their current 
attitude toward colonization. He asks them to cooperate to base their relationship on the principle 
of mutual benefits, not of oppression and exploitation. To the settlers, he states, to achieve the 
goal of “coexistence and co-prosperity (kyōson kyōei)” as they advocate facing the colonies’ 
demands for self-determination rights after WWI, they must grant them independent status and 
allow them to participate in determining colonial policies for their own societies. Without giving 
them this kind of freedom (jiyū), the advocacy of “coexistence and co-prosperity” becomes mere 
deception.  
In the same way, Yanaihara tries to appeal to the natives by emphasizing the modern 
products generated in the course of colonization: infrastructure such as railway and other 
transportation and projects for water control or reforestation, the distribution of education and 
hygiene and the maintenance of public health, the political reforms to extinguish evil customs, 
the establishment of a constitutional system, and the guarantee of safety for life and property.177 
Although colonization entails injustice and misfortune, he attempts to rally the discouraged 
colonized to strengthen their nation by employing modern development generated by the 
expansion of international trade. “Because the natives were economically, socially, and 
politically weak, he concludes, the colony was established. However, through colonization, the 
natives also can develop (kanyō) their ability to resist the colonizers’ exploitation.”178   
Yanaihara’s argument on the value of colony, as laid out above, has become the target of 
criticism for scholars who judge him as a defender of empire or an imperialist. But Yanaihara 
insisted that he was not an imperialist. Rather, he aspired to be an “internationalist,” according to 
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his own definition, who advocated a free market mechanism in an international economic system 
without political intervention.179 In a sense, it can be said that he was an advocate of 
modernization. Just as Smith saw the possibility of democracy in the expansion of international 
free trade through colonization without monopoly, Yanaihara also dreamt of emancipatory effects 
of modernization through actual colonization.  
However, this pro-modernization stance produced contradictions in Yanaihara’s colonial 
theory. As already seen in his argument on the value of colony, Yanaihara acknowledges that 
colonization which generates positive value for the settler group can generate negative value for 
the native group. One wonders, then, how Yanaihara was able to argue for the general advantages 
of colonization. Can his so-called “actual colonization” exist? What kind of colonial policy could 
create such an ideal form of colonization?    
To address these questions, I would like to redirect the discussion from the question of 
whether Yanaihara was an imperialist or not, to the questions of how he juxtaposed pro-
modernization ideas and anti-imperialist criticism. I ask how this juxtaposition produced 
theoretical complexities and contradictions and explore the impact of these contradictions on his 
contemporaries. Smith’s advocacy of the general advantages of the socio-economic interactions 
among free nations through international free trade, and his criticism against the particular 
advantages of the exclusive possession of colonies through political and military occupation, 
became the basic framework for Yanaihara’s colonial theory with its binary division between 
pro-modernization and anti-imperialism. In the next sections, I will examine in what ways 
Yanaihara consolidated the binary framework by focusing on another of his theoretical sources, 
Marxist imperialism studies of imperialism. In the conclusion of this chapter, I will then address 
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the limitations of his binary framework of pro-modernization and anti-imperialism.  
 
Marxist Imperialism Studies 
 
Although Smith’s theory provided Yanaihara with the basic structure of his colonial 
theory, it could not explain the new trend of colonization since the development of monopoly 
capital in the 19th century.180 Now, colonizing countries, or the monopoly capitalists, competed 
with one another to expand their exclusive sphere of influence over colonies. These so-called 
imperialists put the top priority on the expansion of empire through the political occupation of 
colonies to maximize their economic profits. However, Smith, who lived before the Industrial 
Revolution, argued in 1776 that long-distance trade and monopolistic trade could not be 
profitable to the economy of the metropole. Before the era of overcapitalization, he could not 
even envision the possibility that a colony could become a market for capital investment.181 
Therefore, to examine colonization in the post-industrial revolution era, particularly after 
the 1870s, Yanahiara turned to Marxist critics, such as Rosa Luxemburg, Rudolf Hilferding, and 
Vladimir Lenin.182 In a sense, these Marxist thinkers’ methodology was similar to Smith’s 
methodology. They took a “practical” (jisshitsuteki) approach, or a socioeconomic approach, 
which posited the colony in the midst of the world economy, to examine its social and economic 
characteristics and the development of social relations in it, just as Smith did. However, they 
were interested in focusing on the metropole’s exploitation of the colony, while Smith was 
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interested only in the effects of colonization on the settler economy. In this regard, the Marxist 
theorists appeared to be even more effective critics against imperialism in Yanaihara’s eyes.183  
In his chapter on the motives of colonization, Yanaihara analyzes the origin of 
imperialism by fully employing the Marxist methodology. Positing imperialism as a later form of 
colonization, the so-called “investing colony” (tōshi shokuminchi), he first explains the motives 
of colonization in a way that can include even the earliest form of colonization in history, the so-
called “settlement colony” (ijū shokuminchi). As he sees it, colonization occurs due to the “social 
group’s ability to maintain their livelihood” (seikatsuryoku). In this way, Yanaihara emphasized 
the socio-economic elements in his explanation of the motives of colonization in accordance 
with his definition of colonization as the movement of a social group and the interactions 
between social groups. He divides the motives of colonization into two kinds, the passive 
motives (shōkyoku teki dōin) and the active motives (sekkyoku teki dōin): The former represent 
the social group’s efforts to avoid unhappiness (fukō no kaihi) and the latter comprises the social 
group’s efforts to pursue happiness (kōfuku no tsuikyū). In other words, a social group moves to a 
new land because they want to escape from disadvantageous living conditions such as 
overpopulation. In the capitalist society, he maintains, overproduction and overcapitalization 
become disadvantageous conditions because they cause the situation of overpopulation. 
Moreover, religious and political oppression also operate as passive motives. By contrast, he 
argues that the active motives stand for the manifestation of human vitality, such as a social 
group’s migration to use labor and capital in a more productive way to improve their living 
conditions. The search for commercial profits, the import of food and raw materials on the 
capitalist demands, and the acquisition of a new market or of a new place for capital investment 
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all belong to the active motives. A political will to control, religious evangelism, and cultural 
chauvinism or cultural “humanitarianism” are also active motives.184 
Positing imperialism as one of the active motives, Yanaihara identifies the origin of 
imperialism in the development of monopoly capitalism. Drawing on Rosa Luxemburg, he 
maintains that the structure of expanded reproduction of capitalism through primitive 
accumulation of capital itself ceaselessly generates colonization. Luxemburg’s concept of 
“outside” (gaibu), which means the “perfect outside of the capitalist economy,” or “non-capitalist 
conditions,” such as non-capitalist social classes and states, is identical to his concept of an 
actual colony. He mentions that this does not necessarily mean foreign countries in terms of 
international law. Rather, the “outside” stands for the internal or external regions of a state which 
are not yet capitalized. He argues that expanded reproduction of capital constantly makes people 
migrate to the outside, a new non-capitalized region, in search of social and economic profits.185  
In other words, capitalism originates from primitive capital accumulation, which 
necessitates colonizing non-capitalist countries. They become the market as well as the source of 
raw materials and food for the metropole. However, since the 1870s when the competition 
between Britain and Germany to expand their own exclusive sphere of domination over non-
capitalist countries intensified, modern imperialism had made its appearance. Now, the economic 
will to control a great economic region through cartel or monopoly capital combined with the 
political will to control the region. Regarding this rise of imperialism, influenced by Hilferding, 
Luxemburg, and Lenin, Yanaihara concludes: “The substance of imperialism is the expansion of 
political domination. Here, political domination does not necessarily mean the expansion of 
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territories (ryōdōken). It stands for interference in the affairs of other countries through political 
power (seiji teki kenryoku niyoru kanshō). The capitalist economy’s expansion or maintenance of 
a sphere of monopolistic domination constitutes the inevitable contents or purpose of modern 
imperialism. In other words, modern imperialism is the political and economic domination by 
monopoly capitalism of other countries.”186 
Yanaihara criticizes the exploitation of the colony as an effect of imperialism. Pointing 
out that the colony became a market as well as a source of raw materials and food, he states, 
“While the metropole (honkoku) became increasingly capitalized with expanded reproduction of 
capital, the colony experienced the proletariatization (musanka) of the natives: their loss of lands, 
the commercialization of their labor, the increase of production for foreign trade, the import of 
international goods, and subsequent extravagance (shashi).” In sum, due to the capitalization of 
the colony, the colonial capitalists became wealthier while the natives became poorer.187  
Yanaihara’s critical insight into the exploitative nature of colonization in the era of 
imperialism is clearly expressed in his report to the Institute of Pacific Relations, “Problems of 
Japanese Administration in Korea,”188 published in 1938. In this report, drawing on Korea as a 
typical example, he criticizes the problems of the Japanese assimilationist colonial policy in the 
1920s and the 1930s.189 After WWI, Wilsonian principles had fostered an international mood in 
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which colonies demanded the right of self-determination. Korea’s independence movement 
broke out in 1919, as part of this international trend. In response, the Japanese government 
adopted a revised colonial policy in Korea with two principles, promoting industry and 
encouraging education to Japanize the Koreans by appeasing them on the one hand, the so-called 
“paternalistic protection and encouragement,” while, on the other hand, reinforcing the police 
force to suppress Communism and the Nationalist movement in Korea, “bureaucratic 
oppression.”190  
Yanaihara argues that these two principles make the Korean colonial government 
significantly financially dependent on the Imperial Treasury of Japan proper. In particular, he 
harshly criticizes the policy for aggravating this financial dependency, noting that the Japanese 
government does not encourage Korea to be financially independent from Japan, but focuses on 
keeping Korea’s economy dependent or subordinate to Japan’s economy. For instance, he draws 
on the example of the development of rice production in Korea with Japanese support beginning 
in 1920. The goal was to solve the food problem in Japan proper rather than to help the growth of 
the Korean economy. As the fear of shortages in Japan was eliminated, the Chosen Government-
General was compelled, in May, 1934, to curtail its extensive rice production program and to 
control and limit rice exports. In addition, stimulated by the trade boom during WWI, in 1917, 
the Japanese colonial government initiated several new industries – cotton spinning and the 
manufacture of sugar, cement, and iron – in Korea. However, as the trade boom ebbed away, 
those industries were no longer encouraged. Mining enterprises were undertaken during the same 
period, but their backers withdrew in the depression that followed the war. “Consequently,” 
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Yanaihara concludes, “the relations of Korea with Japan proper were on a typical colonial 
footing, Korea supplying the home country with agricultural products and depending on Japan 
for its industrial requirements, a situation characteristic of the relationship prevailing between 
home countries and colonies in the present industrial age.”191   
Yanaihara’s use of a pejorative term, “paternalistic,” to characterize the Japanese colonial 
policy reveals his intention to criticize the exploitative characteristic of the Japanese colonial 
policy.  He put the most emphasis on the fact that the policy of protection and encouragement 
did not give economic and political autonomy to Korea. In this sense, he thought that it affected 
the benefit that could accrue to the Korean people, which in the end would have an impact on 
Japan too. He praised the policy for bringing Korea “gradual modernization and capitalist 
advancement” through colonization, such as the emancipation of Koreans from the “corrupt and 
unscrupulous government of the old Korean dynasty” and their transformation from “victims of 
inertia and reclusive hermits” to “hard and diligent workers with ambitions.” Nevertheless, the 
Smithian colonial policy scholar pointed out that Japan would inevitably experience serious 
difficulties from refusing to “confer on the Koreans such political rights and privileges as the 
franchise and participation in defense services.” As he saw it, by prohibiting Koreans from 
having political autonomy, Japan precluded Korean people from planning the independent 
development of their own economy, and, as a result, Korean financial dependency on Japan 
proper continued, causing Japan to bear heavy financial burdens and incur conflicts with Koreans, 
whose political aspirations for independence only grew stronger as they modernized. He calls 
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this the limitations of an “undemocratic” and “despotic” colonial policy.192 
In sum, Yanaihara claims that actual colonization has the democratic effects of 
modernization contributing to the benefits of ordinary people in the metropole and the colony. 
But as the Japanese assimilation policy shows, he maintains, formal colonization monopolizing 
and politically controlling the colony creates significant colonial problems; Japan has to 
withstand enormous financial burdens to support the colonial government and to suppress the 
natives’ aspiration for national independence naturally resulting from modernization through 
colonization. Likewise, out of the mixture of Smithian and Marxist criticisms, Yanaihara 
advocates actual colonization, colonization of development, while criticizing formal colonization, 
colonization of exploitation.  
 
The Ideal of Colonial Policy: Development Without Exploitation 
 
Yanaihara himself finds a contradiction between actual colonization and formal 
colonization, that is, the problem that colonization is actually necessary but begs the question of 
how people can eliminate “colonization as subjugation and occupation with irrationalism 
(fugōrisei).”193 As a result, he dreams of a sort of international economic community of 
development without exploitation.  
As Yanaihara sees it, colonization as the settler group’s socio-economic activities in a 
new land for their own survival has existed throughout history and will exist as long as human 
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beings live on earth. Like his mentor, Nitobe, he regards the ideal of colonization is “the 
economic utilization of all parts of the earth with no part remaining unutilized.” He states, the 
size of the economy of a social group has expanded from a local economy, to a national, imperial, 
and ultimately an international economy. The establishment of an international economy like this, 
he argues, strengthens the foundation of the social groups’ economic lives by maximizing their 
production in both quality and quantity through international cooperation and the division of 
labor.194 
To realize the ideal of colonization, he lists three conditions that must be satisfied: the 
utilization of lands, the freedom of the movement of people and goods, and the solution of the 
conflicts between the settlers and the natives. First, people need to develop the wastelands into 
oikumene (habitable lands) in which people can live through actual colonization. Secondly, 
people and goods must be able to move freely internationally. The overproduced capital or labor 
must be able to circulate freely. He claims the perfect establishment of an international economy 
through the joint use of lands, agreeing with Nitobe, who argued for international socialism only 
in terms of lands for the humanization of the earth (the international expansion of oikumene) and 
the utmost development of humanity. And lastly, expanding Kant’s idea of international 
citizenship (sekaiteki kōminken) based on the principle of “hospitality (kantai),” the right of 
people being welcomed by the natives when they visit their lands, Yanaihara dreams of the “right 
to abode (taizaiken),” the right of the settler freely residing in the new lands permitted by the 
natives.195 Here, he asserts that just as formal colonization (occupation of lands by forcefully 
suppressing the natives) is an injustice (fugi), it is also a social injustice (shakaiteki fugi) that the 
                                           
194 Ibid., 465. 
195 This concept of “hospitality” originated from Kant, who claimed the “right of visit” (hōmonken) for facilitating 




natives, who do not have an ability to develop their broad wastelands, do not permit other social 
groups to come to their lands to develop them. It is a “selfish desire” (gayoku) standing 
comparison with the “violence” (hōryoku) of formal colonization.196  
In other words, Yanaihara is arguing for the reconstruction of empire and the liberalist 
development of internationalism for the idealistic realization of colonization. He claims “an 
organic unity between the settlers and the natives” (yūkiteki ketsugō) and “a unification of 
international social groups” (sekai shakaigun no tōitsu teki ketsugō) as the ideal state of 
colonization or actual colonization.197 As he sees it, such an international community can be 
established only on the principle of autonomy (jishushugi shokuminseisaku), which he explains 
as follows. 
Every social group that possesses an independent “group personality”198 (shūdan teki 
jinkaku) can achieve maximum development under its own historical constraints and 
circumstances, and promote the unification of human society worldwide through mutual 
cooperation. The principle of autonomy means neither the imposition of the average nor the 
elimination of the distinct characteristics of a social group. It aims primarily at creating a 
state of mutual help, instead of a state of war, among social groups. Should this ideal be 
achieved, a colony would become a place where the people suffered no oppression or 
enforcement; the need of social groups for survival would be satisfied; and people 
successfully could migrate without any territorial occupation.199  
 
Unlike assimilation policy that imposes the average, that is, the systems and values in the 
metropole, and eliminates the distinct customs and culture of the colony, Yanaihara argues that 
autonomy policy creates a state of mutual help by respecting the native group’s aspiration for 
individuality or national independence. Emphasizing that the native’s zeal for independence is “a 
social fact,” when it is ignored or violated by the settler, no colonial policy can succeed. In the 
same vein, when the native acts exclude the settler (haitateki), the result is devastating. He 
                                           
196 Ibid., 466-468. 
197 Ibid., 468. 
198 This is Yanaihara’s own translation of shūdan teki jinkaku. 
199 Ibid., 470. I owe the whole translation of this excerpt to Nakano. Nakano, 195. 
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argues that “just as an individual person can live as belonging to a society, a social group can live 
and develop as belonging to a society of social groups.”200  
This idea of empire as an organic unification among autonomous social groups resulted 
from the theory of plural states emphasizing the personality of social groups, which was 
prevalent in the 1920s in Japan. Based on 19th century liberal democracy, which focused on the 
balance between individual personality and political unity, the theory claimed unification through 
alliance (rengō teki tōitsu riron) among states as social groups.201 In addition, the establishment 
of the British Commonwealth after WWI became a great inspiration to Yanaihara. Depicting it as 
a “League of Nations within the League of Nations and a more solid unity of nations than the 
League of Nations,” he highly praised the British Commonwealth, claiming that “each dominion 
in it has autonomy as a nation and is not supposed to have a colonial rule by the Empire.” For 
him, it appeared to be “a great community via solidarity of autonomous nations, which would be 
effective not only from the utilitarian point of view but also from that of social justice within 
which group personality is respected.”202 
However, even the British Commonwealth did not seem like a permanently sustainable 
system of unification. Yanaihara mentions that at the first British Commonwealth Labour 
Conference in summer, 1925, where the members of the Labor Party and the labor union of the 
British Empire gathered, issues surfaced, such as that Indian laborers were being discriminated 
against in the South Africa Union and that British migrant applicants were being rejected in 
                                           
200 Under a belief in the principle of autonomy, Yanaihara advocated the establishment of autonomous assemblies 
and the responsible cabinet government in Korea and Taiwan. He thought that if autonomy policies were 
implemented, the metropole and the colony would separate naturally while being “bound together by the ties of 
mutual benefits and friendship.” Yanaihara, “Chōsen Tōchi no Hōshin,” YTZ I, 742-743. 
201 Sakai, Kindai Nihon no Kokusai Chitsujoron, 135. 
202 Yanaihara, Shokumin Shokumin oyobi Shokumin Seisaku, YTZ I, 478-483; Sakai, “The Political  
Discourse of International Order in Modern Japan,” 239. 
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Canada and Australia. In these cases, it was argued that the white laborers worked better than the 
Indian laborers, or that there were not enough jobs even for the Canadians and the Australians.203  
Disappointed by the fact that even the British Commonwealth, seemingly observing the principle 
of autonomy, was likely to be threatened because of people’s search for self-interest,204 
Yanaihara concluded his masterpiece with a utopian message.  
 “Scientifically or historically, nothing can guarantee the realization of the ideal of 
autonomy policy,” he states, “[therefore], hope! And religion! I believe. Peace will be achieved 
in the eternal love of the strong Son of God.”205 Ironically enough, the colonial policy scholar, 
who aspired above all to be practical and scientific, found the most effective way of solving the 




Out of a deep sympathy toward people suffering in the colony and the metropole in the 
era of imperialism, Yanaihara conscientiously searched for an alternative form of empire. 
Influenced by Smithian economics and Marxist critical theories against imperialism, in the 
democratic atmosphere in the 1920s after WWI, Yanaihara argued for reconstructing the empire 
as an organic international economic entity among autonomous nations, which would co-operate 
with each other under the principle of mutual aids. This argument expressed the Smithian 
                                           
203 Yanaihara, Ibid., 479. 
204 Yanaihara showed this kind of pessimistic opinion about other political-economic systems too. In his eyes, 
neither capitalism (whether it is laissez-faire capitalism or monopoly capitalism) nor socialism, which necessitated 
an international economic system, could suggest a sustainable way of making the empire or the economic union an 
organic and amicable (yūkiteki yūgiteki) entity. Both systems seemed likely to be easily dissolved due to people’s 
self-interest. Ibid., 480-481. 
205 Ibid., 483. 
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advocate’s dream of the eventual end of “empire,” operating under the principle of subjugation 
and suppression.  
Yanaihara’s unique definition of colonization, the socio-economic movement of a social 
group and the socio-economic encounter between different social groups, came out of his wish to 
end the current form of “empire.” He divided colonization into two kinds, actual and formal, and 
put value and no-value on each respectively. Actual colonization represented the formation of an 
organic international economic community for the development for all humanity, while formal 
colonization stood for “empire,” that is, the imperialist monopoly of the colony through political 
occupation and suppression, which was harmful for the benefit of humanity. Hepful to that, 
according to him, was actual colonization without formal colonization, that is, an international 
economic entity for development without exploitation. In his eyes, this idea, inspired by Smith’s 
argument for the general and particular advantages of colonization, was an “internationalist” idea, 
not an “imperialist” one. He even acknowledged as the given “social facts” “the human demands 
for survival, migration, and colonization resulting from the development of economic exchanges 
(keizai kōtsū no hatten) [necessitating an international economic system], and the national 
aspiration of independence of all social groups” (kaku shakaigun no dokuritsu teki shūdan 
ishiki).206 Therefore, to him, internationalist colonization could be a solution for “eternal world 
peace” (eikyūteki heiwa jitsugen) without violent conflicts involved.  
 In fact, Yanaihara’s binary concept of colonization, propelled by his pro-modernization 
advocacy, produced a critical historical legacy in the later decades. Tōbata Seiichi, after 
succeeding Yanaihara in 1939, the middle of wartime, as the chair of Colonial Policy Studies at 
Tokyo Imperial University, greatly relied on Yanaihara’s colonial theory to make his own. As one 
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of the main architects for theorizing the Japanese imperialist propaganda, the East Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere Policy, he reformulated Yanaihara’s theory to support Japan’s wartime 
mobilization.  
In particular, the two intellectual sources in Yanaihara’s theory were significantly re-
conceptualized by Tōbata. First, Yanaihara’s advocacy of Smith’s idea of general advantages of 
colonization was reread to beautify the Japanese Empire as the “sphere of co-prosperity” in 
which all “independent” members constructed “an organic international economic community 
for the economic development of all in it.” Secondly, Yanaihara’s reliance on the Marxist 
criticism of imperialism was employed to criticize the British Empire representing all the 
Western enemies fighting against Japan and its allies during WWII. The division between 
development and exploitation under the binary framework of actual colonization and formal 
colonization was transformed by Tōbata into a division with a geographic difference; the 
Japanese Empire was depicted as a sphere of development without exploitation, while the British 
Empire was characterized as a sphere of exploitation.  
In sum, the liberalist transnationalism in the 1920s shown in Yanaihara contained a 
logical linkage to be transformed into hegemonic regionalism in the 1930s. The thread of 
continuity was the discursive framework of pro-modernization ideas that had been constructed 
by the Smithian tradition of Colonial Policy Studies since Nitobe. In next chapter, by 
investigating Tōbata’s colonial theory, I will reveal the continuity of the discursive framework 
reproduced with a new title of “development” in the 1930s and 1940s and its lasting effects on 










This chapter examines the continuing development of Japanese colonial discourse under 
Tōbata Seiichi (1899-1983). He had served as the chair of Colonial Policy Studies at Tokyo 
Imperial University from 1939 when Yanaihara Tadao left the position to 1945 when the 
Japanese empire collapsed. This chapter analyzes Tōbata’s concepts of colony, colonization and 
empire and displays how he conceived the relationship between the colony and the metropole 
during the so-called Fifteen Years War from 1931 to 1945.207 In doing so, it argues for the 
continuity of Japanese colonial thought from the 1920s to 1945, and shows how this thinking 
persisted in Japanese international relations in the postwar era after 1945. In other words, in this 
chapter, I explore the transition of Japanese colonial discourse from liberalist transnationalism in 
the 1920s established by Nitobe and Yanaihara to hegemonic regionalism in the 1930s theorized 
                                           
207 The term, “the Fifteen Years War (15 nen sensō),” indicates the historical period of fifteen years from the 
Manchurian Incident in 1931 through the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 to the end of the Pacific War in 1945 
in modern Japanese history. In contrast to the attitude of his contemporaries, who limited the Japanese wartime 
period to the Pacific War, 1941-1945, Ienaga Saburō, who first used the term in Japanese history in 1956, insisted 
the Pacific War be understood in the context of a longer process of Japanese imperialism. By using the term, he 
intended to clarify Japan’s war responsibility. Another historian, Tsurumi Shunsuke also shared a similar idea with 
Ienaga by coincidentally inventing the same term himself in 1956. See, Ienaga Saburō, “chishikijin no 
sensōsekinin,” Chūō kōron, January, 1956; “Nihon chishikijin no amerika zō,” Chūō kōron, July, 1956; Taiheiyō 




by Tōbata. Also, I deal with the subsequent transition from hegemonic regionalism in the 1930s 
and the 1940s to democratic transnationalism in the post-1945 era, which was exemplified by the 
academic and bureucratic career of Tōbata.208   
Tōbata, born in 1899 in Mie prefecture in Japan as the first son of a landowning farmer, 
became an assistant professor in the Faculty of Agriculture at Tokyo Imperial University in 1924. 
After studying in America and Germany from 1926 to 1929, primarily under the guidance of 
Schumpeter, he returned to Japan, to the same department and the same university, and 
established his fame as an agricultural economic policy expert and an importer of Schumpeter’s 
economics to Japan. In the 1930s, he was actively engaged in various research committees for 
planning national policy, such as the Showa Research Association (Showa Kenkyūkai),209 the 
think tank of the Prime Minister, Konoe Fumimaro. After assuming the chair of Colonial Policy 
Studies in the Faculty of Economics at Tokyo Imperial University in 1939, while continuing to 
hold his professorship in the Faculty of Agriculture, he participated in making colonial policy as 
well in the Showa Research Association and other government-led research committees such as 
the Philippines Research Committee (Hitō Chōsa Iinkai).210 In these institutions, notably, he 
theorized the economy section of the “East Asia Cooperative Community (Tōa Kyōdōtai)” policy, 
which was the Japanese government’s official colonial policy beginning with the Second Sino-
Japanese War in 1937 and continuing through the end of the Japanese empire. His theory went by 
the name of the “Grand Regional Economy” (kōiki keizai ken)211.   
                                           
208 Here I adapted the terms, “liberalist transnationalism” and “hegemonic regionalism,” from Sakai Tetsuya’s study, 
“The Political Discourse of International Order in Modern Japan: 1868-1945,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 
9(2) (Cambridge University Press, 2008): 234. In original, “liberalist transnationalism” is termed by Sakai as 
“liberalist-oriented transnationalism.” 
209 Sakai Saburō, Showa Kenkyūkai: Aru chishikijin shūdan no kiseki (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1992). 
210 Morita Ryōji, “Nihon Shakai Kagaku to Shokuminchi Ajia.” 
211 “Regional Sphere” can be an alternative translation. “Grand Regional Economy” is Tōbata’s own translation of 
his term, “kōiki keizai ken.”  
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Although Tōbata was one of the main figures who laid the theoretical foundations for 
colonial policy during the Pacific War, his colonial ideas have rarely been examined by 
scholars.212 Instead, what attracted the attention of academia was his postwar economic thought 
and activities.213 This focus on Tōbata’s later career occurred because he was regarded as a key 
figure in the process of Japan’s economic reconstruction in the postwar. In particular, Prime 
Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s offer to him for the Minister of Agriculture in 1946214 and his major 
role in drafting the Basic Law of Agriculture of 1961215 assured his place in the postwar 
economic history. Tōbata’s modernist and developmentalist ideas, largely derived from 
Schumpeter, have been assessed as a theoretical basis underlying the economic miracle of the 
postwar Japan. Yet, the scholars who make these claims strictly limit his academic influence 
exclusively to the agricultural economy, as if his scholarly interests had always been confined to 
Japan’s domestic economy.  
As the brief overview of Tōbata’s career shows, however, he was a colonial policy 
expert as well as an agricultural economist. During the colonial period, he interpreted the 
domestic economic problems of Japan in the larger context of empire, relating them to the 
situation of the colonies. His modernist and developmentalist stance was formulated in this 
                                           
212 The exceptions are Morita Ryōji’s Ph. D dissertation and article, in which Tōbata’s colonial theory is examined 
in relation to his activity in the Philippines Research Committee. See, Morita Ryōji, “Nihon Shakai Kagaku to 
Shokuminchi Ajia”; “Tōbata Seiichi no Philippine: ‘Shokumin seisaku gaku’ kara ‘chiiki kenkyū’e no tenkai,” 
Shakai Shisōshi kenkyū, no. 21 (1997). Other than Morita, Sakai Tetsuya briefly mentions the theoretical 
relationship between Tōbata and Yanaihara in his analysis of Yanaihara’s colonial theory. Sakai TetsuyKindai 
Nihon no Kokusai Chitsujoron (Tokyo: Iwanami Koza, 2007).    
213 Shinozaki Takao, Tōbata Seiichi no Keizai shishō: kyōdōkumiai, kigyōsha, soshite chiiki (Nihon Keizai Hyōron 
sha, 2008); Minoguchi Takeo, “Tōbata Seiichi and Japanese Agriculture,” Ikeo 1999; Yagi Kiichirō, “Japanese 
Theory of Industrialization/Modernization between Liberalism and Developmentalism,” in Werner Pascha ed., 
Systematic Change in the Japanese and German Economies: Convergence and Differentiation as a Dual Challenge 
(NY: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); Mark Metzler, Capital as will and imagination: Schumpeter’s Guide to the Postwar 
Japanese Miracle (Cornell, 2013); Andrew E. Barshay, The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: The Marxian and 
Modernist Traditions, (Univ. of California, 2004). 
214 Yoshida Shigeru, Yoshida Shigeru: Last Meiji Man, translated and edited by Hiroshi Nara (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2007): 63. 
215 Yagi, “Japanese Theory,” 23. 
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process, as he sought to nurture the economic development of Japan within broader transnational 
boundaries. In light of this history, his economic thought cannot be examined without seriously 
considering his ideas constructed during the imperial period. 
Tōbata’s postwar activities further illustrate why studying his colonial theory is 
important. After rejecting Yoshida’s offer to be the Minister of Agriculture, Tōbata became the 
director of the National Research Institute of Agricultural Economics newly established by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and, at the same time, the director of the Institute of Developing 
Economies, a support institution for the Official Development Assistance (ODA) which was 
Japan’s overseas developmental funding program.216 This is a close reenactment of what Tōbata 
did during the wartime, when he held a joint professorship in the department of Agriculture and 
Colonial Policy Studies. Tōbata’s academic journey from agricultural economy to colonial policy 
and his subsequent attempt to integrate the two fields strongly suggest that his ideas of Japanese 
domestic economic development were formulated based on his theory about broader regional 
economic system.  
It shoud be mentioned that I am not trying to explain Tōbata’s whole economic theory in 
the postwar period through his colonial ideas. Rather, my aim here is to criticize the tendency of 
the previous studies on Tōbata to overlook the continuities in his thought from the wartime to the 
postwar era. In my view, this tendency to deny the theoretical link across 1945 is related to the 
sharp division that these scholars have maintained between internationalism and imperialism, 
which I pointed out in the introduction of this dissertation. The previous scholars seemed to think 
that Tōbata’s wartime discourse was too imperialist to be incorporated into his postwar 
democratic thought, which took an internationalist stance on regional economic development 
                                           
216 Yagi, Ibid., 23. 
109 
 
through mutual aids and cooperation. For them, the East Asia Cooperative Community policy 
had nothing to do with the Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the sense that the former 
was exploitative while the latter was supportive and developmental.  
My study of Tōbata’s colonial theory, by contrast, will show the continuity between 
wartime Japanese empire and democratic postwar Japan. I argue that the Grand Regional 
Economy policy, a theoretical tool for wartime mobilization, was in fact the one presenting a 
strategy and “model of economic development for late developing countries.” By exploring this 
logical basis of the policy—on which the fully exposed wartime propaganda had relied—and by 
noting its survival even after the war and its role in Japan’s foreign economic support system in 
the postwar era, I offer critical insight into Japan’s postwar economic history and policy. 
Many believe that the Grand Regional Economy policy, which was an exploitative 
ideological tool for Japanese imperialism, relied on Japan’s sense of superiority and the 
justification of its colonial hegemony. In fact, however, this policy was based on an appeal for 
“equality” between Japan and its colonies and for their “right of self-determination” as 
independent countries. It actually identified Japan with its colonies as a late developing country 
and depicted the national independence of Japan and its colonies as being threatened by the more 
developed Western countries. Its message was that the Japanese empire must be reconstructed 
into a regional economic community in which all countries could develop their own national 
economies for their own national survival by following a unified economic policy directed by 
Japan, the leading country of the region. Consequently, Tōbata called it a model of “regional 
economic development without exploitation.” Interestingly enough, he again used the exact 
phrase, “regional economic development without exploitation,” in the postwar era as the motto 
of the ODA plan for the Japanese foreign support system. It is a historical irony that the 
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exploitative wartime mobilization and the democratic economic support plan shared the same 
logical underpinnings. 
My observations on this foundational logic for wartime Japanese imperialism would 
contribute in a couple of ways to the field of modern Japanese history. Firstly, they call for a 
reconsideration of the prevailing view of the discourse on the East Asia Cooperative Community. 
This discourse has been regarded as the “criticism of nationalism and the right of self-
determination.” For example, Sakai Tetsuya argued in his work on the political discourse of 
international order in Japan that the discourse of Japan’s hegemonic regionalism was destined to 
be “not national self-determination but rather ‘cooperation among nations.’”217 In other words, 
he constrasted the logic of national self-determination, the cornerstone of Wilsonian ideals, with 
the logic of communal social construction. My research on Tōbata, however, presents a different 
idea that in the discourse on the East Asia Cooperative Community the two logics were not 
contradictory but complementary. In its attempts to colonize the Manchukuo (the Japanese 
puppet state in Northeast China), China (a semi-colony), and the Southeast Asian colonies of 
Western colonizers, Japan adopted a strategy of first claiming the national independence of these 
“countries,” in order to eliminate the claims of other imperial powers to them. It then deployed 
the logic of a regional economic community of independent nations to give the characteristic of 
the Japanese empire. In presenting the expansionist discourse of hegemonic regionalism in the 
1930s through 1945, Tōbata used the very discursive ground that Yanaihara had built in the 
1920s; a logic of integration between national self-determination and transnationalism. My 
finding provides a clearer explanation of the logical linkage between the liberalist 
internationalism in the 1920s and the expansionist imperialism in the 1930s and the 1940s. It also 
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helps explain in what ways the Japanese wartime colonial discourse was transformed in the 
postwar era, particularly, in the process of decolonization, that is, in the national reconstruction 
of Japan as well as of its former colonies.   
Secondly, my understanding of the logical basis of wartime Japanese imperialism calls 
for a critical revision of the binary way of thinking that has consistently dominated the postwar 
studies of Japanese colonialism. The question that structures these studies is whether Japanese 
colonization was for “the development of the colony or the exploitation of the colony.”218 By 
illuminating the origin of this binary way of thinking, my study blurs the clear line of 
demarcation between development and exploitation. I argue that the binary framework in fact 
originated from Japanese colonial policy scholars’ imagination of “regional economic 
development without exploitation.” This concept, which Yanaihara Tadao, influenced by Smith, 
originally posited as a critique against imperialism, was appropriated by Tōbata, who used it to 
advocate the superiority of Japanese colonialism over Western case. By examining the process in 
which the idea was transformed from Yanaihara to Tōbata, I will show the historical process by 
which development and exploitation, inseparably intertwined in the nature of colonization, were 
imagined as two separable things. In other words, by historicizing the binary framework itself, I 
will point out its limitation. As seen in Tōbata’s case, the binary was employed to disguise the 
fact that Japan needed to develop and exploit its colonies to expand its sphere of power and 
influence.  
In this chapter, I will explore the theoretical basis of wartime Japanese imperialism by 
tracing the logical process by which Tōbata theorized the Grand Regional Economy. I will argue 
that it was constructed on the theoretical three-fold basis of Schumpeter-Smith-List to claim the 
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Japanese empire as a model of regional economic development for late developing countries. 
Following the order of these theoretical roots, this chapter will consist of four sections.  
The first and second sections will examine Tōbata’s ideas of colonization and colony, 
tracing how they were influenced by Schumpeter’s economics. Tōbata viewed colonization as 
the movement of capital, not people, and the colony as a place where “creation,” a 
Schumpeterian term standing for “economic development,” takes place. Here, through a 
comparison with Nitobe and Yanaihara, I will argue that Tōbata advanced such a modernist and 
developmentalist view in order to display the possibility of Japan’s economic development in the 
midst of the economic crisis during the Fifteen Years War. In the third section, I examine the 
process by which his idea of colony was expanded to that of empire. Focusing on Tōbata’s new 
coinage, “Counter-Colonization,” I will show that Tōbata incorporated Smith’s view of the 
British Commonwealth into his Schumpeterian concept of colony to claim that the empire was a 
sphere of mutual economic development between the metropole and the colony. This will 
illuminate the process in which Yanaihara’s interpretation of Smith on transnationalism in the 
1920s was adapted into Tōbata’s colonial ideas in the 1930s. Lastly, in the fourth section dealing 
with the Grand Regional Economy, I will discuss how Tōbata’s view of empire was reified in the 
late 1930s while Japan was conducting the two major wars. Responding to the increasing need 
for total mobilization, the Japanese empire became redefined as an organic regional economic 
community among independent developing countries in which they worked together in unison 
for their national survival under the guidance of one leading country, Japan. Tōbata completed 
his theory by adding List’s economics to his Schumpeter-Smith combination. I will examine the 
process in which the contradiction between the equality of Japan and its colonies and the 
hierarchy acknowledging Japan’s dictatorship was resolved by Tōbata’s effective deployment of 
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Schumpeter’s concept of “entrepreneur,” Smith’s idea of “international division of labor,” and 
List’s category of “national system.” In the conclusion, I will discuss the historical legacy of 
Tōbata’s colonial ideas on Japan and its neighboring countries in the postwar era of 
decolonization. During the colonial period before 1945, Tōbata’s colonial theory, emphasizing an 
entrepreneur’s leading role for the rapid and effective economic development of all, justified 
Japan’s dictatorship as necessary for other developing countries to reach the same economic 
level as Japan. And the political tensions, such as social unrest or ethnic conflicts within the 
empire, were regarded as problems that must be managed through governmental controls to 
allow rapid economic development. I will argue that these colonial ideas evolved into 
modernization theory and developmental dictatorship theory (kaihatsu dokusai ron)219 in Japan 
and its neighboring countries in the postwar era when the world was reconstructed into Cold War 
camps.  
Reflecting his dual professorship, Tōbata left two groups of works: on agricultural 
economics and on colonial policy theory. In this study, I will mainly analyze his works on 
colonial policy theory, including academic essays, newspaper articles, encyclopedia entries, and 
reports to the Takumushō, which were published between 1940 and 1944 while he was the chair 
of the Colonial Policy Studies. In addition to these, I will also examine some of his works on 
economics as far as they are relevant to colonial problems, such as his analysis of the Korean 
agricultural economy. In the list of primary sources, I include his autobiography and his 
disciples’ memoirs of him. Lastly, some unpublished documents—for example, reports and 
minutes of Showa Kenkyukai meetings stored in Tōbata’s personal collection at the Mie 
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Prefectural Library in Japan, and photos, certificates of commendation and letters of appreciation 
that he received from the Japanese government preserved at the Tōhata Memorial Museum at the 
Mie Agricultural College—have an influence on this study; they demonstrate the continuity in 
Tōbata’s career, that is, as a bureaucrat who was engaged in international economic policy from 
wartime to postwar Japan. 
 
Colonization: The Movement of Capital 
 
In August 1940, Tōbata published his first paper on colonial theory, titled “The 
Substance of Colonization.”220 Heralding his new start as a colonial policy theorist with an 
agricultural economy background, this article introduced the main concepts and structure of his 
colonial theory, which would lay a foundation for his later works. In this section, I will start with 
his concept, the “transplantation of capital” (shokkin), to examine the basic feature of his colonial 
theory. I will examine this concept in comparison with the views of his predecessors in Colonial 
Studies—Nitobe and Yanaihara. Tōbata himself makes this comparison when he says:     
The word, “colonization,” originally meant movement of people. Our translation of the word, 
“shokumin” [植民 literally means “transplantation of people”] particularly well proves it. A 
recent trend shows, however, that the priority in colonization is shifting to the movement of 
capital rather from that of mere labor (rōdōjinko). There is no need to remain loyal to the 
original setting in which the word was created. What is important is to see the changes that 
have happened subsequently in the setting. We must not adhere to “people.” The word 
“transplantation of capital” (植金 shokukin) also stands for colonization.221    
 
In this statement, Tōbata attempts to intervene in the existing tradition of Colonial Policy 
Studies. Criticizing his predecessors, Nitobe and Yanaihara, who regarded the movement of 
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people as the most important element of colonization, he argues that the movement of capital 
rather than people encapsulates the nature of the colonization of his time. Using his own word, 
“shokukin” (transplantation of capital), he emphasizes that colonization is an economic activity 
after all. Politics and culture can be adjusted according to the economy in his view.  
He explains this trend toward the transplantation of capital as a historical transition in 
the form of colonization. Although colonization has existed throughout history, he states, it was 
not until the Industrial Revolution in the 19th century that it was conducted mainly through 
economic factors, relatively independent from social, political, or other factors. In his view, the 
early form of modern colonization, such as the British colonization of America and Australia, 
took place in “uninhabited lands” mainly to alleviate the problem of overpopulation in Britain. 
That is, in this period, a multitude of British people moved to the New World, and the colony 
existed as an extension of the motherland (bokoku no enchō). But in the 19th century, as seen 
from the European colonization of Asia, he argues, colonization began to occur through the 
movement of excess capital to an “existing society,” resulting from the problem of 
overcapitalization in colonizing countries.222 Arguing that colonization can be explained more 
accurately with the term “migration of capital” than of people, in this period, Tōbata points out 
that mass migration disappears as the movement of people becomes a mere by-product of the 
movement of capital.223  
As the best example of this contemporary trend in colonization, Tōbata draws on the 
phenomenon of the “semi-colony” (han shokuminchi)—for example, China and some countries 
in the Balkans and South America, which were not politically subsumed under any single 
colonizer, but were economically dominated by several colonizing countries. Characterizing the 
                                           
222 Ibid., 14-16. 
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20th century as “the era of international conflict to maintain semi-colonies, not to acquire 
colonies,”224 he argues that the colonial relationship has now changed from a one-to-one 
relationship between colonizer and colony to a one-to-many, that is, between one colony (or one 
country that will likely be colonized) and many imperialist colonizers. He explains this trend as 
follows, relating it to the change in the nature of capital that had occurred since the late 19th 
century. 
[Since the late 19th century, the age of imperialism] a national category has been added to 
capital, which was originally an economic category, and therefore nationality becomes 
attached to capital. At this time, a nation-state exports capital [to other countries] as a means of 
its national expansion……. In order to export capital, first of all, the state provides guarantees 
and guidance. Then, the state exports capital for itself. In this case, however, we never see a 
simple commercial transaction. The state pushes the export of capital forward to promote 
national interest (keneiki), not profits (lijun). Thus, general security (ippanteki tanppo) is put 
in place in the country where the capital is exported, and therefore the state, obtaining the right 
to do business (jigyō sankaken), dispatches technical advisers and makes directs investments. 
Likewise, there emerges a relationship of domination (shihai) or compulsion (kyōryoku), 
which clearly shows the nature of colony (shokuminsei).225  
 
Here, Tōbata points out as the main feature of capitalist development in the late 19th 
century that capital began to be associated with nationality and became a means of domination. 
In this era of imperialism, as he sees it, imperialist powers started to export their capital to other 
countries for their national interests, not for profits. And as a result, he argues that the so-called 
semi-colony emerges, that is, a “region (chiiki) surrounded by several colonizing motherlands, 
not a single motherland.”226 He explains, since no power wants the semi-colony to become 
another power’s exclusive political colony, the imperialist powers manage to keep a balance of 
power among themselves. They leave the semi-colony as a politically independent country in a 
formal sense, but in actuality they colonize it collectively by expanding their own respective 
national interest in the region through capital investment. Tōbata argues that this semi-colony, 
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the most contemporary form of colony, can be explained only through an economic approach 
focusing on the migration of capital.   
In sum, Tōbata’s colonial theory is characterized by his unique definition of colonization 
as occurring in two stages, that is, first the transplantation of people (shokumin) and, second, the 
transplantation of capital (shokukin). By defining colonization since the 19th century as the 
transplantation of capital, he attempts to revise the tradition of Colonial Policy Studies that had 
earlier defined colonization as transplantation of people. What remains to be seen, then, is what 
theoretical differences can be found between him and Nitobe or Yanaihara, and where these 
differences originate. 
First of all, unlike Nitobe, Tōbata views colonization as an economic activity. By 
contrast, Nitobe regards colonization as a political activity of the state. Nitobe emphasized 
people’s movement in his view of colonization because he thought that the people stood for 
nationality. In his definition, colonization meant the movement of people from the motherland to 
the new land and the subsequent result of the movement—the political relationship between the 
motherland and the new land. Therefore, he did not consider the British people’s movement to 
the New World as modern colonization because it was motivated by private groups with private 
goals. However, Tōbata takes this case into account. He calls this movement of a number of 
British people the first form of colonization in the modern era, which was motivated by the 
problem of overpopulation in Britain.  
In this regard, Tōbata seems to have something in common with Yanaihara. For 
Yahaihara, who defined colonization as a socio-economic activity by social groups, the British 
colonization of America and Australia was a clear example of colonization. Yanaihara and Tōbata 
have a more comprehensive definition of the colony than Nitobe did, so that their definitions can 
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encompass all cases of colonies throughout human history.227 In fact, based on his own 
comments on his predecessor, Tōbata seems to acknowledge his theoretical debts to Yanaihara. 
Tōbata has given him high praise for the comprehensiveness and precision of his colonial 
theory.228  
Tōbata, unlike Yanaihara, attempts to examine the phenomenon of colonization as an 
exclusively economic activity, disregarding its social nature. While Yanaihara took the socio-
economic approach in order to address both the benefits and the negative impact of colonization, 
that is, the economic development for humanity as well as the economic exploitation of the 
colony and subsequent colonial problems such as national conflicts, Tōbata focuses only on the 
economic effects of colonization. This difference is clearly found in their views of the rise of 
monopoly capital in the late 19th century. While Yanaihara harshly criticized it as the main reason 
for the rise of exploitative (or “formal”) colonization, Tōbata, without any value judgment, 
plainly describes it as one of the phenomena seen in capitalist development in the modern era.  
More specifically speaking, Tōbata makes a positive assessment of the movement of 
capital, whether it is monopoly capital or not, stating that it brings about economic development 
in the colony. He believes that the colonizing country’s investment and trading activity in the 
colony facilitate the modernization of the colony, as did Rōyama Masamichi, the founder of 
Japanese international politics. Rōyama, an old brother of Tōbata’s close friend, was his 
admiring mentor from his adolescence.229 Tōbata followed Rōyama, who had a functionalist 
                                           
227 Nonetheless, Yanaihara’s concept is more comprehensive than Tōbata’s since it includes immigration and 
internal colonization in the category of colonization. Tōbata argues that these cannot be called colonization because 
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more detail, see the next section in this chapter, “Colony as Creation.” 
228 Tōbata Seiichi, “Shokumingaku no taikan,” Tōkyō teikoku daikaku gakujutsu taikan hōgakubu keizaigakubu 
(Tōkyō teikoku daigaku, 1942): 652-653. 
229 Tōbata Seiichi, Watashi no Rirekisho (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1979): 208. After growing up, they 
worked together in the Showa Research Association [Showa kenkyūkai] and on the Philippines Research Committee 
119 
 
understanding of international relations. Both of them expected that American capital that 
penetrated into China would promote the modernization of China to increase the mutual 
dependence among the states and to facilitate the establishment of a regional order for peace in 
the Pacific Rim.230 
  
Colony as Creation 
 
Finding the main essence of colonization in the movement of capital, Tōbata argued that 
the reason he took an economic approach was because it could best capture the most 
contemporary trend of colonization of his time, that is, the emergence of the semi-colony. But I 
would argue that another reason why he took this approach was because of his firm belief that 
colonization necessarily brought economic development to the colony. And I would like to 
highlight the fact that he owed such a belief to his mentor, Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1883-1950), 
an Austrian-born economist who was one of the most influential economists in the 20th century. 
In this section, I will show how Tōbata framed his colonial theory with the basic concepts of 
Schumpeter’s economics, particularly the concept of “creation.”  
Tōbata met Schumpeter in 1929 when he studied in Germany at the University of Bonn. 
With Nakayama Ichirō,231 Tōbata became an ardent student of Schumpeter. Returning home to 
Japan, they translated their mentor’s book into Japanese and published it in 1937, titled Theory of 
                                                                                                                                        
[hitō chōsa iinkai]. For the activities of the Philippines Research Committee, see Morita Ryōji, “Nihon Shakai 
Kagaku to Shokuminchi Ajia,” 72-79. 
230 Sakai Tetsuya, “‘Tōa Kyōdōtai ron’ kara ‘Kindaika ron’ e,” Kindai Nihon no Kokusai Chitsujoron (Tokyo: 
Iwanami Koza, 2007): 
231 Nakayama Ichirō (1898-1981) was a professor of Economics at Tokyo Commercial University (Hitotsubashi 
University at present). He contributed to industrialization and labor relations in postwar Japan.   
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Economic Development (Keizai Hatten no Riron).232 Employing Schumpeter’s ideas on profits, 
capital, credit, interest, and the business cycle, they also published their own analyses of the 
Japanese economy.233 After becoming the head of Colonial Policy Studies, Tōbata used his 
expertise in Schumpeter’s economics to create his own colonial theory. Therefore, I will first 
introduce Schumpeter’s economic theory before examining Tōbata’s colonial theory.  
In the preface to the 1937 Japanese edition of his book, Theory of Economic 
Development, Schumpeter clarified his intellectual debts to Léon Walras (1834-1910) and Karl 
Marx (1818-1883). According to Hungarian historical economist, Aladár Madarász, Schumpeter 
thought that the equilibrium theory of Walras was theoretically important in that it provided a 
precise foundation for the theory of exchange, prices, and money, as well as an explanation of 
distribution. On the other hand, Walrus’ theory could not explain the dynamics of the economy, 
or economic development, as Marx did, because it preferred a stationary process in which the 
economic system reproduced itself unchanged over a period of time.234 Thus, Schumpeter 
attempted to explain the process of economic development and in the end concluded that 
economic growth took place in the conditions where the status of equilibrium was broken, such 
as in economic crises.  
On economic crises, Schumpeter stated as follows: 
It is the essence of economic development that the means of production, which, up to then, 
have been employed in a defined static manner, are withdrawn and put in the service of new 
                                           
232 Joseph Schumpeter, Tōbata Seiichi and Nakamura Ichirō trans, Keizai hatten no riron (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1937); 
The Deutsch original, Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (Leipzig, 1912); The English translation, Theory of 
Economic Development (Cambridge, Mass. 1934). 
233 Nakayama Ichirō, Junsui Keizaigaku (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1933); Tōbata Seiichi, Nihon Nōgyō no Tenkai 
Katei (Tokyo: Tōyō shuppansha, January 1936). Tōbata’s book was expanded and published by Iwanami Shoten in 
June, 1936.  
234 Aladár Madarász, “Economists and Economic Thought: Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic Development,” Acta 
Oeconomica 25, no. 3/4 (Budapest Hungary, 1981): 343. This article is a separate publication of the author’s 
introduction to the Hungarian version of Schumpeter’s book. To write this section, I owe a great deal to Madarász’s 
summary of Schumpeter’s economic theory. 
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ends. Here this is called the process of carrying out new combinations. These are not realized, 
as it were, automatically, as the customary combinations of statics, but they demand the sort of 
intelligence and energy over which only a minority of economic subjects dispose. The 
carrying out of such new combinations is the specific function of entrepreneurs.235  
 
For Schumpeter, economic crises were the time when the static status of general 
equilibrium was disturbed by some factors and the time precisely when economic development 
occurred through entrepreneurship, which carried out new combinations of means of production, 
or innovation, to bring a new level of equilibrium. As Madarász summed up, the essence of 
Schumpeter’s theory of business cycles—economic fluctuations in his terminology—remained 
“entrepreneurial activity, its appearance in swarms, disturbances in the equilibrium resulting 
from innovations, the spread and reception of the innovation, and the achievement of a new state 
of equilibrium.”236 Rejecting the presumption of continuous and automatic development in the 
neo-classical theory of circular flow, he emphasized discontinuous change due to the economic 
disturbances resulting from factors that were intrinsic to the capitalist system; and he viewed the 
entrepreneur as innovator in times of disturbance and crisis. For Schumpeter, in this sense, the 
Great Depressions in 1929 were “far from being unmitigated social evils but actually in the 
nature of ‘a good cold douche’ for the capitalist system.”237  
Schumpeter’s theory had a great influence on Tōbata, especially when he tried to find a 
solution to the economic crisis, from which his home country suffered severely. In 1930, when 
he came back to Japan from Germany having finished his study under Schumpeter, he observed 
his home country experiencing crucial damage caused by the Great Depression. During this so-
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called Showa Agricultural Shock238, the half-agricultural country was suffering a sharp decline of 
silk and rice prices, aggravated by the massive import of rice from its colonies such as Korea and 
Taiwan.239 In the midst of the economic depression, Japan also saw political turmoil, for 
example the assassinations of major political figures by young right-wing officials after the 
Manchurian Incident. At this time, Tōbata felt urgently that he had to make economic plans to 
resolve the crisis.240 Therefore, he published two books, one about the structure and the 
development of the agricultural economy of Japan and the other about the structure of the 
agricultural economy of its colony, Korea.241 In these books, Tōbata insisted that Japan must 
reform its systems with an entrepreneurial approach, and argued that the economic crises caused 
by the international economy, including a competitive colonial economy, offered a perfect 
opportunity to make such domestic reforms.242 Here, in all likelihood, he was influenced by the 
Schumpeterian idea that “business fluctuation is the essence of the capitalist economy.”243 
Meanwhile, after taking charge of Colonial Policy Studies at Tokyo Imperial University 
in 1939, Tōbata needed to re-conceptualize the colony and the colonial relationship between the 
colony and the motherland. Before 1939, he believed that the colony was just one of the external 
factors that had an influence on the Japanese agricultural economy. But after 1939, he felt the 
need to focus on the colony as much as on Japan. And to create his own colonial theory, the 
newly-appointed colonial policy theorist began to reconstruct Schumpeter’s economic theory.  
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“[To define it simply], colonization is the process in which a new society is created or an 
existing society is forcefully transformed by the movement of the means of production (which 
are labor and capital) in the arena of conflict among colonial powers.” (shokumin genshō wo 
kantan ni teigishite, rekkyō sōtō no jinchū nioite seisan shūdan (sōryoku to shihon) no idō 
niyotte zakki sareru shinshakai no sōzō katei moshiku wa kison shakai no kyōryoku teki 
henkaku katei dearu).244  
 
As seen from this statement, Tōbata defines colonization by highlighting its effect. He 
declares it the “creation of a new society” (shin shakai no sōzō), or the “forceful transformation 
of an existing society” (kison shakai no kyōryoku teki henkaku). Using Schumpeter’s vocabulary, 
“creation,” he asserts that colonization gives birth to a new society in the colony, which has been 
seen neither in the motherland nor in the colony before colonization. In particular, the colony is 
depicted as a place where a new mode of economic development is achieved in a sudden and 
innovative way that has not existed in these previous societies. “Forceful transformation,” 
another term used by Tōbata for “creation,” also represents this feature of the colony—economic 
development in a new way, not in a traditional way.  
Before examining the relationship between creation and economic development, I would 
first like to clarify the relationship between creation and forceful transformation. As already 
mentioned in the previous section, Tōbata constructed his colonial theory with two categories of 
modern colonization in mind: colonization of an “uninhabited” land, like the New World in the 
19th century; and that of an existing society in the 20th century, where a number of people already 
lived. In these two different categories of colonization, the motives for colonization also differ. 
He argues that the 19th century type was motivated by overpopulation, and the 20thcentury type 
was motivated by overcapitalization. Thus, in the earlier type the main content of colonization 
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was the movement of labor (people); in the latter type, it is the movement of capital.  
For Tōbata, it is this particular feature of modern colonization that calls for the term 
“forceful transformation.” As he sees it, this term characterizes the colonization in the 20th 
century, in which capital moves from a colonizing nation or nations to an existing nation with a 
significant population, by which the colony is forcefully transformed to become a new society 
despite their reluctance to be changed. By contrast, “creation” refers to 19th century colonization 
which, he claims, had no possibility of causing national conflicts because the colony was an 
“uninhabited” land.245  
In a word, Tōbata used the term, “forceful transformation,” without any intent to critique 
modern colonialism for its reliance on force or violence. It was a substitute for “creation” for him. 
In fact, the word “forceful” (kyōryoku) was used in Japan with a positive meaning similar to 
“bringing about significant change and development in the society.” For example, in 1872, when 
a compulsory elementary education system was about to be established for the first time 
regardless of strong resistance from all levels of people in the country, the Meiji government’s 
official title of the system was “coercive education” (kyōhaku kyōiku).246 In this case the Meiji 
government regarded coercion are necessary to make their people faithful citizens and 
furthermore to ensure national progress. In 1883, Fukuzawa Yukichi passionately argued in his 
bestseller, The Encouragement of Learning, “We support the coercive system (kyōhaku hō), 
because it is very important for Japan at present.” In particular, Fukuzawa believed that the 
coercive educational system was essential for national survival because it could make a strong 
army and a wealthy country, and later his belief was proven true in Japan’s victory in the Sino-
                                           
245 Ibid., 22-23. 
246 The term, “kyōhaku,” can be translated into “compulsory.” It literally means “to press something or someone 
with force.”  
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Japanese War in 1895.247 Likewise, the word “forceful” or “coercive” was favorably used, or 
propagandized, in Japanese society to mean “intensive and extensive change and development 
for individuals as well as for the nation as a whole.” Thus, Tōbata adopts this term without 
implying criticism of the concept of modern colonization. 
Regardless of the differentiation just described, Tōbata views any type of modern colony 
as a “creation.” And this means that he regards the colony as a place where “economic 
development” takes place. The relationship between creation and economic development is 
clearly displayed in the following chart of “economic process” that Tōbata presents based on 
Schumpeter’s economic theory. 
 






As can be seen in this table, Tōbata explains the economic process focusing on three 
different stages of the mentality of an economic actor and his relationship with the economic 
environment. Tōbata argues that the economic actor has no economic rationality in a primitive 
state. In this initial stage, he quenches his thirst by eating fruits and satisfies his hunger by eating 
food he finds as he wanders in mountains and fields. At this time, the economic environment is 
in a state of disorder. As time passes, however, the economic actor comes to have a sense of 
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rationality and thus he begins to calculate and measure his surroundings with a peaceful mind. 
He can adapt to his surroundings through trial and error, and these repetitive efforts produce 
habits and customs, that is, an order or an orientation (Orientierung). At this time, the economic 
surroundings are placed in a state of stability. But when this static state continues for a long time, 
the economic actor feels weariness and wants to break through the status-quo by taking dynamic 
and energetic action. He takes an irrational and creative action that cannot be calculated or 
imagined in the static state of peace and repetition. This “reorientation (Umorientierung),” 
exemplified by the change from handicraft manufacturing to mass production or by the shift 
from individual enterprise to company enterprise, throws the economic environment into a state 
of instability. Traditional methods of production that have been regarded as the best and the most 
appropriate become disturbed by innovative new methods of production. Tōbata argues that 
economic development takes place in this state of instability or disturbance.249 Invoking 
Schumpeter’s notion that “business fluctuation is the essence of the capitalist economy,”250 he 
implicitly argues that the capitalist economy is destined to develop continuously because of its 
intrinsic nature of instability. 
Likewise, Tōbata argues that the economy develops when the creative actor (or 
entrepreneur) takes irrational and creative action (or innovation) that cannot be imagined by the 
static actor, who tends to remain in a stable economic mode.251 In short, in an unstable state such 
as an economic crisis, the economy develops through the entrepreneur’s creation of new 
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Therefore, his definition of colonization—the creation of a new society—can be 
rephrased as “the creation of new combinations” and as “a space where new combinations take 
place and thus the economy develops.” It is noteworthy that Tōbata is asserting here that the 
colony, by its very nature, is a place where economic development is inevitable. To support this 
assertion, in fact, he emphasizes that the colony, from the very moment of being colonized, has 
the nature of “instability,” the main condition in which entrepreneurs make innovations. 
Deploying social analyses of the South-East Asian colonies which were influential at that time, 
John Sydenham Furnivall’s (1878-1960) theory of plural society (fukugō shakairon) and Julius 
Herman Boeke’s (1884-1956) theory of dual economy (nijyū keizairon), alongside 
Schumpeterian economic theory,253 Tōbata explains this “inherent” process of economic 
development in a colony as follows:  
[Before being colonized], an existing society has a low level of economy and its own social 
structure. Tentatively, I call this the unitary society (ichigen teki shakai). This society has its 
own distinctive customs, order, structure, and culture, and is ruled by a value system of its 
own. To speak about economy only, the society has a demand-supply curve that corresponds 
to its given social structure and value system. Its economy has an ability to achieve 
equilibrium as well as economic development for itself. 
As capital is invested from outside [through colonization], however, the society is suddenly 
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put into a capitalist relationship [with the motherland], and new capitalist companies are 
established that make the natives (dochakujin) into laborers. Until yesterday, the natives have 
been subordinates or serfs and have had fruits and wild animals in nature for food. Working 
individually, they had weak consciousness of labor and no sense of saving. They had a supply 
curve of labor different from a capitalist society. But as they become laborers in a capitalist 
company [after being colonized], they serve the so-called plantation agriculture and industry 
in colony. The relationship between labor and capital in the motherland and that between the 
so-called black labor and white capital in the colony are different. In the colony, to facilitate 
collective labor and factory labor, it is necessary to implement forced labor and contract labor 
that often correspond to whipping. Although the capital has come from the motherland due to 
overproduction, it has a totally different world to work in in the colony and precisely at this 
point the secret of “colonial profits (shokuminchi rijun)” is discovered. Somehow, this kind 
of company is established next to the obsolete form of native capital. Likewise, when the old 
economy and the new economy exist in parallel, the plural economy of the colony 
(shokuminchi keizai no nigen teki seishitsu) emerges.254  
 
In this statement, Tōbata clearly shows that he understands colonization as the 
movement of capital from the motherland to the colony, or capital investment. He considers the 
colony as the meeting place of an old economy and a new economy, or in other words, pre-
capitalism and capitalism. To use Schumpeterian terminology, he suggests that this meeting of 
the economy in “murkiness” and the economy in “stability” generates the plural economy in a 
state of “instability,” which becomes the source of “creation.” He concludes that the “plural 
economy” creates colonial profits which can be obtained neither in the old economy in the 
colony nor the new economy in the motherland. In sum, in Tōbata’s colonial theory, the colony 
becomes a new place where a new way of economic growth is created because of the fact that the 
new migrated capital from the motherland coexists with the old native capital. The colony 
becomes the space of “creation” out of the inherent structure of instability of the plural 
economy.255   
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Interestingly, in Tōbata’s theory, no matter how much the instability in colony is 
emphasized, it has no negative effects on the possibility of economic development in the colony. 
Unlike Nitobe and Yanaihara, who separated the social problems in the colony, such as ethnic 
problems, from the economic development in the colony, and even characterized the two as 
conflicting, Tōbata bridges the separation, insisting that the former is the very condition in which 
the latter can take place through the innovative achievements of some individuals. 
In fact, Tōbata mentions that the state of instability in a colony tends to be aggravated by 
social and political factors. “The new colonizers with a different value system and social 
knowledge come in with capital and take the dominant position in the colony. And they live in 
parallel with the natives with their own old value system. The two groups have no sense of 
commonality or connectedness. In the colony, there can be ‘will of all’ but no ‘general [shared] 
will.’ The society can be called the ‘mixed residence of plurality’ (nigensei no zakkyo).”256 He 
also comments that the fragile balance of power among colonizing countries as well as the 
nationalism of colonized countries intensifies the instability in the colony.257 Under the 
Schumpeterian framework, however, Tōbata argues that it is precisely this unstable nature of the 
colony that provides the very ground on which the economy can develop and progress to the next 
level.258  
 In addition, he believes that such instability or disturbance can be calmed through an 
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Worldly Philosophers, 311. 
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able government’s policies. Calling them Datenpolitik (与件政策 yoken seisaku),259 he draws on 
extraordinary police and military systems for examples of such policies and argues that they will 
facilitate economic development by effectively managing the economic conditions of the colony. 
Dividing economic policy into two categories in general—the policy for economic order and the 
policy for economic development (sei chō seisaku), he maintains that Datenpolitik of the former 
constitutes the main part of the economic policy for societies in the beginning stage of a 
capitalist economy. A colony, one of these societies, needs Datenpolitik to make its economic 
development continue for a long duration.260 In short, Tōbata considers colonial problems such 
as national conflicts and social distress in the colony to be manageable, similar to the natural 
conditions of a disobedient nature in tropical regions full of epidemics, where public health and 
hygiene policies produce a more tractable natural order (shizen chian). For him, the 
establishment of public order (chian) in terms of the human world as well as the natural world 
through Datenpolitik is the basic principle for wealth and economic development. Citing Adam 
Smith, Tōbata argues that, even in liberal societies with advanced capitalism, the role of 
government is crucial for establishing the conditions for economic development.261 This idea of 
the necessity of a strong and able government for economic development, when it is applied to 
the relationship between the colony and the metropole, provides a justification for Japan’s 
dictatorship in the service of colonial economic development.  
If it is the colonial government that creates the foundations for economic development 
                                           
259 According to Tōbata’s definition, Datenpolitik stands for the policy to promote the growth of the economy by 
stabilizing the relationship between economic conditions and the economy (yoken to keizai no kankei wo antei), and, 
going further, processing (kakō) actively the conditions. Processing the nature (shizen ni kansuru kakō), the 
establishment of social peace (shakai heiwa), and the maintenance of various systems are examples. See, Tōbata 
Seiichi, “Shokumin Seisaku no Dankai” (1943):11  
260 Tōbata Seiichi, Ibid., 11, 15-17. 
261 Ibid.,11-12.   
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through policy, then who are the entrepreneurs who will push economic development forward 
through innovation? For Tōbata, it is clearly the colonizers who become the entrepreneurs. They 
have vitality, determination, and leadership, and most are from the upper strata of their society. 
Calling them an “unstable population with determination (kakugo) and drive to push outward 
[into the colony] (Drang nach aussen),”262 he argues that they bring to the colony the advanced 
level of technology of their home country, and thereby create something that has never been seen 
either in their home country or in the colony. 
In addition to the colonizers, Tōbata includes the colonial authorities in the category of 
the entrepreneur. While the concept of entrepreneur in Schumpeter’s theory connotes the 
“function of fulfilling innovation” without being associated with any specific “class” or 
“occupation,” Tōbata specifies it as a “mover with a specific form to lead Japanese economy or 
agriculture.” And thus, industrial associations or government can also qualify as entrepreneurs.263  
In his lectures in the 1930s, for example, he often explained that, “government is a risk avoiding 
entrepreneur.”264 The Japanese colonial authority in Choson, he maintained, was an entrepreneur, 
which played an entrepreneurial role in facilitating the Japanese colonizers’ migration to Choson 
and in providing them with such supports as subsidies or low-interest funds.265 
By contrast, he sees no possibility of entrepreneurship in the colonized people. For him, 
they are people with no vitality and a very low level of civilization (mindo), who have no ability 
to develop by themselves. In his description of Choson agriculture written in 1934, for instance, 
he states that Choson landlords, the leaders in the society, have no entrepreneurial talent, desire, 
                                           
262 Tōbata, “Shokumin Genjō no Honshitsu” (1940): 21. 
263 Yasuhiro Ōtomo, “Bukuribū 2: Shinozaki Takao cho, Tōbata Seiichi no Keizai no Shisō,” Kanau, October 2008. 
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264 Yoshio Abe, Sensibility and Management, translated by Robert McIlroy (Tokyo: Diamond Inc., 1990): 176. 
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or ability. He argues that they are interested neither in capitalizing their farm rents nor in 
investing in their agriculture. Moreover, Choson peasants have no consciousness of saving, 
mainly due to the lack of food. In his eyes, the Choson agricultural economy looks stagnant, with 
no possibility of creating modern capitalism on its own. In the end, he concludes that Choson 
necessarily has to be led by Japanese colonizers to develop their economy. Characterizing 
Japanese colonizers as profit-seekers who are willing to take risks in Choson—a “virgin soil” or 
an “unexplored area” or a “new enterprise,” he argues that these colonizers produce economic 
development by combining capital and labor with new methods. They are effective 
“technicians,” he states, who can manage technologies and organizations with scientific 
knowledge to create agricultural development.266  
As an agricultural economist, Tōbata conceptualized colonial theory based on his 
Schumpeterian understanding of economic development. In his view, just as the Showa 
Agricultural Shock was an opportunity for Japan to enhance its economic systems through 
reconstruction, the colony was a site where economic development naturally would occur 
through innovations, precisely out of the state of instability produced by the encounter of two 
different economic and social systems. Furthermore, this concept of the colony as creation was 
expandable to a larger context, empire. Tōbata went on to construct the concept of empire as 
creation, which became the theoretical foundation for the economic component of the Japanese 
wartime policy throughout the Second Sino-Japanese War and the following Pacific War. In the 
next section, I will discuss the process of this transition and expansion of the concept of creation 
in Tōbata’s colonial theory. 
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Empire as Creation: Counter-Colonization 
 
Tōbata emphasized the role of Japanese colonizers in creating the economic 
development of the colony. But he did not see this role as the “white man’s burden.” Rather, he 
defined colonization as a two-way process mutually beneficial to both the metropole and the 
colony. He argued this point with his new coinage, “counter-colonization” (gyaku shokumin).   
The New World was able to create different things, [that is,] a different civilization 
from Europe’s, even though it came out of Europe. We can call this colonization. The 
statement, “Civilization is the result of colonization rather than the cause of 
colonization” (S. de Sismondi), does not fit in this case. In addition, it goes without 
saying that the different civilization in the New World had influences back on its 
motherland even before it became independent. It did so, not through the travels of 
people or capital, but through ideological and institutional products. We can call this 
“counter-colonization.” In the beginning, people established a colony due to domestic 
problems of overpopulation and overcapitalization. However, not only did they 
alleviate these problems, they also transformed themselves in the process of 
encountering life in the colony, due to the effect that the colony had on them in 
reverse. At this stage, the phenomenon of “counter-colonization” must be 
recognized.267 
 
Drawing an example from the relationship between the New World and Britain, Tōbata 
argues in this explanation that the colony also has creative effects on the metropole, just as the 
metropole does on the colony. In other words, just as a new society is created in the colony by 
the impact from the metropole, so a new society emerges in the metropole as a result of the 
impact from the colony. To illustrate this process, he cites Frederick Jackson Turner’s (1861-
1932) frontier thesis, which insisted that the formation of American exceptionalism was based on 
the frontier movement. Turner claimed that the so-called “American” traits such as democracy 
were formed during the Westward movement throughout two centuries and that these traits in 
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turn influenced British society.268 For Tōbata, the metropole was a creation as well as the colony 
was. 
This view has its theoretical roots in Schumpeterian ideas of crisis. Even before 
becoming a colonial theorist, Tōbata insisted in his books, The Rice Economy in Choson 
(1935/1937) and The Process of Development of the Japanese Agriculture (1936), that even 
though Japanese society had suffered serious economic problems like the Showa Agricultural 
Shock since the Great Depression and the Manchurian Incident due to the inflow of cheap rice 
from the colonies,269 it could take advantage of this crisis to spur economic development at 
home. Through the transition to the wartime economy (senji keizai), he argued, Japan could 
make an opportunity out of the crisis to take reformative action to transform its agricultural 
structure.270 For Tōbata, armed with Schumpeter’s economic theory, even the competitive or 
substitutional function (daitaiteki, kyōsōteki yakuwari) of a colony that disturbed the Japanese 
domestic market provided a helpful stimulus for the metropole to develop its economy, beyond 
the complementary function (hosokuteki yakuwari) of the colony in providing Japan with the 
resources it lacked.271 Based on this positive understanding of the “counter-effects” of 
colonization, the term “counter-colonization” was conceptualized to have the meaning of the 
“colony’s economic transformative effects on the motherland (bokoku e no keizai henkaku 
sayō).”272 And as a result, the empire was seen as a space of “mutual creation,” or “mutual 
economic development” between the metropole and the colony.  
                                           
268 Ibid., 33. 
269 Since 1932, due to the rice problem in Japan, the regulation of rice imports from the colonies such as Korea had 
been the main issue in the Japanese government’s rice policy. “Chosen no Nogyō to Nōmin” (1934): 53. 
270 Tōbata Seiichi, “Tōa shin chitsujo no kensetsu niokeru nihon nōgyō,” Nihon Nōgyō Nenkan, November, 1939 
(Tokyo: Fumin Kyōkai)—Cited in Morita, “Tōbata Seiichi no Philippine: ‘Shokumin seisaku gaku’ kara ‘chiiki 
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Later, Tōbata incorporated this initial view of counter-colonization into the wartime 
discourses of Japan in the 1930s and the 1940s when Japan fought two major wars, the Second 
Sino-Japanese War, and the Pacific War against the U.S.A. and its allies. During wartime, the so-
called discourse of the “East Asian Cooperative Community” and its later form, the discourse of 
the “Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere,” developed in a way that emphasized the Japanese 
empire as an organic community of Japan and its colonies, to justify Japan’s wartime 
mobilization of its colonies. And Tōbata’s concept of counter-colonization contributed to those 
discourses as it provided the economic rationale. He expanded the meaning of counter-
colonization to stand for the “Grand Regional Economy,” which conceptualized the Japanese 
empire as an economic entity of mutual cooperation between Japan and the colonies, achieving 
economic development through the “autonomous” development of each state (kokka) within it. 
In this conceptualization, the empire itself became a regional “community” of creation through 
economic development.  
Tōbata arrived at this conceptual transformation of counter-colonization emphasizing the 
communal construction of the empire by revisiting Adam Smith’s colonial thought on the British 
Commonwealth through the mediation of Yanaihara Tadao, who had elaborated on the subject a 
decade earlier. As seen in the previous chapter, Yanaihara interpreted the British Commonwealth 
after WWI as a model for the Japanese empire: a great community via solidarity of politically 
and economically autonomous nations based on common economic interest shared by the 
metropole and the colonies. Yanaihara regarded it as a rational community, not only from the 
point of view of utilitarianism but also from that of social justice, because it demanded 
recognition of each group’s respective personality. Tōbata modifies Yanaihara’s evaluation of 
Smith to emphasize economic unity, only without serious consideration of the political autonomy 
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of the colonies. In this light, he argues that the Japanese empire must establish its economic 
policy by learning from Smith, the best model for understanding the effect of counter-
colonization.  
Tōbata states, “It is important that while people paid attention to only the one-way 
relationship from the metropole to the colony before Smith, Smith, who recognized the effect of 
‘counter-colonization,’ presented a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between the 
metropole and the colony by addressing the problem of the metropole as a problem that included 
the colony” (The emphasis is in the original. shokuminchi o fukumete no honkoku no mondai ga 
mondai to serareta zentaikan ga teiji serareta ten ni aru).273 In his view, Smith was a pioneer 
who viewed the metropole and the colony as one community of mutual economic development, 
going beyond the existing view of colony as merely the object of depredation (ryakudatsu). He 
argues that the economic success of the Imperial Unity (a pejorative term used by the Japanese 
side to designate the British Commonwealth), exemplified by the enormous extension of the 
market of Great Britain, was the result of the Smithian view of colony, which recognized the 
economic development of the metropole through developing the economy of the colony. Praising 
the astonishing level of productive power resulting from the international division of labor within 
the empire, he declares that the Industrial Revolution, the economic transformation in Great 
Britain, was the “best example of taking advantage of the counter-colonization.”274  
By adding Yanaihara’s interpretation of Smith on the relationship between the colony 
and the metropole to his Schumpeterian view of the creative effect of the colony on the 
metropole, Tōbata constructed a vision of empire as an organic community for mutual economic 
development based on the principle of mutual cooperation. As for the reason for creating this 
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organic unity, however, Tōbata differed from his predecessors, Yanaihara and Smith. He located 
that reason in politics rather than the economy.  
 
The Grand Regional Economy 
 
In the early1940s, in the specific context of the war against the U.S. and its allies, 
including Great Britain, Tōbata could not agree with Yanaihara, who had viewed the British 
Commonwealth as an ideal to be pursued by the Japanese empire. Instead, arguing that Japan as 
a “Late Power” should find an alternative way of establishing such an economic community, he 
theorized the concept of the “Grand Regional Economy.” In an article written in 1943, in the 
midst of the Pacific War, he explained the concept, which he had once described as “Late 
Power’s version of the Imperial Unity of Great Britain,”275 as follows:  
The Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere aims to establish Grossraumwirtschaft (kōiki 
keizai, Grand Regional Economy). This term is not exactly from pure economics. The most 
notable situation in the world economy today—particularly since the Ottawa Conference in 
1932 and the Nazi’s principle of reconstruction of Germany— is that unlike in the past, the 
regional boundaries within which the world economy, or international trade, and the 
movement of capital take place have become narrower (kyōiki ka, the emphasis is in the 
original). WWII and the Great East Asian War have forced the national economy of every 
state (kakkoku no kokumin keizai) to narrow such regional boundaries in the context of war, 
and it is clear that the Ottawa Conference was the major reason for this trend of narrowing 
the sphere of the economy (keizai kyōiki ka). The essence of the concept, Grand Regional 
Economy, lies not in problematizing this narrowing of the “Economic Cosmos” (keizai kūkan, 
the author’s original translation) but in attempting to achieve economic development based 
on this recent trend, or even regardless of it. Broadening (kōiki ka) the boundary where a 
unified economic policy is set up and implemented, in other words, is the kernel of the 
concept (the emphases are original).276 
 
According to this statement, the Grand Regional Economy has three general 
characteristics. First, it is necessary for Japan, due to the change in the international political 
                                           
275 Tōbata Seiichi, “Shokumin gainen no yōin,” Kokka gakkai zasshi, vol. 57:7 (1942): 17. Late powers were, he 
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economy caused by the Ottawa Conference in 1932. The change refers to the establishment of 
the bloc economy system initiated by the British Empire. The British Empire announced its 
decision at that the Conference to build the British Commonwealth, affirming the protection of 
free trade within the empire and the vested interest of the existing industries of the empire, 
particularly of the motherland, against other countries outside the empire. This current initiated 
by “an advanced imperial power” brought economic hardship to Japan, a Late Power, 
particularly when, after the Manchurian Incident and the subsequent establishment of 
Manchukuo, its puppet state, it opted for an isolationist policy by withdrawing from the League 
of Nations in 1932. As a result, Japan needed to strive to establish its own Block Economy 
within its empire in order to be independent from the existing international economic system led 
by hostile Western powers. The search became even more desperate after 1937 with the 
beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the ensuing economic sanctions imposed against 
Japan by Western powers. Japan’s “East Asian Cooperative Community” policy emerged out of 
this desperation and lasted until after the start of the Pacific War in 1941, when it was renamed 
the “Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere” policy. The policy’s economic piece, the “Grand 
Regional Economy,” aimed at Japan’s economic development by making its own economic 
block to survive a multi-front war.  
Secondly, Tohata’s statement, quoted above, claims that the Grand Regional Economy is 
necessary not only for Japan but also for its colonies. Referring to the metropole as well as the 
colonies with the term, “every state” (kakkoku), Tōbata implies that Japan and its colonies share 
the same fate; their national independence is in danger in the war, threatened by the exclusive 
economic system of enemy countries. He regards Japan and its colonies as “the have-nots.” 
Invoking the history of colonization of the Asian countries by the Western powers, he 
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emphasizes a shared regional fate in which Japan and its colonies are all at risk of being 
colonized by or becoming semi-colonies of “the haves.”277 Yet, he is effectively silent about 
Japan’s own colonization of Asian countries. By this silence, he asserts the necessity of 
transforming the Japanese empire into an organic regional community that works together to 
develop the economy of all of the member states so that they can survive the war and avoid being 
colonized.  
In other words, the principle of mutual cooperation in the Grand Regional Economy is 
different from the ideal Commonwealth that Smith and Yahaihara imagined. While Smith and 
Yanaihara located that principle in an economic or social tendency of social groups to work 
together for fear that social disruption will affect their self-interest, Tōbata located it in a political 
cause, the sense of a common regional fate.  
This point is developed further in the third characteristic of the Grand Regional 
Economy. Tōbata argues that the Grand Regional Economy is a policy “broadening the boundary 
where a unified economic policy is set up and implemented.” This characteristic of political 
unification of the Grand Regional Economy is reinforced by the concept of the “Leading 
Country” [chūshin kokka 中心国家, chūkaku koku 中核国].278 According to Tōbata, the leading 
country is a developed country which is “energetic but poor” because it has to find the materials 
necessary for becoming a “national defense state” (kokubō kokka) in the world market. As war 
breaks out, it needs to build a regional economy where the division of international labor occurs 
under its own economic policy, so it can acquire all the materials for maintaining its heavy 
industry to win the war. Other countries in the region are in a situation similar to that of the 
leading country, in that they also need a broader economic boundary where they can get all the 
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materials they need to build their own national defense state in wartime. But since they are 
severely weak in terms of population, technology, and organization, they do not have an ability 
to create and strengthen such a regional economy. Instead, they need to follow one stronger 
country that is able to lead them in the creation of a developed economy. Likewise, Tōbata 
conceptualized the Grand Regional Economy as the sphere of national defense for all the 
countries in it, including Japan and its colonies, and theorized Japan’s leading role through the 
appeal to regional fate or crisis.279 
Given these three characteristics of the Grand Regional Economy, there is a certain irony 
in the fact that all countries, which seek their own national political independence, nevertheless 
co-operate with one another under one policy planned by one leading country. Tōbata repeated 
refers to every colony in the Grand Regional Economy as a “country” (kuni, kokka), each its own 
political entity, not a “nation” (minzoku). It is difficult to imagine how such a communal 
international entity could exist in which all countries have their own political autonomy but also 
have to follow one country’s economic policy.  
For this reason, in fact, the concept has been interpreted as mere war-propaganda, as 
have the East Asia Cooperative Community and the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.280 
Indeed, there is a grain of truth in this view. During the period of the Fifteen Years War (1931-
1945), Japan needed to make its new colonies such as Manchukuo and some South East Asian 
countries nominally independent countries in order to colonize them. This was because Northern 
Manchuria, where they established Manchukuo, had been a part of China, and the South East 
Asian countries had been colonies of the Western powers. Therefore, Japan strategically called 
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them “independent countries, which were members of the Grand Regional Economy.” In reality, 
in the Greater East Asia Conference (Dai tō-a kaigi) held in Tokyo for two days from the 5th to 
the 6th of November, 1943, the countries that had recently become Japanese colonies were called 
independent countries with their own political sovereignty: Manchukuo, the Nationalist 
Government of Republic of China in Nanjing, the State of Burma, the Provisional Government 
of Free India, the Second Philippine Republic, and the Kingdom of Thailand.281  
However, I would like to argue that the Grand Regional Economy, beyond mere 
propaganda or even political necessity, was also the result of the logical reasoning of Tōbata 
regarding the economic development of the Late Power’s empire. The Schumpeterian economist 
saw no contradiction in the association between politically independent countries with one 
leading country. Instead, for him, the existence of one leading country, Japan, and a unified 
economic policy designed by it, was a necessity for the economic development of each country 
within the empire. This is because he regarded Japan as an “entrepreneur” and its dictatorship as 
Datenpolitik, the two important preconditions for economic development out of crisis, which he 
extracted from Schumpeter’s economics.      
The war situation in the 1940s brought severe economic hardship to Japan and its 
colonies. Japan, which had depended on the Anglo-American sphere for more than 80% of its 
total oil supply, could not sustain its economy when the United States imposed an oil embargo 
against it in response to the 1941 invasion of southern Indochina. Very soon afterwards, Japan 
instigated the Pacific War and continued its invasion of the Southeast Asian colonies of the 
Western powers, hoping to obtain oil, rubber, and other crucial resources through colonization. 
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This “sudden, massive, and discontinuous”282expansion of the empire aggravated the economic 
crisis in the empire. Yet, for Tōbata, armed with a Schumpeterian viewpoint, this crisis still 
seemed manageable as an opportunity for Japan to create rapid economic development.         
In Tōbata’s view, the sudden expansion of the empire looked like a scene where “oil and 
water were suddenly poured into one jar.” This wartime situation of “heterogeneity” where the 
advanced capitalist system of Japan suddenly met with the pre-capitalist system of the Southeast 
Asian colonies, however, could be the very source of economic development in his 
Schumpeterian theory, only if two preconditions were fulfilled.  First, Japanese colonizers 
needed to play the role of entrepreneur, and, second, the Japanese government had to fulfill the 
entrepreneurial function of Datenpolitik for them. The Datenpolitik was, according to him, a 
device to bring a state of order to the colonies, so that the Japanese entrepreneurs could innovate. 
Tōbata’s examples of Datenpolitik ranged from public health policy and hygiene policy to 
military policy (gunji kōsaku), cultural policy (bunka kōsaku), and thought control.  
In this sense, the leading country with one unified economic policy could become the 
essential component of the Grand Regional Economy, causing no contradiction with the claim 
that it was a regional economic community for mutual economic development among politically 
independent countries. And the Japanese dictatorship, intolerant of any opposition against it in 
the colony, could be justified as Datenpolitik for the rapid economic development required for all 
to survive. The colonies’ national aspirations for self-determination were of no concern in this 
logic. They were regarded as just one among many factors causing the state of crisis, which 
could be managed by effective economic policies.  
There was, however, one problem to be solved in the Grand Regional Economy in order 
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for the Schumpeterian logic of economic development to work. It was that the entrepreneurs, the 
Japanese colonizers, had no capital to invest in the new colonies for innovation during the Pacific 
War. The Japanese government could not perform an entrepreneurial function, such as 
subsidizing them, because of the lack of capital.  
Facing this reality, Tōbata found another theoretical source to supplement his 
Schumpeterian model of economic development for the Japanese empire. This was Friedrich 
List’s (1789-1846) concept, “National System,” with which he argued that each country in the 
Grand Regional Economy had to establish its own self-sufficient national economy, developing 
all areas of industry from light industry to heavy industry, step by step, with balance. List was a 
protectionist against free trade, who argued that a late industrialized country like Germany must 
protect its own infant industries through artificial trade barriers, or otherwise be dominated by 
the early industrialized countries like Britain and France.283 Tōbata, under List’s influence, 
identified the Japanese empire in the 20th century with Germany in the 19th century, regarding 
both of them as late developing countries or “have-nots.” He argued that the Grand Regional 
Economy needed to encourage each country in it to protect its infant industry to construct a 
national system for its own survival.  
This claim of the “National System” in the Grand Regional Economy became a mere 
excuse for the unfair exploitation by Japan of all the resources from its colonies without 
providing them with even daily necessities. This theory, as policy, was implemented as the 
Japanese military moved toward a defensive war in 1943 against rapidly expanding U.S. military 
might and a naval blockade. It was disastrous both for local populations that were cut off from 
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preexisting regional trade and for Japanese soldiers fighting in these places.284   
Tōbata, however, insisted that the National System referred to an alternative model of 
economic development for the sake of each country’s national independence. For example, he 
asserts that while the Imperial Unity subjugates the colony’s economy to the metropole’s 
economy by imposing a “monocultural economy” (tansaku keizai)285, suppressing the production 
of general consumer goods and basic commodities, the Grand Regional Economy helps each 
country build a so-called “self-support” (jikatsu) system, where a comprehensive polycultural 
economy (tasaku keizai) is established.286 Using an analogy, he enlarges upon this point.287  
 
In the Anglo style [Imperial Unity], it is not asked whether a student is in elementary 
school, middle school or college. With all students being put on the same plane, the 
division of labor in studying is established; an elementary school student learns math 
only, a middle school student learns history only, and a college student learns physics 
only. In contrast, we provide our students with a perfect education by teaching them 
all subjects by level, so that all students can learn math, history and physics, 
corresponding to their own respective stages of development. The division of labor is 
established by [the level of difficulty of] content here. In the steel industry, for 
example, there is the division of labor from bicycle manufacturing to car 
manufacturing. The former is done by people in the lower level and the latter is done 
by people in the higher level…… We do not use the division of labor as a specific 
tool to “divide and rule” (bunkatsu tōchi). We provide each country and each region 
(kakuchi kakuiki) with guidance to help all of them make gradual improvement 
through a poly-cultural and comprehensive economy (tasakuteki sōgōteki keizai). In 
other words, our economic structure must be “guidance by location” (tokoro o eta 
shidō), not “divide and rule.”288 
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teikoku); countries (kuni) or guided nations (hi shidōkoku) versus colonies (shokuminchi); region (chiiki) versus 
colonies (shokuminchi) or empire (teikoku). See Tōbata, “Shokumin gainen no yōin” (1942): 15-16. 
288 Tōbata, “Dai tōa keizai kensetsu no kōsō” (1944): 10. 
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Here, Tōbata makes a clear division between (Anglo) Imperial Unity and the Grand 
Regional Economy. While the former is the perpetuation of a dependency system through forcing 
a monocultural colonial economy, he explains, the latter is the establishment of an independent 
self-support system through building a polycultural economy in the colony. He characterizes the 
former as “exploitation” through the system of “divide and rule;” in contrast, he sees the latter as 
“development” through the system of “guidance by location,” which helps each colony 
according to the level and stage of its economy. He asserts that Japan, the leading country, gives 
customized guidance for all members in the community to create balanced development in all 
areas of industry, by which they can develop their own national economy without being 
dependent on the metropole’s economy.  
Here, it becomes clear that the binary rhetoric of colonization, whether colonization was 
“exploitation” of the colony or “development” of the colony, already existed in the 1930s 
through 1945. In fact, it was originally Yanaihara who made this distinction between 
development and exploitation in the nature of colonization, before Tōbata. But unlike Tōbata, 
Yanaihara did so in order to criticize the very nature of colonization, asserting that economic 
development of the colony was inseparably intertwined with exploitation of the colony. 
Yanaihara dreamt of an ideal situation where the metropole and the colony could undergo mutual 
economic development without the former’s exploitation of the latter; in fact, this is the reason 
why he made a binary division between development and exploitation. But he knew that it was 
impossible indeed for the ideal to become a reality; in the end, he appealed to his religious faith 
to envision the realization of his ideal.289  
By contrast, Tōbata was convinced that the ideal of mutual economic development could 
                                           
289 Yanaihara, Shokumin Shokumin oyobi Shokumin Seisaku, YTZ I, 483. 
146 
 
be realized in the present. Appropriating Yanaihara’s separation of development from 
exploitation in the nature of colonization, Tōbata superimposed that binary over a distinction 
between Japan and the West: Japanese colonialism existed for the development of the colony 
while Western colonialism existed for exploitation of the colony. During the Fifteen Years War 
era, to take a stand against the Western powers after the Manchurian Incident, Japan needed to 
distinguish the nature of their own colonization from that of Western colonization. As a result, 
Tōbata reconceptualized Japanese colonization as mutual development while criticizing Western 
colonization as development of the metropole only. In this way, Yanaihara’s original Smithian 
vision of “colonization as regional economic development without exploitation” was 
reinterpreted by Tōbata as exclusively Japanese in the 1930s and 1940s wartime Japan. While 
Yanaihara conceived the binary framework of development or exploitation for criticizing the 
contemporary trend of colonization, which was the fusion of development and exploitation, 
Tōbata used it for supporting wartime propaganda, which claimed the Japanese empire as serving 
development for the colonized and the British empire as creating exploitation of the colonized. 
Now, the binary framework was employed to disguise the fact that Japan needed to develop and 
exploit its colonies to mobilize every resource from them to expand its sphere of power and 
influence during the war. 
In sum, it can be said that Tōbata’s advocacy for a “Grand Regional Economy” based on 
a self-supporting national system became mere war propaganda. In other words, Tōbata created a 
discursive rationale for extracting maximal resources from Japan’s colonies and occupied areas 
while investing nothing in the basic commodities necessary to sustain the lives of the people 
living there. This exploitation was pursued on the basis of Tōbata’s theory of economic 
development for the late developing country, which aimed at “economic development without 
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exploitation.” After the Japanese empire ended, his theory became the logical foundation for 
Japan’s economic support project for the developing countries of Asia. In the final section of this 




After 1945, when the Japanese empire collapsed, Colonial Policy Studies was abolished. 
But beginning in 1952, the academic tradition could continue, as Yanaihara became the first chair 
of the Department of International Relations at the University of Tokyo.290 Tōbata as well, after 
retiring from the Department of Agriculture at Tokyo University in 1959, actively engaged with 
the Japanese government’s foreign development assistance program, taking charge as the first 
director of the Institute of Developing Economies (Ajia keizai kenkyūjo), part of the Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan.291  
Regarding the aim of the Japanese government’s foreign development assistance, he 
expressed his idea in 1963 in “Various Issues Facing Asian Countries” (Ajia shokoku no sho 
mondai). Pointing out that there had been two characteristics of colonial management 
(shokuminchi keiei), “exploitation” (sakushu) and “development” (kaitaku or kaihatsu), he stated 
that Japan’s contemporary economic assistance for developing countries in Asia was aiming at 
“development,” unlike colonialism which was “exploitative” in nature. In other words, Tōbata 
seems to believe that his ideal of a “regional community for economic development without 
exploitation”—an ideal impossible to realize under wartime conditions—could now be achieved 
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in the post-1945 era of decolonization. In all likelihood, he envisioned Japan’s postwar foreign 
assistance program as another version of the Grand Regional Economy system, this time without 
exploitation. 
 Before discussing the legacy of the Grand Regional Economy in postwar Japan’s foreign 
economic assistance program for the Asia-Pacific region, I would like briefly to explain the 
origins of the program. After the Japanese empire collapsed in 1945, mostly due to the defeat in 
the Pacific War, Japan went through democratization and demilitarization mandated by the 
American occupation. But after the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were announced in 
1947, the Cold War intensified in the Asia-Pacific region; the so-called “reverse course,” which 
firstly took shape in 1948, was enacted more extensively in occupation policy toward Japan. 
Now the U.S. focused its efforts on making Japan its major ally in East Asia to contain 
communist China and the U.S.S.R., by reviving Japan’s military and economic powers. The first 
step in these containment efforts was to make Japan an “independent” state in international 
politics. At the San Francisco Peace Conference of September 1951, the end of the American 
occupation of Japan was declared. Also, in the conference, a question of reparations by Japan to 
its former colonies were discussed. Since the U.S. wanted the rapid recovery of its new ally, 
whose economy had been devastated by the wars, they limited reparations to the export of 
Japanese manufactured products using the resources of the Asian recipients of compensation 
(ekimu hoshō), which was also helpful to Japan’s economic recovery.292 In this way, Japanese 
economic assistance to developing nations in the Asia-Pacific region was actively conducted in 
the postwar era as a part of the U.S. plan to consolidate the “free” world in that region in the 
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midst of the Cold War.  
 Then, what legacies of the Grand Regional Economy can we find in postwar Japan’s 
foreign economic assistance program? I would like to address two aspects of this question. First, 
in the postwar period, the Grand Regional Economy evolved into what is commonly referred to 
as modernization theory.293 As seen in this chapter, the Grand Regional Economy was 
constructed as a model of regional community among developing countries for economic 
development, which was claimed to be necessary for their national survival in the arena of 
imperial powers’ struggle to acquire more colonies. This rhetoric of imminent danger to their 
independence continued to exist in the postwar, but at this time the visible enemy was a different 
one. While the Grand Regional Economy had claimed that nations must make rapid economic 
development to deal with the imperialist enemy, the postwar assistance program did so by 
emphasizing the threat from the Communist enemy. According to the rhetoric, the threat could be 
prevented by reaching the “norm” of economic development.294   
 In this view, the norm meant the American style of capitalist development, and Japan 
was accepted as the best example of achieving that norm for the first time in Asia, as evidenced 
at the three-day Hakone Conference in 1960 in which thirty-one eminent Japanese Studies 
scholars, including John W. Hall and Edwin O. Reischauer, discussed the modernization of 
Japan.295 Just as the Grand Regional Economy advocated Japan’s leadership for developing 
countries in the regional economic bloc to reach the desirable level of economic development, 
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the level achieved by Japan, the postwar economic assistance program aimed at the developing 
countries of the Asia-Pacific region reaching the norm of economic development with Japan’s 
help.  
 In the Grand Regional Economy policy, however, Japan’s leadership turned out to be 
another name for Japan’s dictatorship, a dictatorship justified as necessary for rapid economic 
development. As seen in this chapter, Tōbata argued that the so-called Datenpolitik (yoken 
seisaku)—policies aimed at installing a new economic order by effectively controlling any 
instability in society by recourse to extraordinary policing and military measures—was required 
to facilitate the policy of economic development. For him, Datenpolitik was a necessity to enable 
Japanese colonizers to make innovations in the colony, and the Japanese government with an 
entrepreneurial function needed to implement it in order to encourage the entrepreneurial 
creation.  
 This point leads to the second legacy of the Grand Regional Economy policy. I argue 
that it evolved into a developmental dictatorship policy (kaihatsu dokusai seisaku)296 in 
developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region in the postwar era, where the idea of rapid 
economic development through Datenpolitik was reproduced. For instance, during the Park 
Chung-hee regime in the 1960s and 1970s, Korea achieved rapid economic development through 
harsh political, socio-economic and cultural oppression. Japan and the U.S., the most favorable 
allies of the Park regime, ignored its anti-democratic policies. Rather, it seems that they regarded 
Park’s dictatorship as useful for establishing a relationship of peace and cooperation in the “free” 
world and, in particular, in the Asia-Pacific region. For example, in the midst of nation-wide anti-
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Japanese protests in Korea in 1964, when the issue of Japanese reparations to Korea for its 
colonial occupation was hastily closed on condition that Japan give Korea economic assistance 
through supplies, civil engineering and funds, Park’s regime quelled the protests with police and 
military power.297 That is, in the postwar democratic era, the responsibility for carrying out 
Datenpolitik seemed to be transferred from the Japanese government in the Grand Regional 
Economy to each nation’s government. Therefore, it can be argued that an idea of the regional 
community for rapid economic development for developing countries, relying on a leading 
nation and Datenpolitik, continued into the postcolonial period. 
 In sum, Tōbata’s colonial theory of the Grand Regional Economy was reproduced in the 
postwar era through Japan’s foreign economic assistance program. Although Tōbata claimed to 
aspire the “establishment of regional community for economic development without 
exploitation,” his developmentalist vision could not reach this goal because he had never given 
an adequate consideration to the inseparability of development and exploitation. 
 
                                           





In the preceding chapters, I have explored Japanese Colonial Policy Studies, focusing on 
the theories and ideas of its three theoretical protagonists. It was an academic discipline as well 
as an influential discursive set whose primary objective and function were to legitimate Japanese 
Empire in the early half of the 20th century. It created the image of colonization as development 
without exploitation for the benefits of all humanity, under the internationalist and “modernist” 
belief that the spread of modernization through colonization would bring every nation in the 
empire freedom, equality, and prosperity. From the beginning of the Japanese empire to its end in 
1945, this discourse set was formed, developed, and spread in the name of “science.” Starting 
from the science of agriculture at Sapporo Agricultural College in Hokkaido, Colonial Policy 
Studies was soon integrated into economics centering on the international economy, and then 
evolved to a sort of area studies on Asia. Using “scientific and practical” research relying on 
various international systems of knowledge in the human and social sciences, including Social 
Darwinism, Comtian biology, and the economic ideas of Smith, Marx, Schumpeter, and List, 
Nitobe Inazo, Yanaihara Tadao, and Tōbata Seiichi defined colonialism as an encounter between 
different national, social, or economic groups, and claimed it would bring development to all the 
interested sides. In the 1910s, the founder, Nitobe Inazo, theorized colonization, mostly 
expressed in the form of national territorial expansion, as a natural phenomenon in which all 
humanity would cooperate with each other to reach the status of the utmost human 
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development—a perfect harmony among nature, humans, and God. To him, colonization was a 
natural stream conveying civilization from the metropole to the colonies. Yanaihara Tadao, who 
was active in the liberalist mood of the 1920s, largely adopted his mentor’s pro-modernization 
perspective. Criticizing the national aspects of colonization, however, he redefined the concept. 
To Yanaihara, such aspects as the metropole’s territorial expansion, its economic exploitation, 
and the consequent political conflicts did not represent the “natural” elements of colonization; 
they were distorted expressions of colonization in the age of imperialism. Taking a stance against 
such imperialism, a fusion of development and exploitation, he dreamt of colonization as 
development without exploitation. In this vein, he defined colonization as a social phenomenon 
in which different social groups interacted, and he imagined the ideal of empire as an economic 
cooperative community among independent nations with the principle of mutual aid. In 
Yanaihara’s view, colonization could serve as a tool for worldwide modernization through 
international division of labor, which would create emancipatory effects for ordinary people and 
nations.  
Even though it was true that Yanaihara was a genuine “anti-imperialist” humanist, his 
theory nevertheless played a critical instrumental role in supporting Japanese militarist 
imperialism in the later years because of its main pro-modernization tenet. During the wartime in 
the late 1930s and early 1940s, employing Yanaihara’s Smithian colonial theory, Tōbata was able 
to theorize the Japanese empire as a cooperative organic community among late developing 
independent nations for the purpose of rapid economic development. He defined colonization as 
an economic phenomenon in which different economic systems, particularly, pre-capitalist and 
capitalist ones, met and fostered entrepreneurial innovations. National conflicts within the 
empire, according to this Schumpeterian, represented a crucial part of economic development; 
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they created a state of “disorder” where innovations took place. The theorist of the economic 
policy of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity utilized Yanaihara’s two key concepts in an 
interesting way; he characterized Japanese empire as an entity where development happened, 
while the British Empire was a space of colonial exploitation. 
Colonial Policy Studies’ imagination of colonization as development without 
exploitation based on pro-modernization ideas has left imprints on postwar Japan and its 
neighboring countries in Asia, its former colonies. To close this examination of its development 
in the hands of its three main protagonists, I would like to address the three legacies of the 
discipline. First, as already mentioned in Chapter 3, it became a theoretical basis of Japanese 
international relations in the post-WWII era. Colonial Policy Studies, already abolished in 1945 
at the demise of the Japanese empire, actually revived in 1952 with the new name of 
International Relations Studies. At this time, the academic tradition of Colonial Policy Studies 
based on international economics became a platform on which the Japanese government’s 
foreign development assistance program was conceived and implemented. The key rhetoric of 
Colonial Policy Studies, “colonization is development for all,” continued to be influential in 
Japanese foreign policy making, as seen in the reenactment of Tōbata’s theoretical formulation in 
the period of the Cold War, when modernization theory wielded its power to claim the Japanese 
model of economic development as the norm for other Asian countries in the “free” world. This 
usage was a discursive strategy to consolidate the “security” and “solidarity” within that camp. 
The economic policy of the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere evolved into a developmental 
dictatorship policy (kaihatsu dokusai seisaku 開発独裁政策) in developing countries in the Asia-
Pacific region in the postwar era, where the idea of rapid economic development through 
Datenpolitik was extensively reproduced. The Park regime’s model of economic development in 
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the 1960s and 1970s in South Korea, which achieved rapid economic development through hard 
line policies and Japanese aid, was a typical example showing the legacy of Colonial Policy 
Studies in Japanese international relations.  
Secondly, in a broader sense, Colonial Policy Studies has had an impact on the 
development of area studies as an academic field. As mentioned above, during the wartime 
period in the 1930s and early 1940s, Colonial Policy Studies was enlarged to become an 
interdisciplinary area studies program on Asian countries, which incorporated ethnography, 
anthropology, history, linguistics, and medicine. Not only formal colonies such as Korea and 
Taiwan, but regions within the Japanese sphere of interest including Manchuria, China, and 
Southeast Asian countries became the objects of its “scientific” research. As Yanaihara pointed 
out in a survey he wrote in 1951 of the genealogy of international economics (which later 
became International Relations Studies), area studies around the time of the Second Sino-
Japanese War presented a “magnificent sight” (ikan), in which various universities and research 
institutions, such as the South Manchurian Railway Research Department (Mantetsu chōsabu), 
the East Asia Research Institute (Tōa kenkyūjo), and the Pacific Association (Taiheiyō kyōkai) 
produced a great number of systematic studies on the Asian region.298 Colonial Policy Studies 
played a key role in creating the boom of Asian area studies in the interwar period which later 
contributed a great deal to shaping Japan’s ideas of international relations and foreign countries 
in Asia in the second half of the twentieth century and after.  
Lastly, Colonial Policy Studies has a postwar legacy in that it has shaped one of the most 
important postwar academic debates in Asian countries, especially in the former Japanese 
colonies: an argument on the nature of Japanese colonial rule and its impact on their 
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modernization. It has done so by providing main terms and frameworks within which the debate 
has been conducted. The discursive set of colonialism based on internationalist pro-
modernization ideas produced a binary imagination of colonization as “either development or 
exploitation,” during wartime Japan. In the postcolonial period, “development” and 
“exploitation” respectively became the key words for each side of the debate, as was witnessed, 
particularly, in Korean scholarly circles in the late twentieth and the early twenty-first centuries. 
Discussions between the so-called perspective of exploitation (sut’alron 収奪論) and the 
perspective of colonial modernization (singminji kŭndaehwaron 植民地近代化論) have often 
escalated into very heated and even political exchanges in which each “camp” has been 
supported by contending political groups in Korea. However heated their debate has been, both 
sides are locked in the framework created in the colonial period by a discourse set whose primary 
goal was to legitimize the Japanese colonial rule, namely, Colonial Policy Studies. In actual fact, 
some participants in the debate suggested deconstructing the framework of “development or 
exploitation,”299 but they simply presupposed that this binary scheme had largely originated in 
modernization theory in the 1960s and 1970s. Consequently, their specific strategy tended to 
come down to critically rethinking the Cold War “modernist” perspective. However, in the 
context of East Asian history, such “modernist” ideas could be traced back to the Japanese 
colonial period, as my dissertation has showed. The binary framework that still exists is, indeed, 
a colonial product, creature, and vestige of the theories and discourse of the three principle 
architects of Japanese Colonial Policy Studies, Nitobe Inazō, Yanaihara Tadao, and Tōbata 
Seiichi.
                                           




A Chronology of Japanese colonialism 
 
Year Lives of Nitobe, Yanaihara, and Tobata Events in Japan and the World 
1862 Nitobe was born in Morioka, Nanbu domain.  
1868  Meiji Restoration 
1875  Agricultural settlement programs 
(1875-1904) were implemented 
by Japanese government in 
Hokkaido. 
1876  Sapporo Agricultural College 
(Sapporo Nōgakō) was 
established in Hokkaido by the 
Hokkaido Colonization Office of 
the Meiji government. 
1877 Nitobe entered Sapporo Agricultural College.  
1878 Nitobe was baptized to become Christian.  
1879  Ryūkyū Islands were annexed by 
Japan. 
1881 Nitobe graduated from Sapporo Agricultural College 
and worked at the Hokkaido Colonization Office and the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. 
 
1882  Hokkaidō was officially 
incorporated into Japan proper. 
1884 Nitobe went to the U.S. and studied economics and 
politics at Johns Hopkins University. 
 
1887 -Nitobe was appointed as an assistant professor of 
Agriculture in Sapporo Agricultural College. 
-Nitobe went to Germany and studied economics and 
agricultural economics at the Univ. of Bonn, Univ. of 
A class, “Agricultural Policy and 
Colonial Policy (nōseigaku oyobi 
shokuminsaku)” began to be 
listed on the curriculum of 
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Berlin, Univ. of Halle. Sapporo Agricultural College but 
could not be taught because of 
the lack of lecturer.  
1890  “Agricultural Policy and Colonial 
Policy” began to be taught for 
the first time by Satō Shōsuke, 
who changed its name into 
“Colonial History (shokuminshi).” 
1891 -Nitobe married Mary P. Elkinton and returned to Japan.  
-Nitobe began teaching colonial history at Sapporo 
Agricultural College. 
 
1893 Yanaihara was born in Ehime prefecture.  
1895  -First Sino-Japanese War broke 
out, and China defeated. 
-Japan acquired Taiwan from 
China.  
1897 Nitobe stopped teaching and went to the U.S. to receive 
medical treatment. 
 
1899 Tobata was born in Mie prefecture.  
1900 Nitobe’s Bushido was published in America and Japan.  
1901 Nitobe was appointed to be the head of the Sugar 
Industry Bureau of the Japanese colonial government in 
Taiwan. 
 
1903 -Nitobe was appointed as an affiliated professor to 
teach colonial policy studies at Kyoto Imperial University.  
-Nitobe stopped working at the Japanese colonial 
government in Taiwn and returned to Japan. 
 
1904 Nitobe became a professor at Kyoto Imperial University.  Russo-Japanese War broke out. 
1905 -Bushido, 10th revised and enlarged edition was 
published in New York and London.  
-Nitobe was invited to the Imperial Palace and met 
Emperor Meiji.  
-Nitobe stopped working at Kyoto Imperial University. 
-Japan won the Russo-Japanese 
War and acquired Karafuto and 
the Kwangtung Leased Territory. 
-Japan made Korea a 
protectorate. 
1906 -Nitobe became headmaster at the First Higher School 
(Tokyo Dai’ichi Gakkō) in Tokyo. 




policy studies in the Faculty of Agriculture at Tokyo 
Imperial University. 
-Nitobe had an inspection tour of Korea. 
1907  Colonial Studies (Shokumin’gaku) 
was established in the Faculty of 
Agriculture at Hokkaido Imperial 
University. 
1908  Gentleman’s Agreement was 
concluded between President 
Theodore Roosevelt and Prime 
Minister Saionji, by which the 
Japanese government to limit 
drastically the flow of emigrants 
to the United States. 
1909 Nitobe became the first chair of the Colonial Policy 
Studies, Tokyo Imperial University. 
Colonial Policy Studies was 
established in the Faculty of Law 
at Tokyo Imperial University. 
1910 -Yanaihara entered the First Higher School and met the 
principal Nitobe.  
-Nitobe established the Association of Colonial Studies 
(shokumin’gakkai).  
Japan officially annexed Korea. 
1911 Nitobe went to America as the first exchange professor 
of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace. 
 
1913 Yanaihara entered the Faculty of Law, Tokyo Imperial 
University. 
 
1914  -WWI broke out. 
-Japan occupied the South Sea 
Islands as a member of League 
of Nations.  
1917 Yanaihara entered the Sumitomo business conglomerate 
and worked for the copper mining sector at Besshi, 
Ehime prefecture. 
Russian Revolution broke out. 
1918  WWI ended. 
1919  -Peace Conference was held in 
Versailles, and President 
Woodrow Wilson presented 
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Fourteen Points with the 
principle of self-determination of 
colonies.  
-Anti-Japanese Korean 
Independence movement, the 
March First Movement, broke 
out. 
-Anti-imperialist May Fourth 
movement in China broke out. 
1920 -Nitobe was appointed as an Under Secretary-General at 
the League of Nations. 
-Yanaihara was appointed as an assistant professor at 
the Faculty of Economics, Tokyo Imperial University and 
started research abroad (mainly England, France and the 
U.S). 
 
1923 Yanaihara returned to Japan and was appointed as the 
chair of Colonial Policy Studies, Tokyo Imperial 
University.  
 
1924 Tobata was appointed as an assistant professor at the 
Faculty of Agriculture, Tokyo Imperial University. 
Immigration Act was 
promulgated in the U.S. to 
prohibit Japanese immigration 
entirely. 
1925 Yanaihara published “Adamu Sumisu no shokuminchi 
ron” and had debates with Yamamoto Miono about 
Adam Smith’s economics and colonial theory. 
 
1926 -Yanaihara published Shokumin oyobi Shokumin Seisaku 
(Colonization and Colonial Policy). 
-Tobata studied abroad (mainly Germany and America). 
 
1927 -Yanaihara had a research trip to Taiwan. 
-Yanaihara published Shokumin Seisaku no Shinkichō 
(The New Foundations of Colonial Policy). 
-Nitobe stopped working at the League of Nations and 
began working for the Institute of Pacific Relations as 
the Japanese chairman. 
 





1929 -Tobata returned to Japan.  
-Yanaihara published Teikokushugi-ka no Taiwan (Taiwan 
under Imperialism). 
Great Depression began in the 
U.S. 
1930  Show Agricultural Shock began 
in Japan. 
1931  Manchurian Incident broke out. 
1932 -Yanaihara had a research trip to Manchuria. 
-Nitobe defended the Manchurian Incident during the 
lecture tour in the U.S. and Canada.  
Japan established Manchukuo, a 
puppet state in Manchuria. 
1933 -Nitobe died in Canada. 
-Yanaihara published Marukusshugi to Kirisutokyō 
(Marxism and Christianity). 
-Yanaiahra had his 1st research trip to the South Pacific 
islands.  
 
1934 -Tobata had an inspection trip to Korea and published 
his report “Chosen no Nogyō to Nōmin” (The Agriculture 
and Farmers in Choson).  
-Yanaihara published Manshū Mondai (The Manchurian 
Question). 
-Yanaihara had his 2nd research trip to the South Pacific 
islands. 
 
1935 -Tobata published Chosen beikoku keizairon (The Rice 
Economy in Choson). 
-Yanaihara published Nan’yō Guntō no Kenkyū (Research 
in South Pacific Islands). 
 
1936 -Tōbata published Nihon nōgyō no tenkai katei (The 
Process of Development of the Japanese Agriculture). 
-Tobata became a member of Showa Kenkyūkai (Showa 
Research Association). 
 
1937 -Tōbata Seiichi and Nakamura Ichirō published Keizai 
hatten no riron (The Theory of Economic Development), 
a translation of Joseph Schumpeter’s Theorie der 
wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Development.  
-Yanaihara published Teikokushugi-ka no Indo (India 
under Imperialism). 
-Yanaihara left Tokyo Imperial University. 
-Second Sino-Japanese War 
broke out. 




1938  Japan colonized French 
Indochina. 
1939 Tobata was appointed as the chair of Colonial Policy 
Studies while continuing to hold his professorship in the 
Faculty of Agriculture. 
Japan colonized Borneo, Malaya 
the Dutch East Indies and Burma. 
1940 Tobata published “Shokumin Genjō no Honshitsu” (The 
Substance of Colonization). 
Japan colonized Manchukuo and 
the Philippines. 
1941  Pacific War broke out. 
1942 Tōbata published “Shokumin gainen no yōin” (The 
Elements of the Concept of Colonization). 
 
1943 -Tobata went to the Philippines as a member of the 
Philippines Investigation Committee (hitō chōsa iinkai). 
-Tōbata published “Shokumin Seisaku no Dankai” (The 
Stages of the Colonial Policy) and “Gyaku Shokumin” 
(Counter-Colonization). 
-Yanaihara published Nitobe Inazō Hakase 
Shokuminseisaku Kōgi oyobi Ronbunshū, a collection of 
Nitobe’s lectures from 1912 to 1917, reconstruced based 
on the class notes by Nitobe’s students—Ōuchi Hyōe 
(1912-1913), Takagi Yasaki (1914-1915), and Yanaihara 
Tadao (1916-1917). 
Greater East Asia Conference (Dai 
tō-a kaigi) was held in Tokyo. 
1944 Tōbata published “Dai tōa keizai kensetsu no kōsō” (A 
Plan for the Construction of the Great East Asian 
Economy), “Hitōjin no Keizai ishiki (1) and (2)” (Economic 
Consciousness of the Philippines). 
 
1945 Yanaihara returned to Tokyo University. -WWII ended as Japan defeated 
the Pacific War, and the Japanese 
empire collapsed.  
-The U.S. occupation of Japan 
began. 
-Colonial Policy Studies was 
abolished. 
1946 -Yanaihara was appointed as the dean of the Social 
Science Institute, Tokyo University.  
-Tobata refused Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s offer to 
be the Minister of Agriculture. 




1948  Cold War began in Europe. 
1949 Yanaihara was appointed as the dean of the College of 
Arts and Science, Tokyo University. 
 
1950  Korean War broke out. 
1951 -Yanaihara was appointed as the president of Tokyo 
University. 
-Yanaihara published a translation of J. A. Hobson’s 
Imperialism. 
-San Francisco Peace Conference 
was held. 
-U.S. occupation of Japan ended. 
-Japan’s reparations to Asian 
countries for its colonial 
occupation began. 
1952 Yanaihara established International Relations Studies in 
the Social Science Institute, Tokyo University.  
 
1953 Tobata went to the Philippines as a member of the 
Reparations Committee of Japan (baishō zenkendan). 
 
1959 -Tobata retired from Tokyo University. 
-Tobata became the first director of the National 
Research Institute of Agricultural Economics (Nōgyō sōgō 
kenkyūjo) established by the Ministry of Agriculture, and 
the first director of the Institute of Developing 
Economies (Ajia keizai kenkyūjo), a support institution 
for the Official Development Assistance (ODA). 
 
1961 -Tobata drafted the Basic Law of Agriculture. 
-Yanaihara died of stomach cancer.  
Park Chung-hee rose to power 
through a military coup in Korea. 
1963 Yanaihara Tadao Zenshū began to be published. Park Chung-hee officially became 
president of Korea.  
1964  -Treaty on Basic Relations was 
signed between Japan and Korea 
to close the issue of Japanese 
reparations to Korea 
-Nation-wide student protests 
against the treaty were quelled 
by Park regime. 
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l'humanité, 4 vols., 1851-1854], Eng. Trans., Edward Spencer Beesly (New York: Lenox 
Hill, Burt Franklin, 1973). 
 
Conrad, Sebastian, “‘The Colonial Ties aer Liquidated’: Modernization Theory, Post-war Japan  
and the Global Cold War,” Past and Present (2012), 216(1). 
 
Conroy, Hilary, The Japanese Seizure of Korea: 1868-1910: A Study of Realism and Idealism in  
International Relations (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960). 
 
Cronon, William, Changes in the Land (NY: Hill and Wang, 2003). 
 
Cullather, Nick, The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia  
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013). 
 
Cumings, Bruce, “Archaeology, Descent, Emergence: American Mythology and East Asian  
Reality,” in Parallax Visions: Making Sense of American-East Asian Relations at the 
End of the Century (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999). 
 
Dahms, F. Harry, “From Creative Action to the Social Rationalization of the Economy: Joseph A.  




Duara, Prasenjit. “Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty: China, 1900-1945.”  
American Historical Review 102, no. 4 (1997). 
 
———, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern (Lanham,  
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 
 
Dudden, Alexis, The Japanese Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power (Honolulu:  
University of Hawaii Press, 2005).  
 
Duus, Peter, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895- 
1910 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). 
 
Duus, Peter, Ramon H. Myers and Mark Peattie eds., The Japanese Informal Empire in China,  
1895-1937 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 
 
——— eds, The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,   
1996). 
 
Eckert, J. Carter, Offspring of Empire: the Koch'ang Kims And the Colonial Origins of Korean  
Capitalism, 1876-1945 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991). 
 
Ekbladh, David, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an  
American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
 
Em, Henry, “Minjok as a Modern and Democratic Construct: Sin Ch’aeho’s Historiography,” in  
Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., Colonial Modernity in Korea (Cambridge,  
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
 
Fukushima Shingo, “Meiji-ki ni okeru shokumin-shugi no keisei,” Shisō (1967).  
 
Furnivall, J. S., Ran’in Keizaishi [Netherlands India: A Study in Plural Economy, 1939], Trans.,  
Minami Taiheiyō Kenkyūkai (Tokyo: Jitsugyō no Nihonsha, 1942). 
 
———, Biruma no Keizai [An introduction to the political economy of Burma], Trans., Tōa  
Kekyūjō (Tokyo: Tōa Kekyūjō, 1942). 
 
———, Nanbō Tōchi Seisaku Shiron [Progress and Welfare in Southeast Asia] (Tokyo:  
Yagi Shoten, 1943). 
 
Gluck, Carol, Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton: Princeton  
University Press, 1985). 
 
Gregor, J. A, Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship (Princeton, N.J: Princeton  




Harootunian, Harry, Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in  
Interwar Japan (Princeton: Princeton, 2000). 
 
Heilbroner, L. Robert, The Worldly Philosophers: the Lives, Times, And Ideas of the Great  
Economic Thinkers, 5th ed., (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980). 
 
Hevia, L. James, English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-century China  
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). 
 
Hirase Tetsuya, “Nitobe Inazō no Shokumin Shisō,” Tōkyō Joshi Daigaku Fusoku Hikaku Bunka  
Kenkyū Kiyō 47 (1986). 
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